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USS Little Rock (CG 4) as flagship,
mobilized in the eastern Mediterranean
during that year’s Arab-Israeli war, also
known as the Yom Kippur War. A Soviet
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of Naval Operations Admiral Elmo R.
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potential for provocation. In “The
Transformation of the Israel Defense
Forces,” Avi Jager traces the challenges
and fortunes of the Israel Defense Forces
following the 1973 conflict, especially
with regard to low-intensity conflict
with nonstate actors, and discusses the
changes made to its various branches,
units, and armaments to operate better
in the modern environment.
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FROM THE EDITORS
The geostrategic picture in the Middle East has been transformed fundamentally
over the last several years by the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab
world, midwifed by the Trump administration in a series of unexpected diplomatic coups. The ramifications of these developments have only begun to play
themselves out and to be assessed adequately by observers. Surprisingly little
attention seems to have been paid to their impact on the Israeli military. In “The
Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces,” Avi Jager provides a concise but
comprehensive account of the significant changes that have occurred throughout
the IDF in recent years, one informed by authoritative, high-level sources within
Israel. These changes include major reductions in the conventional arms, particularly infantry and armor, and increased emphasis on unconventional forces
and cyber; they reflect a conviction that in the future the threat the nation likely
will face no longer will come from states but rather from irregular organizations such as Hamas. And, perhaps most importantly, they signal a shift from
the long-standing Israeli preference for offense and preemption toward a more
defensive orientation. Jager makes clear, however, that there are voices in Israel
that question the wisdom of such a shift. Avi Jager is a reserve officer in the IDF
special forces.
The eastern Mediterranean as an arena of sea-power competition has been
lost from view since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet in its aftermath. Times are changing. It recently was announced that,
for the first time in forty years, an American naval vessel will be based at Souda
Bay in Crete. Greece and Turkey are at odds over territorial maritime claims,
and the discovery of enormous natural gas deposits in the waters off Cyprus in
recent years has opened up a complex face-off among Turkey, Greece, Cyprus,
and Israel. In this context, the question of Israel’s relation to the sea takes on
major strategic significance. In “Cultural Challenges for Israeli Sea Power in
the Eastern Mediterranean,” Samuel Helfont provides a fascinating overview
of the State of Israel’s cultural attitudes toward the sea, as limited by its deeply
felt connection with the “Land of Israel.” He argues that Israel has yet to make
the fundamental cultural turn toward its clearly ordained strategic maritime
future. Samuel Helfont is a Naval War College professor teaching at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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The centrality of culture in developing a state’s maritime orientation is also
the theme of Andrew Rhodes’s “The 1988 Blues: Admirals, Activists, and the
Development of the Chinese Maritime Identity.” Rhodes points to 1988 as a decisive year in the turn to the sea of the People’s Republic of China, witnessing as it
did two unrelated but important developments: the airing on Chinese television
of the six-part documentary River Elegy, which became wildly popular, and the
beginning of the PRC’s commercial and military expansion into the South China
Sea. Strikingly, the young filmmakers who produced the series were prodemocracy activists who fled the country after the Tiananmen massacre of the following
year, while not all members of the Chinese leadership at the time were happy with
the criticisms the documentary had expressed over the country’s past neglect of
its maritime frontier. Andrew Rhodes is a professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.
To grasp the full magnitude of the maritime challenge posed by the People’s
Republic of China to the United States and its allies, it is essential to look beyond
the purely naval dimension. In “The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While
America Turns Its Back: How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime
Industry, and the Implications for the World,” Christopher J. McMahon issues a
stark warning about the consequences of the U.S. government’s continuing virtual abandonment of the commercial maritime industry. The Chinese have made
no secret of their ambition to dominate this industry with regard to commercial
shipbuilding as well as infrastructure construction around the world (the socalled Belt and Road Initiative), and they are well on their way to doing so—the
number of large private corporations in this business continues to shrink at an
alarming rate. The consequences are not merely economic but also political and
strategic. Christopher J. McMahon holds the Maritime Administration Emory S.
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College.
How military organizations adapt to the (real or supposed) lessons of battle
remains a matter of great interest to military historians and practitioners alike.
Ethan Rafuse, in “One Approach, Two Results: The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault during the World Wars,” lays out what at first seems
an improbable comparison between French battle tactics in the two world wars
and the Marine Corps’s approach to amphibious warfare during the Pacific War.
In neither case, he argues, was maneuver warfare an option; the challenge was
rather that of finding the proper balance of artillery and infantry assets employed
in frontal assaults. While not denying that French performance suffered in both
wars from doctrinal rigidity, he suggests that the conventional wisdom fails to
account for France’s eventual success in World War I. As for the Marines, he argues that their well-deserved reputation for doctrinal innovation enabled them
to learn from initial mistakes in ways not altogether dissimilar to what the French
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army did in that conflict. Ethan Rafuse is a professor of military history at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College.
Finally, in “London and Washington: Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite
Strategic Differences during Operation EARNEST WILL,” Richard A. Mobley offers a fine-grained case study of coalition operations—specifically, the uniquely
intimate U.S.-U.K. alliance relationship in the Persian Gulf during the reflagging
and protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987, toward the end of the Iran-Iraq
War. This analysis, based primarily on recently declassified material from British
archives, shows the extent to which differing perceptions and interests can complicate alliance relationships and should require a more sophisticated approach
to such relationships than has been the norm, at least on the U.S. side. Richard
A. Mobley is a former intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM

AS I WRITE THIS COLUMN,

we have reached the one-year anniversary of the COVID-19 pandemic, which has impacted
people, families, organizations, and societies significantly worldwide, including
here in Newport, in Monterey, and in the Navy’s many other dispersed distancelearning environments. I continue to be amazed by the flexibility and creativity
of our students, faculty, and staff, who have adapted so well to ensure that the
College has been able to continue to execute effectively its education, research,
and outreach missions. The College’s value and contribution to the entire Navy /
Marine Corps enterprise continue to be recognized, and I thought I would highlight several initiatives that demonstrate the College’s relevance and significance
to the maritime services’ future success.
Most recently, in January 2021, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released his Navigation Plan (NAVPLAN) that charts the course for how the Navy,
Marine Corps, and Coast Guard will execute the Tri-Service Maritime Strategy.
The NAVPLAN outlines the challenges the nation and the Navy face, the Navy’s
unique role in meeting those challenges, and the four priorities that will focus
the Navy’s efforts. These priorities are identified as Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and Our Sailors. The educational, research, and outreach expertise of the
Naval War College (NWC) is vital to meeting the challenges delineated in the
NAVPLAN, particularly in the areas of Capabilities enhancement and Sailor
development. The complete NAVPLAN can be found by searching “Navy
NAVPLAN 2021” using any search engine. There is much to learn from its fifteen
skillfully written pages!
During calendar year 2020, a major reorganization within the CNO’s staff resulted in the establishment of the position of Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
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(DCNO) for Warfighting Development (known as N7). The DCNO (N7) directs
the development of Navy strategic concepts by applying strategic guidance,
aligning strategic activities, and prioritizing analytic efforts. The goal is to improve the Navy’s ability to develop warrior-scholars and war-fighting ideas and
to deliver war-fighting advantage. Of particular interest to all of us at NWC is
the defined mission to “align the naval education enterprise with strategy and
improve how the Navy utilizes its flagship educational institutions.” We are working closely with key leaders within N7 to refine our educational and research
products to serve the Navy’s needs better. The College also is being tasked to play
a leading role in providing higher-fidelity, decision-quality information to Navy
leadership.
All of us are aware that many key decisions must be made in the near term
to shape the Navy of the future. To this end, the Office of the CNO (OPNAV)
Warfare Development Division (N72) has developed a naval Analytic Master
Plan (AMP) as an enterprise-level means of supporting informed decisions by
the CNO and other senior leaders. By following the AMP, all key stakeholders
will be kept apprised of the full range of analytic tools (such as war games, exercises, fleet experiments, modeling and simulation, etc.) that Navy commands
and organizations are using to evaluate new technologies, techniques, platforms,
weapons, and other potential solutions to emerging challenges. The AMP has the
following seven main “pillars”:
Intelligence—led by the Office of Naval Intelligence
Studies—led by OPNAV N72
Exercises—led by Fleet Forces Command
Fleet Experiments—led by the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
Test and Evaluation—led by the Operational Test and Evaluation Force
Modeling and Simulation—led by OPNAV N81
Wargaming—led by NWC
The primary purpose of the AMP is to bridge gaps and identify redundancies in
naval analysis that have occurred previously owing to the lack of an overarching coordinating structure and inadequate information sharing and knowledge
management.
As the Wargaming Pillar Lead, NWC is spearheading efforts to integrate all
research activities within the naval wargaming enterprise and facilitating the
promulgation and integration of research findings across the naval analytic
community. The goal of this integration is to create a faster-learning organization
that produces the high-fidelity information our leadership needs to make critical
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decisions in a time- and resource-constrained environment. Our partners in this
effort include NWDC, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, the systems commands (e.g., the Naval Undersea Warfare Center),
and the Office of Naval Research.
I am happy to report that rapid progress has been made in meeting the goals
of the AMP. In February 2021, NWC hosted a virtual, two-day event to launch a
series of recurring discussions within the Wargaming Pillar and across the analytic pillars of the naval enterprise. This research summit convened more than a
hundred stakeholders, all of whom are working toward a shared understanding
of the total capacity for gaming within the maritime services. They embody the
wide range of capabilities available to support the CNO, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and fleet commanders. In addition, this first summit addressed
opportunities for collaboration and research integration in support of a longterm, analytic campaign that addresses future-force design.
The impressive amalgamation of talented and dedicated gamers will convene
for a second summit in late March 2021 to refine the governance of the Wargaming Pillar and agree on issues such as the need for a recurring call for research,
prioritizing problems for examination, allocating scarce wargaming capacity,
and scheduling analytic events. Additionally, the second summit will introduce
a new Title 10 war game on future-force design that will nest within an extended
(eighteen-month) campaign of analysis across the AMP. This research approach
will be both iterative and integrated and will draw from all corners of the research
enterprise to provide high-fidelity analysis for use by senior decision makers.
As noted, one of the primary challenges the CNO faces relates to future-force
design, and the AMP will integrate the efforts of the overall Navy research community to inform CNO guidance and decisions. Since one of NWC’s principal
missions is to “define the future Navy and its associated roles and missions,” the
College is well positioned to contribute to this effort. The research, analysis, and
gaming conducted here in Newport produce focused, forward-thinking, and
timely research that anticipates future operational and strategic challenges, develops and assesses strategic and operational concepts to overcome those challenges,
assesses the risk associated with these concepts, provides analytic products that
inform the Navy’s leadership, and helps shape key decisions about the design of
the future fleet and other strategic challenges.
As I mentioned in the opening paragraphs of this column, NWC has done
remarkable work under the constraints brought about by the pandemic response.
In the summer of 2020, the Strategic and Operational Research Department
within the Center for Naval Warfare Studies (CNWS) supported an effort by
OPNAV N81 to identify key components and capabilities of the future naval
force in response to direction from the Deputy Secretary of Defense. This project
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laid the foundation for NWC to develop a long-term “arc of research” that will
be undertaken over the next several years to gain a deeper understanding of the
technologies, capabilities, and requirements the Navy will need to deter, defend
against, and defeat potential adversaries in the future.
Another demonstration of our College’s expertise in executing complex games
was CNWS’s exceptional conduct of the Northwest Pacific (NWPAC) War Game
2021. The wargaming team expertly designed and executed a distributed, classified war game with Seventh Fleet and our Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
allies. Breaking new ground in areas of collaboration across CNWS and the
College, as well as pushing the technology to execute a distributed game across
fourteen time zones, NWPAC 21 set new standards that will influence all war
games going forward. Commander, Seventh Fleet reported that the game yielded
a significant number of actionable issues on which U.S. and Japanese navy commands already are beginning to work. This distributed game was designed to
reduce the risk of transmitting COVID-19, and required the support of many
people to send two key team members to Japan safely.
Over the past two years, CNWS has been reshaping its approach to research
and analysis by realigning efforts, strengthening internal collaboration, hiring
and aligning faculty, and establishing partnerships across the enterprise in anticipation of the emerging analytic requirements of the fleet and the CNO. These
initiatives, coupled with the foundational work accomplished by the center, have
poised NWC to lead the Wargaming Pillar and to make major contributions to
the AMP and the research enterprise.
In his closing comments in the 2021 NAVPLAN, CNO Admiral M. M. Gilday,
USN, told all hands, “I am counting on you to take in all lines and get us where
we need to go—and do so at a flank bell!” Be assured, the Naval War College is
ready, willing, and able to do so!

SHOSHANA S. CHATFIELD

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College
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THE TR ANSFORMATION OF THE ISR AEL
DEFENSE FORCES
Avi Jager

O

ver the past decade, Israel’s military—the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)—has
enacted major changes to its structure and war-fighting priorities. Infantry, armor, and artillery forces have been reduced and ordered to implement structural and
doctrinal changes to make them more relevant to anticipated future conflicts against
Hamas and Hezbollah. Naval and air forces expanded their unconventional capacities at the expense of their conventional-warfare capabilities. Equally important,
while Israel has allocated vast resources toward strengthening its defensive formations, the IDF has prioritized expanding cyber and intelligence units above all others.
The driving forces behind these changes were the rise of nonstate adversaries,
the declining threat from neighboring nation-states, and groundbreaking innovations in military technology. The implications of this transformation for Israel’s
security and military preparedness are potentially severe. Hamas and Hezbollah
have kept developing new ways to challenge Israel actively, which has responded
principally by developing defensive measures to protect against these new threats
rather than engaging with the sources of those threats offensively. Nonetheless,
contending with the existential threats Israeli security experts foresee on the
horizon—a multifront war with hundreds of thousands of missiles and rockets
targeting Israeli population centers—could require deploying ground forces to
capture areas in the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, Syria, and perhaps even Iraq
and Iran. Since the IDF ground forces have been reduced, deprioritized, and
neglected, they will encounter much greater difficulty achieving those objectives.
This article uses interviews with IDF intelligence analysts, security researchers, and past and present defense ministry personnel to present a comprehensive
survey of these changes and reforms across the IDF, their sources, and their
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operational implications. Among the interviewees were the alternate prime minister of Israel, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Benjamin (Benny) Gantz, former defense
minister and chief of general staff Lieutenant General (Ret.) Moshe Ya’alon, and
former IDF comptroller Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick. In addition, ten
IDF intelligence analysts and commanders of varying ranks and specializations
were interviewed. The remaining data were collected from official publications
of government agencies, military publications, archival materials and protocols,
and over one thousand testimonies of IDF soldiers and reservists.
THE SOURCES OF IDF TRANSFORMATION
The primary reason for the IDF’s transformation was a deliberate decision by
Israel’s political and military leadership to strengthen the country’s defensive
formations, prioritize cyber and intelligence capabilities, and implement structural and methodological changes to make the IDF more relevant to future wars
with nonstate actors such as Hamas and Hezbollah. Benny Gantz, who currently
serves as Israel’s alternate prime minister and who led the IDF during this transformation period as chief of general staff, explained its rationale as follows:
[T]he purpose of [these changes] was to create a smaller yet deadlier army, capable of
confronting non-state adversaries in complex environments and on multiple fronts.
. . . The ability to be a smaller yet deadlier military depends primarily on the ability
to obtain accurate intelligence, process and analyze it effectively, and transfer it to the
combat forces in real time. . . .
I am saying, unambiguously, that I prioritized cyber and intelligence over infantry
and armor . . . [;] unlike the threat of ground invasion, the threat of cyber is realistic.1

Indeed, Israel’s political consensus is that the last conventional military threat
to Israel, the Syrian state, evaporated almost entirely during the civil war that
began there in 2011. Until then, Israel had considered a conventional war with
Syria to be a likely conflict scenario. Unlike Jordan and Egypt, Syria never signed
a peace agreement with Israel, nor did it establish any diplomatic or economic
relations. Syria confronted Israel directly in 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982, and
continued to require mass conscription for its army. In 2011, the Arab Spring
spread to Syria and put the al-Assad regime on the cusp of extinction. The Syrian
armed forces suffered tremendous losses following the outbreak of the civil war,
from both casualties and defections. As a result, the regime lost territory and
sovereignty to such an extent that it had to rely on foreign support to preserve
its rule. Syria’s declining demographic and economic stability, combined with
its deteriorating military power, led Israel to judge that the al-Assad regime no
longer was a central threat to its national security, at least over the short term.2
The structural and doctrinal changes to the IDF were, by and large, the operational and organizational response to the gradual transformation of Hamas
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and Hezbollah from local resistance movements into powerful militant organizations. Within twenty-five years, Hamas has transformed from a grassroots
socioreligious movement into a political regime with a military wing consisting
of over thirty thousand combatants and an arsenal of approximately twenty
thousand rockets capable of reaching targets two hundred kilometers away.3
Hezbollah has undergone an even greater organizational transformation, from
a grassroots political movement into what many experts consider to be the most
powerful nonstate military force in the world, with an estimated fifty to sixty
thousand fighters and more than a hundred thousand rockets.4 Hezbollah’s tactical skill set evolved drastically as a result of its experience in the Syrian civil
war and it now is capable of carrying out offensive attacks beyond Lebanon’s
borders and on Israel’s home front.5 Hamas’s and Hezbollah’s combat experience,
firepower, and confidence have elevated their status in the eyes of the Israeli
military leadership, which regards them as being among the primary military
threats to Israel’s security now.6
THE IDF’S NEW BATTLEGROUP FORMATION
In the summer of 2015, the IDF launched the Gideon multi-year plan (GMYP)
under General Gantz to shrink, modernize, and reform the Israeli military to
meet the asymmetric, nonstate adversary threats that now were prioritized
over its traditional state-on-state warfare mission. The IDF cut combat and
noncombat forces alike and across both active and reserve military formations.
The IDF standing army was instructed to cut 10 percent of the commissioned
and warrant officer posts and reduce their total number from 45,000 to 40,000
troops.7 The size of conscripted forces was reduced as well; the length of male
conscripted service was shortened by four months, and it is expected to be
reduced by an additional two months in the coming years.8 The reserve forces
were affected most by the GMYP, which suggested cutting 30 percent of the reserve army, which meant releasing one hundred thousand out of three hundred
thousand active reservists.9
Perhaps the most profound change suggested by the GMYP was the reorganization of the IDF’s combat formations. Since the founding of the IDF, the divisional formation had been the IDF’s core operational battle group.10 Following
the Yom Kippur War in 1973, the decline of conventional warfare and the rise of
nonstate adversaries led to an erosion of the divisional framework as the IDF’s
primary battle formation. As time went on, the IDF operated in smaller areas
of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and southern Lebanon that did not require, nor
could they accommodate, large task forces. The IDF’s missions no longer were
to occupy vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to gain operational control
over geographically limited hostile areas and eliminate localized threats such as
missile capabilities and arms-smuggling tunnels. The capabilities of the nonstate
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adversaries against which the IDF increasingly was being tasked—disorganized
militias in southern Lebanon and local Palestinian terrorist cells in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip—as advanced as they were, did not justify deploying entire
divisions. Furthermore, deploying large task forces could have resulted in more
casualties, more collateral damage, and ineffective use of the combat forces.
In 2011, the IDF began implementing a new operational doctrine that established brigades as independent battle groups instead of division-sized formations, each capable of planning and executing ground maneuvers without
divisional support.11 The new brigade battlegroup formation consisted of six
battalions, including infantry, armor, artillery, and combat-engineering forces.
In addition, each battalion now could communicate directly with the air force
and navy for exfiltration or
fire support. To allow better
The driving forces behind these changes were
control and coordination bethe rise of nonstate adversaries, the declining
tween the different battalions,
threat from neighboring nation-states, and
each brigade battle group was
groundbreaking innovations in military
given its own command-andtechnology.
control headquarters. These
headquarters were in continuous communication with other field forces, as well
as with parallel forces and the senior commander. Brigades were now responsible
for managing their own logistics, rearmament, and tactical extractions.12
The primary purpose of the new battlegroup formation was to create a fighting force that would be more relevant in future conflicts against Hezbollah
and Hamas. Israel expects its future conflicts will be characterized by dynamic
adversaries that constantly change their structure and methods, in addition to
acquiring new techniques and weaponry. The shift to smaller battle groups with
the combined capabilities of different corps and the ability independently to plan
and execute battle plans increases the IDF’s effectiveness and flexibility.13
In turn, this reform of the IDF’s primary fighting formations had profound impacts on the organization of the army branches and corps that contributed forces
to the new brigades.
Infantry
In recent years, the IDF reduced the size of its combat infantry forces and expanded the constabulary forces that guard Israel’s borders and the occupied
territories. In 2005, the IDF established a new infantry brigade to specialize in
those security missions, the Kfir Brigade. The Kfir Brigade was larger than most
combat infantry brigades; IDF infantry brigades usually consist of four battalions, whereas the Kfir Brigade consisted of five battalions. The brigade’s purpose
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was to maintain a permanent presence in the West Bank to perform routine security missions, protect the Israeli settlements, and prevent infiltration attempts
into Israel.14 Between 2004 and 2017, to perform border-protection and routine
security missions across Israel’s borders, the IDF established four more similar
battalions: the Caracal, Lions of the Jordan Valley, Cheetah (Bardelas), and Lion
of the Valley battalions.15
The IDF’s combat infantry units, after experiencing a significant reduction in
manpower following the decision to reduce the length of compulsory military
service, began focusing their training on combating guerrilla warfare and preparing for future conflicts against Hezbollah and Hamas. The basic training of IDF
infantry units is divided into two parts, general training and specialized training.
The IDF has not changed the general training style and requirements significantly
over the last several decades. The first part of the basic training is focused on fundamentals. These include preparing, using, and maintaining a personal rifle; walking long distances with heavy weight; team protocols such as battle formations
and movement; and military sign language and chain-of-command structures.
The second part of the basic training is conducted after the soldiers are assigned
to their individual specializations: squad leaders, advanced marksmen, machine
gunners, grenade gunners, shoulder-fired-missile operators, medics, or riflemen.
In this phase, they learn about the theory and practice of their respective roles and
undergo extensive training and tests to qualify as fully operationally proficient.16
In contrast, the specialized training of IDF infantry soldiers has seen substantial changes in response to Israel’s changing adversary priorities. In the past, the
specialized training focused on open-field warfare techniques. This included
individual, squad, platoon, and company open-field-warfare drills, focused on
capturing and holding strategic geographic positions to support seizing and
controlling large swaths of territory. Urban warfare was practiced only rarely
and underground warfare and fighting techniques in tunnels and underground
fortifications were excluded entirely from the training curriculum of standard
infantry units. The most basic principle regarding underground installations and
urban areas was simply to avoid them. However, from 2014 onward, the specialized training focused on urban warfare and introduced underground warfare as
a new concept with its own combat doctrine. Open-battlefield warfare practices,
such as occupying Syrian and Egyptian fortifications, were removed from specialized training programs.
Armored Corps
Historically, the two fundamental principles of the IDF armored corps were
mobility and speed; the underlying logic behind these principles was to leverage the armored corps’s unique movement capabilities to minimize its exposure
and vulnerability.17 The IDF exploited these capabilities to achieve decisive
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victories against conventional enemy forces. During the Suez crisis of 1956, the
38th Armored Division, led by Ariel Sharon, penetrated the armistice line with
Egypt along the Sinai Peninsula and captured the strategically crucial Abu-Ageila
military compound.18 During the Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF armored corps
bypassed Egyptian defensive lines on the southern front and captured the eastern
bank of the Suez Canal within two days.19 In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the
armored corps pushed Syrian forces to retreat from the Golan Heights and then
breached their lines to establish a forward offensive position only forty kilometers from Damascus.20 These conflicts all were characterized by open-battlefield
warfare, and the guiding principle on urban warfare at the time was to avoid it
unless it was essential to the mission.
Over the years, the battle space and adversaries shifted away from that traditional paradigm toward more-urban conflict environments, and the armored
corps’s role in subsequent operations diminished. The armored corps, like the
rest of the IDF, went from fighting open-field warfare against conventional
armies to conducting urban warfare against nonstate adversaries. In urban
warfare, armored units are unwieldy, less effective, and more vulnerable than in
rural environments. Urban defenders have inherent advantages; they can prepare
strong defensive formations and fortifications, lure their adversary into vulnerable positions, and move unexposed across infrastructure and populations. An
armored attacker, on the other hand, has limited ability to navigate, mobilize,
and communicate with other forces, especially as part of a diverse battle group.
The Lebanon war of 2006 illustrated armored units’ diminishing effectiveness
in urban and asymmetric warfare environments. During the first three weeks of
fighting, the armored corps and the rest of the IDF ground forces waited in staging areas while air forces engaged Hezbollah. When the ground invasion commenced, only two of four active armored brigades participated, using just 370 of
the estimated four thousand tanks in the Israeli inventory. The missions assigned
to armored units in Lebanon were also much different than in Israel’s previous
conflicts. Instead of penetrating deep into southern Lebanon, the armored corps
carried out raids against suspected Hezbollah compounds near the border. It
also engaged in routine security missions, such as patrolling an operational route
leading from Israel to southern Lebanon, performed rescue missions, and provided logistical support (e.g., transporting food, water, ammunition, and equipment to the other fighting forces).21
To remain relevant, the IDF armored corps significantly reduced its size and
changed its structure to adapt to Israel’s evolving security challenges. According
to former deputy chief of general staff Major General (Ret.) Yair Nave, more than
ten reserve brigades were eliminated over the last decade.22 Still more brigades are
expected to be phased out as the IDF continues to downsize its armored corps.
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In addition, instead of having four to six armored companies in each battalion
of the remaining tank brigades, they are being reorganized to have three tank
companies, two infantry companies, and one combat-engineering company.23
With this mix of forces, armored units now can operate independently as small
task forces, complete a wider variety of missions, and operate more effectively
in urban-warfare environments. These changes to the armored corps’s structure
and its integration into the new battlegroup formations made armored units
much more relevant and effective in Operation PROTECTIVE EDGE of 2014 than
they had been in other recent conflicts. The operation employed all four active
armored brigades for the first time in thirty-two years, and five hundred tanks
took part in the fighting. The armored corps suffered fourteen fatalities in the
operation, but all these were caused by mortar fire outside the Gaza Strip or by
sniper fire against personnel while outside their vehicle; no IDF tanks were destroyed or permanently incapacitated by enemy fire.24
Artillery
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, the official mission of the IDF artillery corps was to provide covering fire for the maneuvering forces. The artillery
corps played a key role in Israel’s armed conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. In the
Six-Day War of 1967, the IDF artillery corps destroyed twenty-six of forty Syrian missile batteries and provided covering fire for the maneuvering IDF ground
forces, enabling them to capture the Syrian Golan Heights within two days of
fighting. In the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the artillery corps divided its attention
between two fronts. The Drakon battalion was instrumental in blocking the Syrian armed forces from advancing in the north while the rest of the corps enabled
the IDF’s counterattack against the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai Peninsula.25
However, as with the fate of the IDF’s armored corps, the waning of conventional warfare reduced the artillery corps’s relevance in Israel’s modern conflicts.
Since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, no foreign military has attempted to invade
Israel and the IDF conducted multidivision ground maneuvers only once, during
the Lebanon war of 1982. More importantly, when IDF combat forces penetrated
hostile areas, battlefield conditions limited the ability of the artillery corps to
provide fire support. The large kill radius of artillery shells combined with their
inability to hit targets with sufficient precision increased the risk of friendly fire
or of excessive collateral damage, limiting artillery’s useful role in the conflict.
The artillery corps began reforming and reorganizing itself to address the
changing operational environment that the IDF faced by the time the second intifada began in 2000. In the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century,
Israeli military leadership established two new secretive units within the artillery
corps to address the mismatch between the corps’s traditional capabilities and
the needs of a more urban battlefield. Instead of artillery weapons, the new units
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were equipped with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to conduct assault and
reconnaissance missions.
The assault UAV unit, called Zik or Unit 5252, operates the Israeli-made
Hermes 450 UAV. The Hermes 450 is a multirole, high-performance, tactical UAV capable of collecting intelligence, conducting electronic warfare, and
launching missiles.26 The main virtue of the Zik unit is its ability to use precisionguided munitions to launch surgical strikes, thus minimizing collateral damage
and threatening distant and hidden targets.
The reconnaissance UAV unit, called Sky Rider or Unit 5353, operates the
Israeli-made Skylark I, II, and III UAVs.27 The Skylark is a miniature, modular,
and autonomous UAV; it is small enough to be packed up and carried by ground
forces and deployed within minutes. The UAV is equipped with advanced communication features that allow it to pass real-time, high-resolution videos, day or
night, within a forty-kilometer radius.28 The role of the Sky Rider unit is different
from other UAV units, as its primary mission is to deliver real-time, tactical intelligence directly to junior combat officers on the battlefield.29
The innovative Zik and Sky Rider units presaged other paradigm shifts within
the IDF artillery corps. In 2014, the artillery corps created a new Detection Unit,
whose original mission was to
identify, monitor, and report on
The IDF’s missions no longer were to occupy
the trajectory of missiles and
vast adversary-state territory but, instead, to
rockets fired into and out of
gain operational control over geographically
Israel.30 The Detection Unit also
limited hostile areas and eliminate localized
collected meteorological data
threats such as missile capabilities and armsto pass on to weapons system
smuggling tunnels.
operators. The unit deployed
sensors at various altitudes using several unique platforms. These sensors collected meteorological data such as air pressure, humidity, wind, and temperature, which are critical for making accurate ballistic calculations and increasing
weapon accuracy. The data were used to improve the accuracy and effectiveness
of artillery guns, UAVs, and precision-guided missiles.31 As the artillery corps’s
tools changed, its personnel structure was reduced or reallocated significantly.
In the past decade, half the IDF reserve artillery brigades were disestablished,
their equipment was sold or scrapped, and the reservists who had served in these
brigades were released or assigned to regular infantry brigades.32 This left the IDF
with four active artillery brigades and four reserve artillery battalions.33
AIR FORCE
In the first decades of Israel’s existence and in its early military conflicts, the
Israeli Air Force (IAF) was tasked with supporting the ground forces as they
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progressed toward and captured enemy territory, and with maintaining aerial
superiority. To achieve this, the IAF operated under two guiding principles that
persist to this day, in some respects. The first principle was the element of surprise; because the IAF had limited air resources compared with the combined air
assets of the Arab alliance that Israel faced in its early years, it was vital to operational success for the IAF to strike adversaries first.34 The IAF’s second principle,
also driven by its relative size, was to concentrate its effort against a single front or
objective before moving on to the next one, rather than dividing into small task
forces to attack multiple targets simultaneously.35
The Six-Day War of 1967 illustrated the decisiveness of these principles in
practice. The war commenced with a surprise aerial attack against Egypt, focusing on its airfields and aircraft while they were still on the ground. Within five
hours, the IAF performed 347 sorties and destroyed more than three hundred
Egyptian fighter jets and eleven Egyptian military airfields.36 The IAF then carried out 125 sorties against targets in Syria and Jordan, destroying most of the
Syrian air force and severely damaging the Jordanian air force. The IAF suffered
twenty-four fatalities and lost forty-six fighter jets.37
Six years later, the IAF faced the reverse scenario. On 6 October 1973, Egypt
and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel. The IAF first had to defend Israel’s
airspace; only then could it go on the offensive. The IAF also was challenged by
Egypt’s and Syria’s newly acquired, Soviet-made antiaircraft systems, which they
purchased pursuant to the lessons of the previous conflict.38 Unlike the Six-Day
War, the Yom Kippur War lasted almost three weeks, and the IAF suffered ninetytwo fatalities and lost 103 fighter jets.39
In the wake of these wars, the IAF worked to improve its aerial dogfighting
capabilities, procure new technologies to defeat Soviet antiaircraft systems, and
increase the accuracy and efficacy of its strikes against enemy targets. In 1978,
Israel purchased seventy-five Lockheed Martin F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter
jets, designed for stealth and air-to-ground attacks, and the McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle, designed for aerial dogfighting against adversary jets.40 These
modernizations led to improved IAF performance during the 1982 Lebanon war.
Over ninety days of operations, the IAF destroyed Syria’s Soviet-made antiaircraft
systems and shot down a hundred Syrian fighter jets, with zero losses to IAF air
forces.41
However, as Israel increasingly became engaged in low-intensity conflict
against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah, the
IAF’s operational role in Israel’s military campaigns decreased. Israel’s nonstate
adversaries diminished the relevance of Israel’s air superiority by adopting guerrilla tactics. They operated in small groups; carried out low-profile operations in
unexpected locations; and used light weapons, suicide bombers, and rockets. To
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protect themselves, they moved constantly, kept strict secrecy about the locations
of their military installations, and assimilated themselves into civilian populations and infrastructure. During the first and second intifadas, the IAF made
a significant contribution to Israel’s attempt to achieve military victory but was
much less influential to the outcome than the ground forces. During the Lebanon
war of 2006, IAF operations were lethal and efficient but failed to influence the
results of the war. Over thirty-three days, the IAF executed eighteen thousand
sorties and destroyed thousands of rocket launchers and military installations.42
But throughout that period, Hezbollah continued to launch rockets into Israel,
showing Israeli military leadership that the IAF’s dominance was no longer a
guarantor of victory in battle.
Toward the end of that decade, the IAF began prioritizing precision-strike accuracy and stealth over air-to-air and air-to-ground attack capabilities. These capabilities were vital to Israel’s attempt to prevent advanced weapons systems from
reaching Hamas and Hezbollah. This allowed the IAF to conduct long-distance
air operations to carry out precision strikes far beyond Israel’s border areas, such
as in Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, while leaving no footprint or signature that
could be attributed to Israel. Perhaps the highest national priority for the IAF was
to maintain and demonstrate the ability to attack and destroy hardened nuclear
facilities by air in remote and hostile territories, as it did in 1981 against Iraq’s
Osirak reactor, and later in Syria. Following its successful strike against the Syrian
nuclear reactor in 2007, the IAF prepared for a potential attack against what were
suspected widely to be Iranian nuclear facilities.43
These sensitive strike missions had significant implications for the IAF’s force
composition and engagement. In 2015, the Israeli defense ministry procured fourteen Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, which were added to nineteen
units Israel had purchased already.44 The F-35, while not suited for dogfights,
has improved stealth capabilities and can reach distant and remote targets easily,
conduct air-to-surface attacks, and even deploy some nuclear-armed missiles.45
Simultaneously, Israel also expanded its UAV arsenal and doubled its fleet of Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules aerial-refueling aircraft, expanding Israel’s
ability to attack remote targets at long distances.46 These advanced acquisitions
strained IAF budget constraints, forcing the IAF to deprioritize other capabilities.
To save money, the IAF decided to disestablish several combat squadrons, including squadrons of F-15 and F-16A/B fighters and Bell AH-1 Cobra helicopters.47
NAVY
Israel shares many of the characteristics of an island, in that it is surrounded
alternately by adversarial states or territories and the Mediterranean Sea. Israel has maritime borders with Egypt, Jordan, Hezbollah-controlled southern
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Lebanon, and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip. Having a small population and
limited natural resources, Israel always has been challenged to provide for its
own subsistence and, therefore, has been reliant on imports via the sea. In fact,
over the years, 98 percent of Israel’s imported goods have entered through the
Mediterranean and Red Seas.48 With over 80 percent of Israel’s population spread
across its 197 kilometers of coastline, this area is especially vulnerable to attacks.49
Moreover, much of Israel’s critical infrastructure facilities, such as power stations,
ports, military installations, communication channels, and water desalination
facilities, are located near or along Israel’s coast.
That being the case, protecting trade routes, securing Israel’s territorial waters, and guarding the coastline are the Israeli navy’s most vital missions. Israel’s
dependence on seaborne imports makes the need to maintain open sea routes
especially important during wartime. Israel’s navy was designed to engage Egypt’s
and Syria’s Soviet-backed navies, which Israeli leadership viewed as the primary
maritime threat.50 To that end, the Israeli navy procured destroyers, missile boats,
versatile patrol boats, and two submarines.51 To minimize dependence on military imports, Israeli Military Industries developed maritime weaponry such as
the Gabriel missile system, designed specifically for surface naval warfare.52
During the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Israeli navy defeated the Egyptian
and Syrian navies while suffering no ship or personnel losses of its own.53 As
with the ground forces, the quantitative power balance at sea seemingly tilted
heavily toward Egypt and Syria, which enjoyed significant superiority in terms
of warships and firepower. The Israeli navy had fourteen missile boats against
Egypt and Syria’s combined twenty-four missile boats. Just prior to the war, the
Israeli navy had decommissioned its two old submarines, leaving a significant
capability gap against the Egyptian navy’s twelve active submarines. Nonetheless,
the Israeli navy destroyed or captured twenty-four enemy vessels while suffering
only minimal damage and personnel casualties. Throughout the entire war, the
Israeli navy managed to keep Israel’s ports safe and most of the Mediterranean
trade routes open, which permitted a continuous flow of energy and other supplies to Israel.54 Most importantly, the Israeli navy pushed those rival navies out
of Israel’s territorial waters and ensured that no Israeli coastal city was attacked
from the sea during the conflict.55
After the 1973 war, the diminishing likelihood of a maritime battle with rival
navies and increasing tension with nonstate adversaries led the Israeli military
leadership to direct the navy to invest more resources in maritime-security
missions to prevent attacks against Israeli citizens.56 The navy decommissioned
all of its destroyers and large missile boats and began purchasing patrol boats
and small- and medium-size missile boats.57 These changes came at a price. The
navy was criticized for not making a sufficient contribution to the 2006 Lebanon
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war. Two days into the war, Hezbollah launched two C-802 antiship cruise missiles against an Israeli Sa’ar 5–class corvette, killing four members of the ship’s
crew. The Winograd commission of inquiry into the war concluded that the
navy operated in a mind-set of conducting policing operations rather than
an offensive military conflict, leading crewmembers to disregard Hezbollah’s
lethality and threat.58
In 2007, the navy took on responsibility for enforcing the blockade of the Gaza
Strip.59 The Gaza conflicts and the continuous attempts by militant groups to
infiltrate Israel via the sea or to break the blockade demanded that the navy play
this growing role in routine security operations. In 2011, the navy added another
routine security mission: the protection of Israel’s newly discovered offshore
natural gas fields.60 Between
2009 and 2012, Israel discov[B]y 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense
ered several gas fields with an
as the most pressing need within the
estimated 680 billion cubic
military, and new recruits who were eligible
meters of natural gas. 61 The
for combat service but also passed cyber
discovery of the gas reserves
units’ requirements were sent directly to
led Israel to begin switching
the cyber units.
its power-generation infrastructure to use natural gas,
meaning that a successful attack against those gas fields could jeopardize Israel’s
energy security.62 The navy was instructed to provide a tiered defense of Israel’s
offshore energy infrastructure, including the gas wells, platforms, and underwater pipelines.63
In 2011, Israel purchased three additional submarines from Germany, doubling its fleet to six hulls.64 While the German manufacturer was responsible
for building the submarine hulls, Israeli teams were responsible for the combat
systems and weapons that were installed on board. These included advanced
radar and communication systems, electronic warfare systems, equipment for
deploying special forces divers to infiltrate hostile areas, and the ability to launch
torpedoes and cruise missiles with conventional and unconventional warheads
and ranges up to 1,500 kilometers.65 The main catalyst for the latest submarine
purchase was Iran’s pursuit of nuclear-weapons capabilities. The IDF was instructed to prepare for two possible scenarios to address Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
The first was that Israel would launch an attack against Iran’s nuclear facilities.
In this case, Israel should be able to threaten Iran with a nuclear response in case
the latter decided to retaliate with other strategic weapons. In the second scenario
Iran would develop a nuclear weapon and threaten to use it against Israel. In this
case, Israel would expand its deterrence to make sure Iran comprehended that an
attack on Israel most likely would lead to mutual destruction.66
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SPECIAL FORCES
The IDF special forces can be classified into four groups.
1.	 The elite units: General Staff Reconnaissance Unit (Sayeret Matkal),
naval commandos (Shayetet 13), air force commandos (Shaldag), and
the Special Operations Engineering Unit (Yahalom)
2.	 The commando units: Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan
3.	 The reconnaissance units: Paratroopers Reconnaissance Battalion,
Golani Reconnaissance Battalion, Givati Reconnaissance Battalion,
Nahal Reconnaissance Battalion, and 401st and 7th Reconnaissance
Battalions
4.	 The specialized units: 669 Unit for airborne combat search and rescue,
canine unit (Oketz), 504 Unit of the Human Intelligence Division, and
Moran Unit for precision-guided missiles
Despite the profusion of special-operations units in the IDF, on only two occasions did the special forces make a significant contribution to the outcome of
a war. The first was during the Suez crisis of 1956, in which the paratroopers
were deployed behind enemy lines to the Mitla Pass in the Sinai Peninsula. The
second was during the 1967 Six-Day War, when the paratroopers again deployed
behind enemy lines to Abu-Ageila, also in the Sinai Peninsula.67 The IDF’s elite,
commando, reconnaissance, and specialized units have not affected the outcome
of any other wars decisively. In most cases, they either received small and insignificant, yet complex, missions or were annexed to an operational brigade and
fought under its command.
Following twenty-four years of low-intensity conflict in southern Lebanon,
the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip, the IDF special forces’ ability to contribute
decisively to a large-scale military campaign had reached its nadir. The Winograd
Commission for the inquiry into the Lebanon war of 2006 concluded that the IDF
did not make effective use of its special forces. According to the report, special
forces were scattered across the IDF and were subordinated to various commands: “the decentralized command of the special forces damaged their ability to
constitute a significant force . . . [which explains their] limited contribution to the
greater strategic cause.” The committee went so far as to conclude that some IDF
special-forces units had been established to deal with specific operational challenges and that many of these challenges no longer existed. Pride and comradery
prevented these units from pivoting their focus or creating collaborations that
could have been relevant to large-scale conflicts.68
In 2011, as part of the lessons of the Lebanon war of 2006, the IDF established the Depth Corps.69 The core of the new command was a new Commando Brigade, which was a seminal unification of the IDF commando units.
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Historically, the IDF’s commando units all operated independently, not under
a unified command. When the new brigade was established, the three commando units—the Egoz, Maglan, and Duvdevan commandos—were extracted
from their existing organizational and command affiliations and began training and operating as a unified fighting force.70 The Commando Brigade unified these units under one centralized command, making it the most lethal
synchronized brigade in the IDF, and the most relevant force to combat Hamas
and Hezbollah.
The reconnaissance units underwent structural and doctrinal changes as well.
Each of the IDF’s reconnaissance battalions was composed of three companies:
an antitank company, a sabotage and engineering company, and a reconnaissance
company. Following the implementation of the GMYP, the missions and training
routines of these companies changed. The most significant modifications were
the focus on underground warfare and the replacement of the antitank and sabotage and engineering companies with three identical reconnaissance companies
in each of the reconnaissance battalions.71 The operational rationale for this was
that combating Israel’s new unconventional adversaries, which lacked armored
forces and infrastructure requiring specialized units to handle, demanded different capabilities from the reconnaissance units.
Elite units remained separate from the new battle groups even after the other
special-forces units were reorganized. While the GMYP reduced the size of the
IDF’s conventional combat forces, the elite units were expanded and allocated
even more training resources, and their service track was modified. Prior to the
new service track, male soldiers in the elite units were obligated to serve the same
three years as other conscripts and then were required to complete an additional
sixteen to twenty months of training before another three-year service period in
an elite unit. Soldiers identified as potential commanders during that training
period continued to Officer’s Cadet School, while the rest of the elite-unit soldiers
continued their service as noncommissioned officers.72 Following the implementation of the GMYP, the elite units introduced a new service track. Now, all
soldiers selected for the elite units would be admitted to Officer’s Cadet School
and serve for seven consecutive years.73 This change is expected to increase dramatically the size of the elite units and help the members of those units be seen
as professionals rather than conscripted troops.
IDF INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
Israeli military intelligence is divided into four core units. The signals-intelligence
(SIGINT) unit is responsible for intercepting communications and electronic
signals. The visual-intelligence (VISINT) unit is responsible for mapping hostile
areas and interpreting images from satellites and other visual resources, such
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as reconnaissance photographs.74 The human-intelligence (HUMINT) unit is
responsible for recruiting and handling human assets, and related operations.75
The research unit is responsible for providing threat warnings of possible hostile
operations and indications of adversary intentions.
In the past, traditional military targets included military bases, concentrations
of forces, defense formations, dams, power stations, bridges, and other elements
of permanent infrastructure. These targets did not require precision targeting, as
they mostly were large, static, and distant from civilian populations. The intelligence process—researching, collecting, processing, analyzing, and distributing
finished products—could take months or years to complete. Over time, with
the declining likelihood of a conventional war and the rising threat of nonstate
adversaries, military intelligence’s focus shifted. Rather than identifying the capabilities and intentions of nations, military intelligence’s focus now is on monitoring the military proliferation of nonstate adversaries, detecting and alerting
on imminent threats, and developing methods to obtain and deliver intelligence
quickly.76 This shift in focus forced the IDF Intelligence Directorate to implement
new doctrinal and structural changes, as well as to introduce new capabilities to
remain relevant.
The SIGINT unit, known as 8200 Unit, responsible for intercepting communications and electronic signals, experienced tremendous growth in recent years. It
added a cyber unit that specializes in hacking and sabotaging electronic systems,
and the Hatsav Unit, which collects intelligence from social media platforms.77
The most significant addition to the SIGINT unit was the establishment of the
Operational SIGINT Battalion. Intelligence analysts belonging to this battalion
provide combat forces with real-time intelligence during operations.78 In practice, this means that intelligence analysts of the Operational SIGINT Battalion
are annexed temporarily to a field unit for specific missions or operations. They
join the field unit’s operational control center and synthesize existing information
with real-time reports from the battlefield and other sources such as drones, cameras, and wiretaps. They communicate their assessments directly to operational
forces in the field to warn them of imminent threats, verify their observations,
and support them amid the uncertainty of battle.
The VISINT unit, known as 9900 Unit, also grew significantly. In the 1990s,
the VISINT unit began expanding its intelligence-collection platforms to include
human observation and static cameras, as well as vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and,
most importantly, satellites.79 In 1988, Israel became the eighth country in the
world to launch a surveillance satellite into space independently. Israel successfully launched eight more satellites into orbit over the next three decades. The last
one, the reconnaissance satellite Ofek 11, was launched in 2016.80 The VISINT
unit was expanded to develop new techniques for producing intelligence from
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existing visual images and to cope with the constantly growing flow of visual data
coming from the new collection resources.81
The IDF Intelligence Directorate also implemented cross-organizational
changes to be more effective against nonstate adversaries and unconventional capabilities. In the past, internal groups within the research, SIGINT, VISINT, and
HUMINT units had been organized around geographic areas or particular stages
of the intelligence process. Now, for the first time, relevant sections were not
limited to working on specific
geographic areas but instead
[T]he IDF’s transformation and Israel’s
were organized to focus on
self-fortification approach to security means
organizational or ideological
that the IDF may not be properly prepared
targets, such as the Islamic
to contend with evolving complex threats
Jihad and ISIS. Other secas nonstate adversaries grow in size and
tions were organized by the
acquire rocket and missile capabilities that
type of threat, such as weaponce belonged only to states.
ons of mass destruction or
low-intensity conflict. Finally,
some units were aligned to different scopes of intelligence: national-level intelligence for the prime minister, strategic-level intelligence for the chief of general
staff, operational-level intelligence for headquarters and high commands, and
tactical-level intelligence for combat forces.82
Moving from a geographic paradigm to a capability and organizational one
necessitated additional reforms to military intelligence. Following the Arab
Spring, the IDF Intelligence Directorate recognized its failure to anticipate the severity of the uprisings and the regional instability that resulted. As a result, Major
General Kochavi, then serving as the Military Intelligence director, established
the Regional Section within the Research Department of the IDF Intelligence Directorate. The section’s purpose was to investigate and monitor economic, social,
and political developments, primarily in the Middle East, and identify potential
geopolitical shifts of strategic significance to Israel. General Kochavi also enacted
a new approach of assembling ad hoc multidisciplinary teams, subcommittees,
and provisional headquarters to address time-sensitive threats.83 Lastly, the IDF
Intelligence Directorate established a new section—the Target Section—to build
a database of targets using deep-learning algorithms and big data to take advantage of advances in developing information and analyzing trends, patterns, and
associations. The algorithms can scan billions of data points (e.g., images, videos,
audio, and electronic signals) to identify potential targets.84 Analysts then can
investigate the suggested targets, after an initial triage by the algorithms, and
confirm correct selections, which in turn improves the algorithms’ performance.
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CYBER
The IDF established its first cyber units in 2011. Initially, the Shin Bet, Israel’s
civilian internal-security service, was responsible for defending Israel’s critical
cyber infrastructure. However, the IDF had greater organizational and technical
capacity to establish and operate larger cyberoperations centers. As the cyber
threat expanded beyond the capacity of any single agency’s resources into a strategic, crosscutting dimension of war, the IDF began to prioritize cybersecurity
and took over responsibility for protecting both Israel’s security and civilian cyber infrastructures. The IDF’s cyber activities were divided between two directorates. The Intelligence Directorate was responsible for offensive cyber operations
and the collection of intelligence; the Computer and Information Technology
(IT) Directorate was responsible for protecting the military and civilian infrastructures from attacks.85 The Computer and IT Directorate then was expanded
to include a new division, the Cyber Defense Division. Subsequently, the name
of the Computer and IT Directorate was changed to the Computer, IT, and Cyber
Defense Directorate.
The Cyber Defense Division is responsible for providing defense for air, sea,
land, and cyberspace, and is the senior authority for cyber protection in the IDF.
The division protects the IDF’s communication and computing systems and its
technology-based offensive and defensive cyber capabilities, and it trains all IDF
forces in countercyber practices and operations. The Cyber Defense Division’s
primary objective is to prevent electronic information from leaking out of the
IDF, and it ensures the continuity of IDF operations without IT disruptions.86
The organizational structure of the Cyber Defense Division is unique and reflects the unit’s significance within the IDF. A brigadier general was appointed to
command the division; in the IDF, staff divisions more typically are led by colonels.87 The Cyber Defense Division also, rather than the normal three sections,
has four—operations, intelligence, technological, and electronic warfare—each
commanded by an officer at the rank of colonel.88 Finally, the Cyber Defense
Division was given a unique modular structure in which soldiers could work as
part of a large task force but also could be annexed to combat branches of the IDF
to work independently or in small teams.89
Two additional organizations were created to assist the Cyber Defense Division in implementing its policies and improving connectivity and cooperation.
The first was a cyber branch within the IDF multi-corps command headquarters,
which already had air force, armored, naval and infantry branches. The purpose
of the cyber branch was to protect offensive and defensive military capabilities
(e.g., armored personnel carriers, weapons, radars, and computing systems) from
cyber attacks. In practice, this required ensuring the safety of the entire manufacturing process and supply chain, as well as routine checks against malware.90
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The IDF also established a Cyber Situation Center to manage cyber-related
emergencies, track international trends in cyberspace, and coordinate between
the separate cyber units in the IDF.91
The establishment of these organizations and priorities for cyber defense
marked a significant cultural shift within the IDF. The Israeli military had a longstanding tradition that prioritized combat units above all others in competitions
for qualified manpower, budgets, and positions. IDF recruitment protocols dictated that new recruits were directed first to combat units, and only those who
were not assessed to be qualified for combat duty were directed to noncombat
units. But by 2011 the IDF prioritized cyber defense as the most pressing need
within the military, and new recruits who were eligible for combat service but
also passed cyber units’ requirements were sent directly to the cyber units.
Moreover, the IDF, for the first time in its short history, launched a program that
offered eligible soldiers in combat units the option to transfer to a cyber unit.92
Finally, while combat forces were experiencing a significant reduction in manpower and the IDF cut five thousand officers, the cyber units were provided with
a hundred new positions for commissioned and noncommissioned officers in
2015, in addition to ten thousand new cyber posts already allocated.93
A TRANSFORMED IDF AND
THE RISKS OF “SELF-FORTIFICATION”
At the center of Israel’s military transformation stands a new, defensive approach.
Toward the end of the 2010s, Israel’s perception of its military objectives in a
conflict changed dramatically. Israel no longer sought the total defeat of its opponents or to uproot threats; it now sought to avoid large-scale confrontations
by showing restraint, carrying out precision strikes, and building multiple layers
of sophisticated defensive infrastructure and technology to protect itself. This
defensive, rather than offensive, approach evolved into a new doctrine of “selffortification.” Instead of incorporating tactical defensive measures as part of a
larger offensive effort to combat threats, these tactical measures, often based on
groundbreaking innovations in military technology, became the principal deterrent to Israel’s nonstate adversaries.
Beyond surrounding itself with fences and concrete walls along its borders,
Israel has integrated advanced technologies to increase the effectiveness of these
physical barriers. Throughout the years, Israel’s border barriers have been fortified and equipped with day- and night-vision cameras, touch sensors, motion
detectors, and floating cameras. These measures are reinforced with military
patrols, human observers, and sand-filled areas near the fence that professional
military trackers scan for footprints. In some locations, Israel has replaced its
border fence with concrete and steel walls, particularly in places with a higher
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risk of infiltration and sniper fire. In 2017, Israel began replacing the border fence
with Lebanon, which stretches across 130 kilometers, with a nine-meter-high
concrete wall topped with another three meters of steel fencing.94
A year later, Israel began building the new Israel-Gaza barrier. The six-meterhigh barrier is made of galvanized steel and will stretch across the entire border
between Israel and the Gaza Strip at completion.95 Under the Israel-Gaza barrier,
Israel has constructed a belowground concrete wall to protect against infiltration
tunnels. The underground wall is expected to stretch across the sixty-five kilometers of the Israel-Gaza border. The barrier will consist of concrete and steel and
will penetrate the ground as deep as thirty meters.96 In 2018, Israel completed the
construction of a new sea barrier along the maritime border with the Gaza Strip.
The barrier consists of three layers—a regular breakwater, reinforced stone, and
barbed wire—all reinforced by smart fences equipped with alarm systems and
touch sensors, day- and night-vision cameras, and motion detectors.97
Israel has an active, multilayered missile-defense system arrayed against barrage threats from adversary states and militant organizations alike. This includes
the Arrow 3, Arrow 2, David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and Iron Beam—a newly developed active missile-defense system that uses concentrated laser waves to intercept
smaller objects such as mortar shells and small drones. The multilayered defense
system is under constant development and is expected to provide defense against
mortar shells; short-, medium-, and long-range surface-to-surface missiles and
rockets; medium- and long-range conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles;
and UAVs.
Colonel Yehuda Vach, commander of the Heiram regional brigade of the
Northern Command and one of the fiercest critics of Israel’s doctrine of selffortification, warns against the illusion of security that it creates: “[A] nation that
fortifies itself [with fences, barriers, and walls] is a nation that lives in fear. The
more fences we built across the borders, the more our security doctrine became
dependent on defense and self-fortification. A society that builds more and more
fences is a society that lives in fear. Logically, it might seem that fortifications
project strength but the truth is that it does not[;] if anything, it projects fear.”98
Through this lens, Israel’s doctrine of self-fortification can be perceived as a
symptom of national weakness. As Vach observed: “[T]he fighting spirit of the
military will not be reinforced by physical barriers but by its mental strength. A
nation that hides, projects mental weakness, is making it easier for the enemy
to defeat it. . . . [T]he fence creates an illusion, a false perception that [misleads
people into believing that] they are safe.”99
Major General (Ret.) Yitzhak Brick, who served as IDF chief ombudsman
and examined the operational readiness of more than a thousand military
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units during his service, is another fierce critic of the current trend in the IDF.
Brick criticized political and military leaders for shifting the IDF’s force planning toward defeating nonstate adversaries and disregarding the possibility of
a conventional war in the future. According to Brick, “the current misconception [among] the IDF military command [is] that there won’t be any more big
[conventional] wars. They do not consider the possibility that the Middle East
will change . . . that the Syrians might recover, that the Egyptians will change
their attitude, nothing. Just a small military for two arenas [the Gaza Strip and
Lebanon].”100
But Brick believes the IDF still will encounter difficulties facing nonstate adversaries, even with a self-fortification doctrine.
The next war will be a multi-front war against Hamas from Gaza, Hezbollah from
Lebanon and [at the same time we will have to deal with] missile attacks from Syria
and perhaps from Iraq. . . . [The next war] will include pounding [heavy missile barrages] of population centers in Israel by hundreds of thousands of rockets. . . . [Israel
will be] attacked by 1500–2000 missiles every day, . . . among them, missiles with
600–700 kilogram warheads. . . . [Israel] is facing a serious problem, as it is currently
incapable of blocking such [heavy, coordinated bombardment]. The air force alone
cannot do it, as we saw during the previous campaigns in Gaza. Our [anti]missile
[systems] are not developed enough to deal with such a large number of missiles.101

Senior officers in the IDF have explained that the only way to prevent massive
and destructive barrages from raining into Israel is to capture temporarily the
hostile areas from which the shelling is taking place.102 Previous military campaigns in the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon demonstrated that the air force
alone, despite its advanced antimissile capabilities, could not prevent missile
launches into Israel altogether, much less a coordinated missile attack on four
fronts. Thus, defending Israel effectively from major multiaxis barrages would
require a major military ground operation in which the IDF captures and controls launching areas in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria and, if need be, extends this
ground control as far as Iraq or Iran. Because the IDF reduced and deprioritized
its conventional fighting forces over the past decade, it is reasonable to conclude
that the IDF is not sufficiently prepared to contend with this worst-case scenario
and contemporary existential threats to Israel.
Overall, this article provides a primary analysis of recent structural changes
in the IDF at the tactical level, based on interviews with IDF soldiers, and points
to five observable trends: decreasing conventional capabilities, investing in and
developing defensive capabilities, reorientation of the practices and structure
of IDF combat forces toward guerrilla warfare, prioritizing cyber and intelligence capabilities, and expanding nuclear capabilities in the air and at sea.
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These trends indicate a doctrinal evolution in Israel toward prioritizing nonstate
adversaries. The rise of nonstate adversaries and the declining conventional
threat from nation-states, along with groundbreaking innovations in military
technology, drove this transformation. Israel’s shift toward a defensive security
doctrine has shaped the IDF’s force planning and readiness for war, which now
reinforce that doctrine in turn. The cementing of both the IDF’s transformation and Israel’s self-fortification approach to security means that the IDF may
not be properly prepared to contend with evolving complex threats as nonstate
adversaries grow in size and acquire rocket and missile capabilities that once
belonged only to states.
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I

srael traditionally has been reluctant to build a large navy or to become a sea
power. Nevertheless, the discovery of extensive natural gas fields in the eastern
Mediterranean over the past decade has transformed the region further into a
strategic powder keg that is drawing Israel out to sea. Turkey, Greece, Cyprus,
Israel, and Lebanon disagree about the borders of their maritime exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and they have attempted to impose their overlapping claims
by force. The simmering conflicts have drawn in an array of regional powers.
More recently, the United States has waded into the dispute; Russia is not far
behind.
Israel’s discovery of large gas fields in its own offshore EEZ has brought it
into geostrategic alignment with Cyprus and Greece. From a regional security
standpoint, it is one of the most interesting actors. In some circles, Israel has
been touted as a type of silver bullet that will
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more than a shift in operational focus toward the maritime domain; it involves
adopting a much broader national and strategic culture that is able to channel significant resources away from the land and toward the sea. Israel has begun to take
the sea more seriously and it has developed its offshore operational capabilities
significantly over the past few decades; yet, for several reasons that this article will
discuss, Israeli culture remains tied to the land rather than the sea. Using cultural
and constructivist approaches to security that have emerged over the past few
decades, this article will show why that fact will continue to create challenges for
the development of Israeli sea power.3 Israel and its allies need to consider these
cultural constraints when developing naval strategy, and they should factor them
into discussions about how much they can expect Israel to contribute to resolving
potential maritime conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean.
Much of the growing literature on Israel’s turn to the sea highlights Israel’s offshore interests. However, Israeli interests at sea are not new. Because the country
lacks close relations with its neighbors—indeed, they often boycott it—99 percent
of Israeli trade by volume travels by sea. Thus, geostrategically, Israel is equivalent
to an island, and it always has been extremely vulnerable to maritime threats.4 As
David Ben-Gurion himself stated, “There is no Land of Israel without the sea of
Israel.”5 These threats are not hypothetical; Israel fought two wars (in 1956 and
1967) largely over access to the sea.
Additionally, the recent focus on Israeli maritime affairs is not the first time
that political leaders and strategic analysts have proclaimed a turn to the sea by
Israel. On multiple occasions over several decades, Zionist leaders who recognized Israel’s vital interests at sea announced that they finally had overcome the
Jewish state’s “sea blindness.” Yet the need to make such claims repeatedly demonstrates that the transition has never quite occurred. Throughout its history,
Israel’s navalists have had to fight a culture deeply rooted in the land, one that was
not willing to make the necessary terrestrial sacrifices to build sea power. Assessing the viability of Israel’s current turn to the sea requires examining the cultural
impediments that Israel has faced in the past and that it will need to overcome
in the future. In doing so, culturist and constructivist approaches to security in
the eastern Mediterranean provide much-needed insight on a topic that has been
dominated by materialist approaches.
This article first will lay out the rising tensions in the eastern Mediterranean
and, by extension, the stakes for Israel’s development of sea power. Next it will
turn to a discussion of cultural approaches to the theory and history of sea power.
This theoretical analysis of sea power largely is missing from the literature on
Israel’s turn to the sea, but, as this article will argue, grappling with the concept
is critically important if one wishes to discuss Israel’s attempt to play a larger role
offshore. Then the article will discuss the tensions between the foundations of
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Israeli national culture and the requirements of sea power. Finally the article will
outline the cultural challenges that Israel has faced in obtaining sea power, and
why many of those challenges likely will persist in the future.
THE STAKES
Before discussing cultural impediments to Israeli sea power, this article first
must discuss the forces that currently are pulling Israel offshore and are making
Israel’s ability to operate at sea increasingly relevant. Over the past decade, Israel,
Cyprus, and Egypt have located and begun to exploit massive natural gas fields in
their maritime EEZs. Until recently, most estimates have valued these discoveries in the hundreds of billions of dollars, if not more;6 the economic downturn
caused by the coronavirus has reduced the projected value of the gas in the short
term and, in some circles, has led to questions about the viability of some plans to
exploit it. However, over the medium to long term, the gas still has the potential
to transform energy markets, and it has reconfigured strategic alliances.7 It also
has kindled instability and conflict; several confrontations at sea already have
occurred, and a naval arms race has kicked off among several eastern Mediterranean states. The United States and Russia increasingly are taking sides.
The contentions mainly stem from Turkey’s interpretations of international
law, which put it at odds with other states in the region as well as with the international community more generally. Since 1982, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has formed the basis for international maritime
law.8 UNCLOS designates territorial waters and maritime EEZs that govern resource exploitation at sea. However, because UNCLOS grants small islands the
same rights as continental states, Turkey’s EEZ is limited by the presence of Greek
islands around its coast. Therefore, Turkey rejects UNCLOS and claims an EEZ
without consideration for islands.9
This problem is compounded by the Cyprus dispute. Turkey is the only state
in the world that recognizes the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, located
in the northeast part of the island, and the Turks have anointed themselves the
guardians of the rights of Turkish Cypriots. As a result of these disputes, Turkey
asserts a claim to offshore gas fields that the rest of the world recognizes as belonging to the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has turned to the use of force to defend
its claims on Cypriot and Greek waters; Ankara repeatedly has sent its navy to
prevent Nicosia and Athens, and international oil companies, from drilling for
gas there. Meanwhile, Turkish warships are protecting Turkish oil companies as
they illegally explore and drill in Cypriot waters.10
The Turkish navy traditionally has been the most powerful in the region.
However, Cypriot interests in confronting Turkey over access to offshore gas have
aligned Cyprus with powerful regional and international actors. Israel and Egypt
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currently are exploiting large offshore gas fields in their EEZs. Like Turkey, Israel
is not a signatory to UNCLOS, but, unlike Turkey, Israel abides by UNCLOS definitions of territorial seas and EEZs. The UNCLOS interpretation of these matters
is the basis for agreements that Israel has signed with its maritime neighbors
over the past decade. Offshore gas could prove transformative to the Israeli and
Egyptian economies if the countries can export it to European markets. The most
obvious, and cost-effective, way to do so is through a pipeline that runs through
Turkey. However, both countries have rocky relationships with Ankara and do
not feel comfortable tying their economic interests to a Turkish pipeline. As an
alternative, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece want to establish an undersea pipeline that
would run from the gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean through Crete and up
through Italy to supply the European continent.
The combination of shared energy interests and animosity toward Turkey
has pulled Israel, Cyprus, and Greece into a close political alliance over the past
decade.11 From the beginning, this alliance, sometimes termed the “Energy Triangle,” has had a military component. In 2011 and 2012, Israel sent its air force to
Cyprus in a show of force meant to support its new ally. Israeli jets buzzed Turkish ships and entered what the Turks claim to be Northern Cyprus’s airspace. This
caused Turkey to scramble its own air force to interdict Israeli aircraft.12 Israel
and Greece also have begun to hold high-profile naval exercises in the region—a
clear warning to the Turks.13 Increasingly, Turkish actions have pushed Egypt and
Italy into the alliance with Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Newly discovered Egyptian
gas fields are adjacent to Cypriot and Israeli fields, so the three states have been
cooperating closely, and together they formed a high-profile East Mediterranean Gas Forum in Cairo in January 2020.14 Turkish interference in the area has
disrupted Egyptian gas operations and pushed Egypt even closer to Cyprus and
Israel. In response to negotiations between Cairo and Nicosia on using liquefied
natural gas (LNG) to avoid the Turkish pipeline in February 2018, the Turkish
navy blockaded ships from the Italian energy company ENI from reaching their
drilling site in Cypriot waters. The effect of the Turkish action was the opposite of
what Ankara had hoped for—it actually drove Cyprus and Egypt closer together.
They rushed to sign an agreement on sending Cypriot gas to Egypt for conversion
to LNG so it could be exported to Europe by ship rather than through a Turkish
pipeline. Shortly afterward, Israel followed Cyprus’s lead and penned a deal with
Egypt to do the same with its gas.15
Along with Israel, other regional actors have lined up against Turkey, especially after Ankara signed a deal with a semi-Islamist faction in the Libyan civil
war in November 2019 to divide the central and eastern Mediterranean between
them. In that deal, Turkey made a claim to seas that disregarded Greek islands
and Cyprus. In defense of its European Union allies and international law, France
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deployed its aircraft carrier, Charles de Gaulle, “to defensively stalk Turkish frigates sailing near to the contested gas fields close to Cyprus” in February 2020.16
The United Arab Emirates, which opposes Turkish regional policies, particularly
its actions in Libya, has become a strong supporter of Greece and Cyprus. Since
2018, it has participated in the annual Greek-led military exercise INIOCHOS,
along with the United States, Israel, Cyprus, Italy, and Egypt.17
As these tensions mount in the region, Israel is being drawn into a setting in
which several states are expanding their navies. Turkey has embarked on what it
describes as a transformative expansion of its fleet—already the most powerful
in the region, as noted. By 2023, Turkey will put twenty-four new ships to sea,
including four frigates and its first aircraft carrier, Anadolu. Turkey also is developing its domestic submarine program, and it is retrofitting its existing ships
and submarines with new navigation, weapons, and propulsion systems. In an
attempt to transform itself into a true sea power, Turkey has emphasized that this
naval construction is being accomplished by domestic Turkish industries. And,
as other sea powers have done, Turkey is developing educational, cultural, and
media institutions to drive public support for its anticipated emergence as a great
power on the sea.18
The Turks will not be the first state in the region to acquire an aircraft carrier; that honor goes to Egypt. The Egyptian navy also has expanded its fleet
considerably over the past decade, including by acquiring several German-built
submarines. France had built two Mistral-class helicopter carriers for Russia but
canceled their delivery in response to Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea. Egypt
stepped in to buy the two ships, which it now operates as Gamal Abdel Nasser
and Anwar el-Sadat.19
Israel also is in the process of updating its fleet, as part of its turn to the sea.
Most importantly, it is acquiring a new class of German-built corvette, the Sa’ar
6, which will be the most advanced surface vessel in the Israeli fleet. Israel also is
updating its older Sa’ar 4.5 and Sa’ar 5 corvettes, and it has acquired very capable
Dolphin 2–class submarines from Germany as well.20
On top of these local developments, several outside powers have become increasingly involved in the eastern Mediterranean region. The European Union
and the United States have criticized Turkish actions harshly and have come
down strongly in support of the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek energy triangle as well
as the Egyptian-led East Mediterranean Gas Forum. In the summer of 2019,
an influential, bipartisan group of U.S. senators and representatives introduced
the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019, which
codifies American support for Greece and Cyprus at the expense of Turkey. It
also offers military aid to both Cyprus and Greece. Then, in October 2019, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo flew to Greece to announce plans to expand
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the U.S. naval presence there and to turn Greek bases into an alternative to
Turkish bases for American operations. He also announced a deal to develop
supply channels to NATO allies in eastern Europe that run through Greece
rather than along the historical routes through Turkey. Pompeo made clear
“that operations in international waters are governed by a set of rules” and that
“[w]e’ve told the Turks that illegal drilling is unacceptable.”21 This language, along
with the expanding American military presence in the region, can only be read
in Ankara as a tacit threat.
On the other side, Turkey is not the only country that is being cut out of the
new gas deals. Russia has its own pipelines, through which it supplies over 50
percent of most European Union states’ gas needs. Thereby Russia can hold European energy markets hostage, and in the past Moscow has used these pipelines
to exert political influence on the continent.22 Any eastern Mediterranean gas
deals that cut out Turkey and Russia not only would hurt those two countries
financially but would threaten their geopolitical positions. Unsurprisingly, the
gas deals have pushed the two countries closer together and facilitated alreadybudding defense cooperation between them. Some analysts have begun to speculate that Russia might back Turkey not only politically but militarily in the growing regional disputes, including over gas in the eastern Mediterranean.23
Finally, Iran has sought to establish a corridor to the Mediterranean to support its allies and proxies in Syria and Lebanon. The most important Iranian asset
in the Levant is Lebanese Hezbollah, which looks to Tehran for both religious
and political guidance. Lebanon, which is increasingly dominated by Hezbollah,
hopes to discover its own gas fields in its EEZ. Lebanon has an unresolved maritime border dispute with Israel; although this does not affect Israel’s proven gas
fields, it would affect future exploration. Hezbollah, for which Iran is helping to
build irregular naval capabilities in the eastern Mediterranean, rejects Israel’s
existence and has threatened Israel’s offshore gas infrastructure.24 As the civil war
in Syria winds down, both Iran and Russia are likely to use their gains in Syria to
play a larger role at sea in the eastern Mediterranean. This almost certainly will
raise regional tensions.
In sum, the stakes for Israel in the eastern Mediterranean are high. The discovery of gas has reconfigured geopolitical alignments, pitting Israel, Cyprus,
Greece, Egypt, the European Union, and the United States against Turkey, Russia,
Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah. The rising tensions already have been militarized, and
unresolved disputes over waters with billions of dollars of gas under them easily
could turn into open conflict.25 Israel possesses one of the most powerful militaries in the region, but traditionally it has not been a sea power. Whether it can
and will turn to the sea will have important implications for this highly volatile
region. Yet, if history is a judge, Israel will need to do more than buy new naval
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platforms; a true turn to the sea will require a major shift in Israel’s national and
strategic culture.
SEA POWER AND CULTURE
The relationship between culture and sea power is not new, and it is not limited
to Israel. Over a century ago, the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan
famously laid out six elements of sea power. Most of those elements dealt with
ports, population size, geography (Switzerland will never be a sea power), and
the willingness of the government to support a navy. However, one of Mahan’s
elements (number five on his list) dealt with a more amorphous subject: “national
character.” As Mahan argued, a state can have all the attributes of a sea power,
but if its people lack a certain national character that pushes them toward the sea,
that state will have difficulty achieving its interests in that domain.26 It would be
easy to dismiss this aspect of Mahanian sea power as rooted in racial and racist
ideas of the later nineteenth century; indeed, Mahan’s contemporaries openly
discussed certain races as being inherently better suited for the sea.27 It is unclear
to what extent these racial notions influenced Mahan, but even if they did they
are not the only way to interpret his concept of national character.
National character just as easily can be viewed through the lens of culture,
and more-recent sea-power theorists have done just that. Geoffrey Till points
out that, since ancient times, seafaring communities have developed a distinctive culture—one that can be found across both time and space all over the
world. He gives an example of the Vikings having it in their “spirit of adventure,
enterprise, curiosity, and greed.”28 Likewise, the retired USN admiral turned
sea-power intellectual James G. Stavridis describes the “uncertainty and sense of
adventure” that “sailors have felt going back two thousand years or more.”29 These
sentiments are remarkably similar to the “healthy excitement of exploration and
adventure” that Mahan argued is an important element of the national character
needed for sea power.30 Andrew Lambert, one of the most accomplished naval
historians currently active, goes even further; in fact, he criticizes Mahan for not
putting enough emphasis on the cultural aspects of sea power. He argues that
sea power requires “actively constructing a cultural identity focused on the sea.”
Historically, sea powers not only built ships and ports but infused their cultures
with nautical themes. Their art, architecture, and public spaces highlighted the
role of the sea in the national character, and, as Lambert shows, eventually “this
consciously crafted identity spread beyond elites and interested parties: it flowed
into popular culture, pottery, coins, graffiti, books, printed images, and, by the
1930s, cinema.”31
In some sense, sea-power culture is a necessary but artificial social construct
for states that want to dominate the water. It is necessary because most people
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are not naturally inclined to focus on the sea; after all, they live on the land, and
their most immediate interests—and their military objectives in times of war—
most often are on land rather than at sea.32 Moreover, navies are expensive and
take considerable time to build. Sea powers require not only ships and sailors but
shipyards, ports, and skilled engineers. At best, these requirements take decades
to produce. Navies also require manpower that is more technically skilled than
what armies require, which means it is more difficult for a navy to rely on reserve
forces or a draft to fill its ranks. As a result, it is much more difficult to create and
maintain navies than ground forces.
Leaders promoting sea power, therefore, need to spend considerable effort to
convince their people that they should invest limited resources in a sea service.
For example, when Theodore Roosevelt, who was heavily influenced by Mahan,
wanted to build American sea power, he spent considerable time and effort raising public support for the U.S. Navy—for instance, by sending the Great White
Fleet to circumnavigate the globe in 1907–1909.33
Roosevelt also created naval heroes onto whom the public could latch.34 In
1905, Roosevelt had the body of the Revolutionary War sea captain John Paul
Jones exhumed from a long-forgotten grave in Paris. Jones’s body was returned to
the United States, where it was reinterred, with great public fanfare, in a massive
tomb on the grounds of the U.S. Naval Academy.35 Jones was a genuine war hero,
but after the Revolutionary War he left the United States to serve in the Russian
navy and died in obscurity in France. As a recent biographer of Jones has argued,
one of the reasons he was “resurrected” was that “Teddy Roosevelt needed a
hero.”36 Roosevelt understood that creating such heroes was essential for building
among the masses a culture of sea power that would support his naval ambitions.
He was right; throughout history, people lacking admiration for the sea have resisted government efforts to build sea power. Therefore strategies to build sea power
often are controversial; at times they can rip apart a state’s political leadership,
sometimes literally—in the seventeenth century, the Dutch sea-power enthusiast
Johan de Witt was “torn to pieces in the streets of the Hague” by those who were
tired of his focus on the sea and wanted to return to their land-based interests.37
The difficulties in building sea power for a country such as Israel are compounded by the distinction between large and small navies. If a state cannot or
will not invest enough to become a full-fledged sea power, its navy almost immediately faces several problems. Seafaring requires numerous, technical skill sets,
but if a navy has only a few ships it often is difficult for sailors to get enough time
at sea. Even for those who do, the opportunities for career progression and senior
leadership are limited. Thus, it becomes difficult to retain the most talented sailors. Moreover, because there are only a few senior positions in small navies, the
departure of leaders has an outsize effect.38
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Relatedly, as Till points out, “[n]avies survive and prosper partly through their
ability to have an appreciable impact on the defence decision-making processes
which define a country’s maritime policy.” But with few senior officers, “there
are fewer people with the necessary professional experience to influence, even
help shape, policy at the national level.” As a result, national policy “becomes less
likely to serve naval purposes. Instead, the navy simply gets told what its policy
is.”39 Such a situation clearly is not ideal for addressing predominantly maritime
problems.
Finally, navies in non-sea-power states face problems with economies of
scale. The fewer ships a state has, the costlier each individual ship is to produce,
maintain, and refit and the more expensive it is to train and equip the sailors who
man them. As a result, such states often are forced to outsource production and
professional military education. In many cases, this reliance on other states can
limit the strategies and policies of non–sea powers severely because their allies
hold significant leverage over them. Moreover, non–sea powers with small navies
often need to choose between spreading their limited resources thinly over a wide
range of capabilities and building real competency in a limited number of areas
while hoping that their allies will fill in the gaps. Neither approach is ideal, and
the latter choice likewise exposes small navies to strategic constraints imposed
by their partners.40
Almost all the problems associated with small navies and a lack of sea-power
culture have hindered the development of the Israeli navy. These obstacles likely
will persist in the future.
THE SEA, THE LAND, AND THE GEOGRAPHY OF
ZIONIST IMAGINATION
In contrast to the culture of sea power, the Zionist ideology on which the modern
state of Israel was founded is rooted deeply in interests on the land. Zionists traditionally have read Jewish history through the relationship between the Jewish
people and Eretz Yisrael (the biblical Land of Israel). Such a reading of history
aligns with a general perception that Jews are not a seafaring people.41
Of course, such reductive narratives are not as straightforward as their proponents suggest. Over the past few decades, a stream of revisionist scholarship has
uncovered or given new emphasis to Jewish experiences related to the sea. Jews
have traveled, explored, and made their living on the sea from ancient times until
the present.42 In contrast to popular perceptions of Jews as meek, city-dwelling
scholars and merchants, there were even some swashbuckling Jewish pirates in
the Caribbean.43
Therefore the Zionist focus on land represents a constructed identity rather
than the articulation of an innate characteristic of the Jewish people. This does
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not make Zionist narratives any less powerful in shaping the national ethos of
modern Israel. To understand that ethos, and the obstacles it presents to creating
sea power, it is necessary to detail how and why Zionist narratives about the connection between Jews and the land were created.
Throughout Jewish history, one finds a longing for a return to Eretz Yisrael,
and across the centuries numerous Jews acted on that impulse. However, modern
forms of political and cultural Zionism have their roots in nineteenth-century
Europe, where the place of Jews, never completely secure, became increasingly
dire. The rise of European nationalism and Romantic ideas about a Volk rooted
in the land threw into sharp contrast stereotypical depictions of “the wandering
Jew,” who spoke a different language (predominantly Yiddish), ate different (kosher) food, adhered to peculiar customs, and claimed roots in the Middle East.
Some Jews sought a solution to their predicament by creating a nation-state of
their own in what they considered to be their ancient homeland. In the second
half of the nineteenth century, this movement became known as Zionism.
In addition to the political goal of creating a Jewish state in Jews’ perceived
homeland, Zionism also developed a cultural component. Zionists attempted
to fashion what they called the “new Jew,” who contrasted sharply with the
stereotypical Diaspora Jew. Once Jews returned to their homeland, Zionists
would work in industries such as agriculture. Toiling in the fields would develop
physically strong bodies and root these new Jews in their land. This rootedness,
according to Zionist ideology, would solve many of the problems Jews had faced
as perennial outsiders in every land they had inhabited since the Roman Empire
exiled them from Judea.44 Yet this desire for rootedness was in direct conflict
with the veneration of wanderlust, exploration, and adventure that normally accompanies sea power.
Zionists’ desire to be rooted in a homeland dovetailed with their reading of
biblical history. The heartlands of ancient Jewish kingdoms were located among
the inland mountains and valleys of ancient Judea, Samaria, and the Galilee; the
coastal areas largely were controlled by Philistines, Greeks, and Phoenicians.
Thus, as one might assume, the ancient Israelites were concerned far more with
the land than the sea.
The Bible discusses land and agriculture extensively; it is far less concerned
with nautical matters. This focus on the land is reflected not only in biblical narratives but in the content of the ancient Hebrew language itself. Although the Hebrew Bible discusses warfare at length, it does not even provide a word for navy.
When modern Zionists turned to ancient Jewish texts for other nautical terms,
they struggled to find them. They had to invent terms such as ma’agan (anchorage), hashaka (launching a ship), saver (dock worker), and shayit (sailing).45 By
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contrast, biblical Hebrew is infused with vocabulary linking the ancient Israelites
to the land. At the most basic level, the Hebrew words for land/soil (adama) and
man (adam) are closely related. In root-based Semitic languages such as Hebrew,
this relationship is much more meaningful than it would be in English—it suggests a common essence.
Modern Zionist culture did not grow organically from a deterministic biblical past. However, when Zionists wanted to tie themselves to a land, it was not
difficult for them to find justifications in biblical history, and as Zionism developed, politically and culturally, its proponents increasingly emphasized the links
between Jews and the land—between adam and adama. Thus, writing in 1919,
the influential Zionist intellectual Harry Sacher wrote, “The idea of Judaism is
inseparable from the idea of the Jewish people, and the idea of the Jewish people
is inseparable from the idea of the Jewish land.” He tied together religious, political, cultural, and linguistic themes, referencing Jewish sages, and arguing, “The
cultivation of the Hebrew tongue is as natural as the cultivation of the land.”46 The
kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz, a collective agricultural settlement), in which the
Zionist “new Jews” tilled the soil, featured heavily in the early Zionist literature.47
Hebrew writers wrestled with overcoming the image of the diasporic wandering
Jew and putting down roots in the land.48 Early Zionist art and photography dealt
with similar themes. In 1935, the first Hebrew-language movie, Zot Hi HaAretz
(This Is the Land), explored images of adam and adama.49 The celebration of the
new Jew, who developed his mind and body by pouring blood and sweat into the
soil of his homeland—making the “desert bloom”—permeated popular culture. A
line from a folk song that later became a type of national slogan proclaimed “Anu
banu artzah livnot ve-lehibanot bah” (We came to the Land to build and be built
by it).50 Similarly, a 1937 poem that, when put to music, became an “unofficial
anthem” for Zionists’ agricultural settlements captures the emotions tied up in
the return both to an ancient homeland and to working the land.51
Watch, look, and see
How great this day is
Fire glowing in the chest
And the plow
Again tilling the field.52
Of course, Zionist thought could not ignore the sea completely. Most Jews had
to travel by sea to reach Eretz Yisrael, and a subset of Hebrew literature emerged
representing that experience.53 However, as often as not the sea was simply “a barrier
that had to be crossed before arriving at the shores of the new country”; it was not
essential for building a new national identity.54 There were no portrayals of the sea

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

53

48

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

in early Zionist culture that could compete with the place of the land in the emerging national consciousness.55 As one scholar of Zionist culture put it, “The history
of Zionist efforts to elaborate the dialectical relation between Jew and land in no
small measure defines the entire history of the movement between 1881 and 1938.”56
ISRAEL’S REPEATED TURNS TO THE SEA
The overwhelming focus of early Zionist culture on the land rather than the sea
did not align with the geographic realities of Jewish settlement. In the biblical period, to which Zionists looked for inspiration, Jewish populations, as noted, were
concentrated in the interior mountains, while non-Jewish populations were concentrated along the coast. By contrast, while some modern Zionist Jews settled in
and around the Jerusalem highlands, most settlement occurred in an N-shaped
pattern up the coast, diagonally southeast through the Galilee, and then north
around the Sea of Galilee into the Hula Valley. The main Jewish population centers, such as Tel Aviv (founded in 1909), were on the Mediterranean coast.57 The
gap between the imagined geography of Eretz Yisrael and the geographic reality
of Zionist settlement created a type of cognitive dissonance. For example, a 1939
short story written in simple Hebrew for new immigrants depicts the surprise of
a Jewish refugee from Europe when he arrives in Tel Aviv. He was in “the land of
the Patriarchs, the revived homeland,” but “[h]ere, on the beach . . . everything
was so ordinary, just like in Europe.” The idea of the ancient land that he expected
contrasted sharply with the Mediterranean reality of his new life.58
These geographic realities gradually began to impose the sea on the Zionist
movement, and in the 1930s one finds the first claims that Zionists had turned to
the sea. During this period, Zionists opened a Jewish-run port in Tel Aviv, developed fisheries, formed maritime leagues, inaugurated a nautical school in Haifa,
and established private shipping companies.59 In 1938, Raphael Patai added intellectual weight to this project when he published a book in Hebrew on ancient
Jewish seafaring. The book was based on a doctoral dissertation that completed
the first PhD that the Hebrew University of Jerusalem had awarded.60 David BenGurion, who emerged as the most important Zionist political leader at this time,
realized that the Zionists’ almost-exclusive focus on the land was misaligned with
the strategic imperatives of the developing Jewish state. Not only was the sea a
geographic reality that forced itself on the Jewish settlements clustered along the
coast, but as the surrounding Arab states emerged from colonial empires Israel
became a geostrategic island. Thus, the sea became the only outlet Zionists had
to the rest of the world. Ben-Gurion therefore argued, “The conquest of the soil
by city people was the great, first adventure of our movement, of our endeavour
in the country. A second adventure, great also, and perhaps harder than the first,
still awaits us—the conquest of the sea.” For Ben-Gurion, the Mediterranean was
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“the natural bridge that connects our small country with the wide world. The
sea is an organic, economic, and political part of our country.” This being the
case, “[t]he road to the sea is a way to expand our country, to augment our economic base, to strengthen our national health, to enforce our political position,
to dominate the elements.”61 At the time, Zionist leaders presented the “conquest
of the sea” as the third pillar of Zionism, along with “redemption of the land”
and “revival of the soul.”62 By 1945, in recognition of their geographic situation,
the Zionists overcame considerable political challenges to establish the shipping
company ZIM. This commercial shipping capability would prove crucial in safeguarding Israel’s trade in the decades ahead, and ZIM eventually developed into
one of the world’s leading shipping lines.63 As a result of these developments, a
historian of modern Israel has argued recently that the prestate Jewish movement
went through a “maritime revolution” during the 1930s and 1940s.64
Yet despite this supposed turn to the sea, in 1948 a newly independent Israel
found itself completely unprepared in terms of resources, training, equipment,
and—just as importantly—mentality to confront the challenges it faced at sea
during its war of independence. Following World War II, Jewish communities in
Israel developed a naval militia called the Palyam, and Zionists—with a great deal
of help from both Jewish and non-Jewish sympathizers abroad—smuggled Holocaust survivors past a British blockade in a program known as Aliyah Bet. The
most famous of these Aliyah Bet ships was Exodus, which the British boarded.
They killed and injured several passengers and sent the Holocaust survivors back
to Europe.65
As independence neared, Zionist leaders attempted to turn these initiatives
into a national navy. As one member of the Palyam later recalled, the leadership
brought him and other members into a meeting and “informed us that we were
no longer the Palyam; we were now the Israeli Navy.”66 The Jews had a hundred
miles of coast to protect, in addition to their shipping. Yet while Palyam members were dedicated and daring, they were trained and equipped only to carry
out small commando raids; they did not possess the technical knowledge to run
a navy. In addition to their lack of ship-handling experience on large vessels,
they had no experience in the command and control that is essential for naval
operations.67 In a sign of how desperate the Israelis were for competent naval
leadership, Ben-Gurion cabled a Zionist office in New York, asking it to send
a twenty-six-year-old Jewish American named Paul N. Shulman. Shulman had
graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and had fought on a destroyer in the
Pacific during World War II. Despite his age, Ben-Gurion wanted him to command HaSherut HaYami (the Sea Service), which is what the Israelis called it at
the time, because they had not settled on a Hebrew word for navy yet. Shulman
recruited several other American Jews with naval experience to take key jobs that
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the Israelis could not fill. Jonathan Leff, who was one of Shulman’s classmates at
Annapolis, became head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery of the Sea
Service; Harold Gershenow, who had served as a ship-repair officer in the U.S.
Navy during World War II, was brought to Israel to rebuild and operate the Bat
Galim port at Haifa; Harold Shugar, who had served as a gunnery officer in the
American navy and happened to be studying abroad at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem when the war broke out, was recruited to be the gunnery officer on the
Israeli flagship.68 The head of the Palyam became Shulman’s deputy, and together
they opened a training program at Haifa.
Yet despite the turn to the sea that supposedly had occurred over the preceding
decade, the land-focused leadership of the Israel Defense Forces did not prioritize
the sea and did not attempt to use it strategically. Its members derided Shulman’s
force as “the bathtub corps.” The navy had only three real ships: two former
Canadian corvettes and a former U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker. The icebreaker,
renamed Eilat, became Shulman’s flagship. None of these ships was armed, so the
Israelis mounted a 1906 French army field-artillery piece on the deck of Eilat.69
The fledgling Israeli navy had difficulty convincing the national leadership to
provide it with resources. Of course, the new state had limited assets it could offer
the navy, especially in wartime, but the lack of available funds only partly explains
the failure to support the navy. Money was available, but the civilian leadership
saw no use in spending it on the sea service. The official responsible for the
navy at the Ministry of Defense, Gershon Zak, had a background in education
administration. Zak rejected Shulman’s repeated requests for funds to build a
communications station, so Shulman asked for money for a cultural center. This
request was more aligned with Zak’s interests, and it was approved. Shulman then
“misappropriated” the funds to build the communications station.70 This would
not be the last time that Israeli naval leaders misled or ignored their superiors
outside the sea service to accomplish their missions and protect the vital interests
of the state.71
The Israeli navy did achieve a few important successes during the war. Most
importantly, a commando raid carried out via a small boat launched from Shulman’s flagship sank the Egyptian flagship, Emir Farouk.72 Yet the Israeli navy
never was used to its full potential. Many Israelis saw Shulman, who was the most
competent naval officer, as a typical Diaspora Jew rather than the “new Jew” of
the Zionist project. He was forced to step down following the war and largely was
written out of Israeli history.73
Following Israeli independence, the national ethos remained firmly rooted in
the land. In a major cultural landmark, the first play performed in the new state
was Moshe Shamir’s highly acclaimed Hu Halakh ba-Sadot (He Walked through
the Fields). It later was transformed into a successful Hebrew movie. As the title

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1

56

Naval War College: Spring 2021 Full Issue

HELFONT

51

indicates, the plot revolves around life on a kibbutz, with all the resulting imagery
of adam and adama.74 Probably the most important influence on postindependence Israeli culture has been the writings of Amos Oz, who burst onto the Hebrew literary scene in the 1960s with a collection of short stories describing life
on a kibbutz.75 The relationship between Zionist Jews and the land permeated his
career.76 In recent decades, agriculture and kibbutzim have lost their central role
in Israel, but they remain an important part of the state’s founding myth, as well
as a cultural force. For example, Oz ultimately cemented his place in Israeli literary history with a 2002 memoir about his own journey as a boy from the life of a
city Jew in Jerusalem to a truly Zionist life on an agricultural collective. Notably,
when he left the city and rooted himself in the land he changed his surname from
the Yiddish Klausner to the Hebrew Oz, thus completing the Zionist transformation. The book made a tremendous impact, and in 2015 the Israeli American
actress Natalie Portman transformed it into a Hebrew-language movie in which
she played a central role, that of young Amos’s mother.77
As one might expect, this continued cultural affinity for the land affected the
resources and attention that the young Israeli navy received from the state. As
one prominent Israeli defense analyst has noted, in the first few decades of Israel’s
statehood “[t]he [Israel Defense Forces] headquarters had little understanding of
naval needs and was not inclined to divert scarce funds to a service considered to
be of secondary importance.”78 In the 1950s, the Israelis attempted to build a navy
around capital ships (mostly British destroyers) and they purchased WWII-era
British submarines. However, the destroyers proved too expensive to man and
run. Moreover, they failed to achieve Israeli objectives at sea. Following the 1948
war, Egypt closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, which blocked passage
from Israel’s southern port of Elat to the Red Sea. Egypt also prevented Israel from
using the Suez Canal. These actions cut Israeli ties with Asia and hindered the
development of its southern Negev region, which was a priority for Ben-Gurion.
Reopening the strait and Israel’s access to the Red Sea became one of the
country’s main objectives when it joined Britain and France in the 1956 war
against Egypt. Israeli forces raced down the Sinai Peninsula and captured Sharm
al-Sheikh, which overlooks the strait. Israel then made opening of the waterway
a key provision for handing the territory back to Egypt, and it took the opportunity to send a few Israeli navy ships through the straits to Elat. Under intense
American and international pressure, Israel withdrew from the Sinai without
clear Egyptian acquiescence to Israel’s right of passage by sea. Subsequently, only
foreign ships were allowed through the straits; if an Israeli ship wished to pass,
it needed to fly a false flag. The Israeli warships that transited to Elat during the
crisis remained bottled up there until the 1967 war. Therefore the Israeli navy was
not able to secure sea lines of communication for vital Israeli shipping (which by
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the 1960s included much-needed oil shipments from Iran). When Egypt decided
to close the straits completely in 1967, Israel had no naval option to open them.79
In such situations, states with small navies often rely on alliances with sea powers,
and the Israelis turned to the United States. However, while the Americans were
supportive, they were tied down in Vietnam, and they could not muster international support to force the issue.80 To regain access to the sea, Israel was forced
into a general war rather than a more limited naval action.
The year 1967 was a low point for the Israeli navy, for several reasons. It largely
missed out on the celebrated actions of what Israelis call the Six-Day War in June.
Other than some small commando raids, the only major action the Israeli navy
took was to attack USS Liberty, an American signals-intelligence-collection platform. Several dozen Americans were killed or injured in the attack. The Israelis
insist the attack was a mistake, but it remains a contentious topic for some in the
U.S. Navy today.81 Later in the year, the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk by a Soviet
Styx missile fired from an Egyptian missile boat. Then, right after the New Year,
an Israeli submarine on its maiden voyage from England to Israel disappeared
along the way.82
Fortunately for the Israeli navy, brighter days were on the horizon. Israeli
navalists understood the critical national interests Israel had at sea, yet the state
provided them relatively few resources. Yet as the adage states, necessity is the
mother of invention, and in the mid-1960s Israeli naval officers developed a bold
plan to scrap Israel’s destroyers and replace them with heavily armed missile
boats. No Western navy relied on missile boats at the time, so this was a fairly
radical plan—even more so because when the Israeli navy decided on this course,
it had yet to develop a surface-to-surface missile and it had no platform on which
to put it.83
Eventually, the Israelis developed the Gabriel missile and the Germans agreed
to build them a modified version of their Jaguar-class fast-attack craft. As theorists of small navies have argued, reliance on foreign procurement can be problematic because it ties strategic assets to the whims of international politics, and
that proved to be the case for Israel and its missile boats. The Germans worried
that the Arabs would boycott them if it became public that they were building
missile boats for Israel; however, the Israelis were able to convince Germany to
allow the French to build the German boats in the port of Cherbourg. Because of
the war in Algeria, the French were out of favor with the Arabs anyway, so they
did not face a diplomatic threat.84
But before the boats were completed, the international political winds shifted.
Following the French withdrawal from Algeria, President Charles de Gaulle attempted to mend ties with the Arab states, and Israel was left in the lurch. The
French imposed an embargo on arms to Israel, which meant they would not
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permit Israel to take possession of the new missile boats on which its entire naval
strategy depended. In a major scandal at the time, the Israelis tricked the French
into thinking they had sold their rights to the boats to a Norwegian shipping
company. Then, on Christmas Eve 1969, the Israelis escaped with the boats into a
storm in the English Channel. Israeli officers and crew, many of whom had been
hiding belowdecks in the French harbor, piloted the boats back to Haifa, refueling
at sea from modified Israeli merchant ships and dodging the French, Soviet, and
Egyptian navies along the way.85
Once in Israel, the boats were fitted with the Gabriel missile system. The
Gabriel’s range was far shorter than that of the Soviet Styx missile, which the
Egyptian and Syrian navies used. This meant that the Israeli boats would be
shot out of the water before they fired their own missiles at their adversaries.
Again, necessity bred innovation, and Israeli engineers developed a revolutionary
electronic-warfare system, mostly using chaff, that was able to spoof the Styx missiles and allow Israeli ships to operate within their range.86
During the 1973 war with Syria and Egypt, the Israeli missile boats performed
beyond all expectations. In the battle of Latakia, Israeli and Syrian boats engaged
in history’s first missile battle at sea. The Israeli boats were able to operate safely
within the range of the Soviet missiles and they sank all five of the Syrian boats
that took part in the battle. Later in the war, the Israelis repeated their successes
against Egyptian missile boats in the battle of Baltīm. Over the course of the war,
the Egyptians and Syrians fired over fifty missiles at the Israeli boats, but none
hit their targets; by contrast, the Israelis were able to sink any Syrian or Egyptian
vessel that ventured out of port. The Israelis used this command of the sea to
bombard strategic targets on the Egyptian and Syrian coasts as well as to ensure
the vital resupply of weapons by sea from the United States.87 In addition to these
victories in the Mediterranean, Israeli naval commandos achieved important
victories around the Sinai and the Red Sea.88 As a result, some have heralded the
acquisition of these missile boats as a turning point for the Israeli navy.89
However, this turning point should not be misconstrued as signifying a new
age for the Israeli defense establishment’s relationship with the sea. While the Israeli navy did achieve a number of stunning successes in the war, those successes
came despite the fact that Israel’s political and military leadership was inept at
using the sea service. David Elazar, the chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces,
planned to use the navy in the war simply to “defend essential targets along the
length of the state’s coast and to be on alert to transition quickly to attack the
enemy on the sea and in the ports.”90 Basically, all he wanted the navy to do was
prevent Egyptian or Syrian boats from coming close enough to launch their missiles at the Israeli coast. On the first night of the war, he ordered Benjamin Telem,
the commander of the navy, to recall a naval force that was heading north toward
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Syria; he did not want the navy to get into a situation that would have required
the diversion of land or air forces. Telem, in a daring—and potentially careerending—move, chose to ignore the order. The force in question won the battle
of Latakia and shaped the war at sea—but it did so in defiance of Israeli military
leadership, not because of it. Elazar later admitted, “I underestimated the navy.”91
While the more than doubling of Israel’s coastline resulting from the 1967
war forced the state to provide the navy with more assets, even this did not occur
without a fight. The government rejected the navy’s additional request to build a
fleet of landing craft following the 1967 war. Israeli navalists regarded this decision as “a grave blunder,” and because of it the army faced significant difficulties
crossing the Suez Canal during the 1973 war. As Efraim Inbar has stated, “The
government was still ground-oriented and not inclined, either by doctrine or
budget, to approve large amphibious operations.”92 The war exposed other problems with the navy as well. Although the Israelis controlled the Strait of Tiran, the
Israeli navy could not prevent the Egyptians from blockading the Bab el Mandeb
choke point at the southern end of the Red Sea, essentially cutting off Israel’s connections with Asia and Africa. The Egyptians also successfully mined the Strait
of Jubal in the Gulf of Suez. By doing so, they cut off Israeli oil supplies from Abu
Rudeis. This highlighted the Israeli navy’s inability to minesweep.93 Moreover, it
should not be forgotten just how close Israel was to not having its missile boats
because of its diplomatic situation; although the Israelis managed to smuggle the
boats out of France in the middle of the night, it was a close-run thing, and the
operation could have been upended in numerous ways. It certainly is not a model
to be replicated.
Nevertheless, the war did demonstrate, even to those who did not understand
the service fully, that the Israeli navy could play a constructive role. Although
Israeli political and military leaders have remained wary about pulling resources
from land and air forces over the years, several optimistic navalists have argued
repeatedly that Israel finally is turning to the sea. Such claims have come every
decade since the 1970s. In the 1980s, Efraim Inbar argued that Israel reached
a new phase in its relationship with the sea after the navy won a hard-fought,
multiyear battle to enact a reform and modernization program, which included
the purchase of American-built Sa’ar 5 corvettes, which were considerably larger
than the missile boats on which Israel had relied since the 1960s.94 Other scholars
argue that, although for “most of Israel’s seven-decades-long history the sea did
not play a significant role in Israeli security, energy market, or development policies, . . . beginning in the 1990s, Israeli decision makers turned their attention to
the sea.” These scholars state that this turn to the sea was tied to an accumulation
of issues such as fisheries, environmental concerns, desalination, offshore energy,
and the development of seaports; together, these and other interests created a
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critical mass that finally pushed Israel to the sea.95 Another analyst claims that
Israel finally began to take the sea seriously in 2006, when Hezbollah hit the Israeli corvette Hanit with an Iranian-supplied cruise missile.96 And finally, there
are the claims that, after decades of neglect, signs of Israel finally turning to the
sea include the discovery of offshore gas fields; the new alliances with Greece and
Cyprus; and the purchase of a new, larger class of Sa’ar 6 corvettes from Germany.
Arguments supporting Israel’s various supposed turns to the sea have highlighted the very real progress the Israeli navy has made over the past few decades.
However, each step forward has been a struggle, and despite some advances
Israel has not resolved its strategic maritime issues. A 2018 report on the Israeli
navy argues that “[t]he Israeli Navy currently has far fewer corvettes and fast attack craft than it requires, and almost all of these have never been fully outfitted
with their designed number of fire-control systems.” In addition, limited missile
reloads for Israel’s otherwise very capable submarines limit their ability to act as
a deterrent.97
Moreover, while Israel has developed its naval shipbuilding industry, the Israeli navy continues to rely on foreign sources for its capital ships and submarines,
which means its future fleet relies on a favorable diplomatic landscape.98 Support
for Israel remains controversial in many states. Recently, even in the United
States—which traditionally has been Israel’s greatest supporter—some political
factions have questioned the American relationship with the Jewish state. Until
Israel resolves the Palestinian issue, it likely will face continued international
political opposition that easily could hinder its procurement of future platforms
or limit its strategic options at critical times. Until Israel develops the capability
to produce, maintain, and man a large fleet independently, these strategic constraints will continue to hinder its attempts to become a sea power.
Then there is the fact that the Israeli defense establishment, as well as its political leadership, still is dominated by officials who have limited knowledge of the
sea or naval operations. In October 2019, this land-focused defense establishment proposed canceling part of Israel’s naval buildup and reallocating the funds
to ground forces and air defense.99 As these examples show, planned expansions
to, or even maintenance of, the existing Israeli navy will continue to be a struggle.
As a high-profile 2016 report states, “It is . . . impossible to overstate Israel’s
interests in maritime security. Yet, surprisingly, the maritime domain is almost
absent from public discourse in Israel, a nation not known for its maritime culture or history.”100 Classic sea-power theory would argue that it will be difficult
for Israel to provide the sustained resources necessary to secure its maritime
interests under those circumstances. If Israeli leaders are serious about building
sea power, they probably need more than a few new ships. To build the national
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expertise and devote the resources required for creating sea power, Israel will
need to develop popular support for such projects. To do so, it will need to infuse
Israeli society with maritime culture. Considering Israel’s history, that will not be
an easy task.
If history is a judge, the Israeli navy will have difficulty meeting the challenges
it faces. While Israel may be devoting more resources to its navy, others are too—
the eastern Mediterranean currently is in the midst of a naval arms race. The
Egyptian and Turkish navies already dwarf Israel’s in terms of size. Not only are
they both rapidly expanding quantitatively, but they are moving toward aircraft
carrier–based fleets. The Russian navy also has shown an increasing interest in
the area.
Additionally, if Israel weds its energy interests to an undersea pipeline running
to Italy and beyond or to LNG shipments from Egypt to Europe, Israel’s critical
maritime interests will extend hundreds of miles from its shore; this will be a
major change for a navy that so far has been concerned with defense of Israel’s
two-hundred-mile EEZ.
Thus, even an Israeli navy that can meet today’s challenges likely will be inadequate in the near future. Israel will need to devote even more resources to its fleet.
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THE 1988 BLUES
Admirals, Activists, and the Development of the Chinese
Maritime Identity
Andrew Rhodes

T

he year 1988 marked a critical moment in China’s emergence as a maritime
power. The seven months from February to August 1988 saw not only a major
naval campaign in the Spratly Islands but also the startling cultural phenomenon
of 河殇 (Heshang, or River Elegy), a multiepisode television documentary that
called on China to turn away from tradition to embrace a maritime identity.1
The prodemocracy creators of Heshang and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
Navy (PLAN) leadership had little in common in terms of how they thought
China should be governed, but there is a surprising overlap in the way the two
groups were “selling the sea,” or seeking to forge a more maritime future for China.2 These two parallel stories highlight an important but overlooked historical
moment in the evolution of China’s maritime identity and its commitment to
maritime power.
In China in 1988, several trends were building to a dramatic, and ultimately
violent, crescendo, with major implications for Chinese society and China’s place
in the world. A decade after the launch of Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms,
the movement that sought democratic political reforms and a new Chinese culture was developing powerful momentum and ties to the outside world—only to
meet tragic suppression a year later at Tiananmen
Andrew Rhodes is a career civil servant. He earned
an MA in international relations from the Johns Square. At the same time, the PLA, and the PLAN
Hopkins University School of Advanced Internationin particular, was in the midst of its own reform
al Studies. In 2019, he graduated with highest disand new engagement on the global stage. Considtinction from the College of Naval Warfare, U.S. Naval War College (NWC), and is an affiliated scholar eration of the intersection of the cultural and poof NWC’s China Maritime Studies Institute.
litical history of 1988 with the military and naval
Naval War College Review, Spring 2021, Vol. 74, No. 2
history of 1988 has focused—understandably—on
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the path to June 1989. But there are intriguing parallels, beyond mere coincidence, in the cultural and naval events of the spring and summer of 1988 that
provide a new lens for viewing the relationship between Chinese culture and
Chinese sea power.
Thirty-two years is not long in the grand sweep of naval history or Chinese
history, but the rapid pace of PLAN development in the twenty-first century
makes 1988 seem rather like the ancient past. The late 1980s are within the living memory of many scholars and strategists, but too few remember the events
of 1988 and the global, regional, and national context in which they took place.
For most Americans, the China of 1988 hides behind two veils—the Tiananmen
Square massacre and the end of the Cold War—that obscure our view of important historical trends. Many of the key trends the world confronts today grew
from seeds that already were germinating, in very recognizable ways, in 1988.
A closer examination of 1988 suggests, for example, that the campaign begun in
2014 to build artificial islands in the Spratly Islands had unprecedented scope
but emerged from actions driven by the “maritime mentality” and specific naval
actions of 1988.3 Revisiting Heshang reveals how PLA leaders in the Xi Jinping
era have echoed the language of 1988’s prodemocracy activists. The PLAN commander in 2014 wrote that China had suffered in the past because it “clung to the
traditional thinking of valuing the land and neglecting the sea,” while the 2015
defense white paper called for China to abandon the “traditional mentality that
land outweighs sea.”4
The next section of this article briefly will review key concepts in the literature
on maritime identity and sea power, and will suggest taking a nuanced view of
China’s evolution from a continental power to a more maritime power. Following
this theory section, the two subsequent sections will explore the cultural dimensions and historical context in which Heshang emerged and the strategic context
of the 1988 naval campaign. The final portions of the article will examine the
interaction of these cultural and naval events, and how such a consideration enriches our understanding of China’s maritime identity. The article will conclude
by arguing that the events of 1988 offer clear evidence that China’s commitment
to sea power has been well under way for more than three decades, and has built
on a surprisingly diverse basis of support over that period.
CONCEPTS OF MARITIME IDENTITY AND
THE PURSUIT OF SEA POWER
The approach of examining 1988 through both cultural and strategic lenses rests
on a strong foundation in the literature on the nature of sea power. Theorists of
sea power broadly agree that a nation’s geographic, political, economic, and cultural contexts shape its relationship with the sea and sea power. As Geoffrey Till
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writes, “seapower is the product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents
that are difficult to tease apart.”5 However, some theorists have emphasized the
nation’s innate characteristics and values that lead to its acquisition and maintenance of sea power, while others have put more weight on the conscious policy
decisions of governments to promote and develop sea power.
The argument that sea power emerges directly from national character has
been compelling to writers from Thucydides to Mahan and has been well argued
more recently by Peter Padfield and Andrew Lambert. In a series of books, Padfield contends that there is a close link between the ability of peoples “ascendant
at sea” to prevail over those “with a territorial power base,” on the one hand,
and the “system of beliefs and of government associated with supreme maritime
power,” on the other. In such a system, merchant wealth leads to “merchant values” and political structures with “dispersed power and open, consultative rule.”
In this sense, the impressive voyages of Ming China in the fifteenth century did
not represent true maritime power, because they were not profit-driven enterprises but instead merely prestige projects “financed by the imperial treasury.”
Padfield also underscores the links between the progressive or disruptive culture
of new media and maritime power.6 Padfield focuses on the innovative media of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the novel and the daily newspaper)
that promoted the values of the merchant class, producing contrasting bases
for maritime power in France, England, and the Netherlands.7 In 1980s China,
television was a similarly new medium that was adapted readily for disruptive
cultural arguments.
More recently, Lambert’s 2018 book argues that there are no pure “seapowers”
in the world today, and history has seen only a small number of true sea powers.
Lambert’s study of how a nation creates a “seapower identity” makes plain that
sea power is a function of cultural factors far more than political, economic, or
military ones. In this very broad cultural argument, Lambert states emphatically
that the real “soul of seapower” must be sought in the culture of a state, and he
chooses to invoke art historians and critics, such as Jacob Burckhardt and John
Ruskin, as being more relevant to the matter than Mahan’s elements of sea power,
which, Lambert argues, address “only the strategic surface.”8
Jakub Grygiel also considers many centuries of the history of sea power, but in
studying ancient China he finds conclusions different from those of Lambert and
Padfield. Grygiel’s analysis of the Ming dynasty leads him to argue that the Ming
retreat from the sea after the voyages of Zheng He “was not a product of deeply
embedded cultural values peculiar and eternal to China. Rather it was a historically specific policy that proved to be a costly mistake.”9 In considering modern
Chinese grand strategy and the country’s ambitions as a rising power, Chinese
and foreign scholars have investigated the influence of Mahanian maritime
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thinking in China and debated whether a continental orientation—sometimes
associated with the geopolitical theory of Halford Mackinder—holds more
explanatory power.10 James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara find clear evidence of
Mahanian tendencies in Chinese leaders since Deng and even some appreciation
for naval power in Mao Zedong. But Holmes and Yoshihara also argue that “sea
power is a conscious political choice,” and they dedicate a chapter of Red Star over
the Pacific to China’s “strategic will to the sea.”11 Several recent Chinese authors,
some of them PLAN officers, have pointed to a lack of 海洋意识 (maritime consciousness) or insufficient 海权意识 (awareness of sea power) for China’s past
defeats, such as in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95.12
These theorists offer useful frameworks for thinking about the connection between Chinese culture and sea power in 1988, but simplistic cultural arguments
fall short where they underappreciate the dynamism of China’s national character
in the 1980s and how much China’s leaders and people willed the nation toward
a more maritime future. Lambert may set too high a bar for qualification as a sea
power, but his articulation of the ideal serves as a useful reminder that most states
exist somewhere on a spectrum between continental and maritime power. Bruce
Swanson wrote in the early 1980s that “Chinese naval history over the past millennium has been characterized between two great cultural entities: continental,
Confucianist China and maritime China.”13 Indeed, as we will see below, this
dichotomy is a central theme of Heshang.
However, Lambert is far too dismissive in his assessment that China never will
be a true sea power, that its “attitudes towards the sea remain profoundly negative,” and that its construction of artificial islands reflects a “Great Wall” mentality that is “the antithesis of seapower identity.”14 Although China was not about
to become another Venice in 1988, key cultural and naval moments of mid-1988
challenge Lambert’s argument. Heshang shows clearly that the prodemocracy activists of 1988 shared Padfield’s vision of a close link between democracy and the
sea: that Chinese maritime power indeed was “driven by merchant mariners for
profit” and not driven by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or “by the court
for prestige, luxury, and sheer curiosity.”15 Holmes and Yoshihara are right to note
Mahanian tendencies among China’s leaders, although the 1988 case suggests
that this has more to do with Mahan’s advocacy for the conscious buildup of naval
power than his emphasis on the economic basis of sea power.
The concept of strategic culture knits together the role of national culture
and the specific choices a nation makes in pursuit of a strategic goal such as the
development of sea power. There are various definitions for strategic culture and
a healthy debate over the explanatory power of the concept, but thinking about
the Chinese strategic culture of 1988—as a “system of symbols” or “modes of
thought and action” derived from the “national historical experience”—enriches
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our understanding of China’s choices and behavior in 1988 and the decades that
followed.16 Of particular note for thinking about 1988, Alastair Iain Johnston describes the value of “cultural artifacts” such as those from the fields of cinema and
literature as lenses for examining the roots of strategic behavior and decisions.17
Heshang is just such a cultural artifact; it creates new ways of understanding 1988
as an essential moment in China’s long-term development of a maritime identity
and its pursuit of sea power.
THE DECADE LEADING TO HESHANG
As a cultural artifact, an explicitly prodemocracy documentary on a Chinese
state–run television network did not occur in a vacuum; it was the result of a
decade of increasing openness in Chinese cultural and political discourse. This
spirit had precedent in Chinese history, and many of the intellectuals calling for
continued reform in 1988 explicitly invoked earlier moments of openness and
forward thinking, such as the Self-Strengthening Movement of the late Qing
dynasty. This movement sought to capture foreign knowledge and technology,
and leading Qing officials, such as Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, sought to
break Western domination of China’s maritime economy by importing Western
maritime know-how and establishing a Chinese shipping industry.18 Reformers
in the 1980s also harked back to the 1919 May Fourth Movement, which not
only launched the modern era of Chinese politics but opened a period “marked
by cosmopolitanism and a desperate thirst for things new and foreign.” The
1980s saw a similar cosmopolitan thirst. Despite several periods of “conservative
backlash”—in 1981, 1983, and 1987—that thirst grew more powerful each time.19
Writing just prior to Tiananmen, Ralph Crozier described the dominant
cultural theme of China from 1985 to 1988 as “going to the world,” as Chinese
artists adapted Western artistic forms and sought to create a new Chinese modernism, rather than just recycling traditional Chinese art.20 The national leadership echoed this external focus in its designation of 1988 as an “International
Year of Tourism.”21 The 1987 film 红高粱 (Hong Gaoliang, or Red Sorghum),
which features themes of rejecting the backward and feudal countryside, enjoyed
domestic success and became the first Chinese film to win major international
prizes.22 The hands-off approach of the CCP leadership in declining to pass
judgment on the artistic merits of this film that became a cultural sensation was
notable. More shocking was the late-1988 opening of a controversial but successful exhibit of nude paintings at Beijing’s National Gallery of Art.23 Not only was
this the first mainstream exhibit of nudes in the history of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC), but the paintings were created by teachers at the Central Academy of Fine Arts rather than being imported from abroad. A final cross-cultural
example from 1988, with a tie to the depiction of navies in popular culture, was

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

71

66

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

the staging at Beijing’s Capital Theater of an all-Chinese production of The Caine
Mutiny, directed by Charlton Heston.24 The popularity of this World War II naval
story in 1988—some three decades after its mainstream success in America as a
novel, film, and play—no doubt raised interesting questions about wartime duty,
the abstract ideals of the naval profession, and the potentially seditious notion of
ousting an unfit leader.25
The cultural movement of the 1980s extended beyond the world of intellectuals and art connoisseurs. Western books of all types became widely available in
China, Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC) opened its first restaurant in China at the
end of 1987, and televisions and television stations proliferated rapidly across
the country.26 The spread of television, in particular, was essential to allowing
Heshang to reach a massively larger audience than any of the other 1988 highculture events in Beijing.
Against this background, Heshang appeared, to great acclaim and popularity,
in June 1988. A group of young Chinese filmmakers had begun work on the series
early that year, even as a thirty-part, apolitical documentary called Yellow River,
on which several of them had worked, was airing.27 Concentrating so heavily
on that river in this initial project inspired writers such as Su Xiaokang to use
the river as a symbol in exploring provocative cultural and political messages.28
Heshang developed into a documentary of six parts, each organized around a different theme. As a work of art, Heshang is subject to multiple interpretations that
may or may not match the creators’ intent at the time, a factor intensified by the
collaborative nature of the project. Richard Bodman, who translated Heshang and
wrote the introduction to a guide to the series, emphasizes that the organization
into thematic episodes and the reliance on symbolic images make any simple
summary “interpretive,” representing “only one possible reading.”29 Nevertheless,
there are general themes running through Heshang that speak to the debate over
China’s relationship to the sea.
The first five parts cover various aspects of Chinese history and culture,
highlighting the failures of many generations of Chinese leaders to keep pace
with a world that was leaving the nation behind. These episodes question and
attack China’s traditional identity while articulating a different patriotic, and occasionally nationalistic, mood to call for a different future for China.30 Of note,
part 2, “Destiny,” invokes the Great Wall as evidence of backward thinking and
dismisses the fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He as a brief vanity project that
failed to take advantage of a historic opportunity to join the age of exploration.
The writers of episode 2 argue that Chinese traditional culture continued to cause
China to miss out on the opportunities created by the sea long after Zheng He,
and that China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had been centuries in the making. Also notable to this discussion is part 4, “The New Era,” which contrasts the
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failed policies of the Maoist era with the rapid but disruptive success of reforms
under Deng Xiaoping, with a particular emphasis on the economic policies of
Zhao Ziyang, the CCP leader in 1988 who carried forward Deng’s reforms with a
particular focus on developing China’s coastal regions.
However, it is Heshang’s sixth episode, “Blueness,” that makes the boldest
political statements and is the most explicitly maritime in both substance and
symbolism. Part 6, written by Xie Xuanjun and Yuan Zhiming, opens with a
view of Earth from space, calling Earth a blue planet, one dominated by blue seas
from which all life emerged. A quick summary of human history then invokes
the linked emergence of democracy and sea power in Athens; highlights the connections between a maritime economy and the rise of industrial capitalism; and
concludes that ships have carried trade, colonization, science, and democracy,
such that “‘blueness’ came to symbolize the destiny of the modern world.”31 After
a review of China’s humiliation in the Opium Wars, the episode explicitly links
cultural barriers and sea power with the story of Yan Fu, a Qing dynasty scholar
sent to study at Britain’s Royal Naval College at Greenwich from 1877 to 1879. On
his return to China, Yan became dean of the Tianjian Naval Academy, which had
just been established by Li Hongzhang, and Yan participated in the short-lived
Hundred Days of Reform that began 11 June 1898 (as it happened, Heshang first
aired on the movement’s ninetieth anniversary, 11 June 1988).32 According to
episode 6 of Heshang, Confucian tradition prevented Yan Fu from bringing naval
consciousness back to China, whereas Hirobumi Ito, a Japanese student in England at the same time, became a leading reformer in Japan, drafted the country’s
first constitution, and was prime minister during the 1894 Sino-Japanese War.
This vignette serves the arguments in episode 6 but represents a very loose interpretation of the history. The Qing dynasty was less adept at naval modernization than were the Japanese, but it did continue substantial investment in China’s
naval forces—particularly the modern battleships of the Beiyang Fleet—in the
years after Yan returned from England, and there is no evidence to support the
assertion in Heshang that Yan and Ito were classmates at Greenwich.33 Heshang’s
take on the history of Qing naval modernization is superficial and flawed, but
the vignette highlights again that the filmmakers were drawing on a rich and
continuous tradition among Chinese intellectuals since the nineteenth century
who have called for China selectively to embrace foreign ideas and technology to
make China powerful and prosperous.34
Episode 6 continues with a full-scale attack on Confucianism and land-based
culture, arguing that, while a continental mentality may produce nuclear weapons and a space program, only blueness can “infuse the whole nation with a
strong, civilizing vitality.” The episode then praises the post-1978 reforms, particularly the role of intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and Zhao’s coastal strategy—a
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PHOTO 1

Images captured from extracts of Heshang posted to YouTube.
Source: 河殇 [River Elegy], aired June 1988 on China Central Television, available at www.youtube.com/.

direct parallel to Padfield’s arguments about the tight connections among national power, intellectual freedom, and a merchant-led maritime economy. This
section of episode 6 includes the closest connection to the PLAN’s 1988 campaign
in the Spratlys; it calls the April 1988 elevation of Hainan Island, in the South
China Sea, to provincial status a “historical undertaking” and states that Hainan’s
economic success would “necessarily give a new color to China’s culture.”35
Heshang proved wildly popular when it first aired in June 1988, and audience
demand led to a second television airing in August. The script was printed in
newspapers nationwide, including the CCP official newspaper People’s Daily, and
a book edition went through five printings between June and September 1988.36
The rapid spread of Heshang’s themes sparked debate among Chinese intellectuals—and controversy within the Chinese leadership. In late 1988, some scholars
tried to take a moderate course, praising parts of Heshang while holding that
some of its messages, such as those in part 6, were extreme and unnecessarily offensive to conservative leaders.37 One of these leaders was party elder Wang Zhen,
who was enraged by the documentary’s assault on traditional culture. General
Secretary Zhao, on the other hand, endorsed Heshang’s proreform messages.38
These deep fissures in the party leadership soon would have cataclysmic results. Within months of Heshang’s broadcast, student-led prodemocracy protests
broke out across China, leading to the ouster of Zhao and the bloody crackdown
at Tiananmen Square. In the months following the suppression of the protests,
the CCP launched a full-scale propaganda assault on Heshang, formally banning
it for allegedly fomenting unrest and promoting “bourgeois liberalism” in the
service of “international reactionary force.”39 Su Xiaokang became the target of a
nationwide manhunt, and the creators of Heshang, many of whom were graduate students, joined other leaders of the democracy movement on the flight into
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exile. It is perhaps only appropriate that many dissidents, including Su, reportedly
made their escape by sea, aboard smugglers’ speedboats to Hong Kong.40
THE DECADE LEADING TO JOHNSON REEF
In the months before Heshang’s first broadcast, Sino-Vietnamese tensions
mounted in the South China Sea, leading to the naval battle at Johnson Reef
on 14 March 1988 and the ensuing PLA occupation of features in the Spratly
Islands. Just as Heshang marked a pivotal moment in the cultural discourse of the
late 1980s, the Johnson Reef battle occurred within the broad context of China’s
emergence as a maritime power. Geopolitical, commercial, and operational concerns steadily increased Beijing’s focus on the South China Sea throughout the
1980s.
Other scholars have covered amply the scope of China’s economic growth in
the 1980s as the country participated more and more in the international trading system. It is important to remember, however, that energy dependence was
not yet a primary concern for Beijing in the 1980s; the country remained a net
exporter of oil throughout the decade. Even though China’s merchant marine had
grown rapidly and already was a major part of the global shipping industry by
1988, discussions of the economic importance of the sea did not yet emphasize
commerce protection, defense of sea lines of communication, or the security of
Chinese-flag ships.41
Beijing was, however, very concerned about ocean resources, including fish,
offshore petroleum, and seabed minerals (and remains so today).42 The Chinese
fishing fleet had particular importance in this period for the development of
nonnaval instruments of maritime power, particularly the growth of maritimelaw-enforcement and maritime-militia forces, which have become major players
in twenty-first-century regional disputes. Maritime militias have played a role
throughout the history of the PRC, helping to defend against coastal raids by the
Kuomintang forces on Taiwan in the 1950s and participating in the 1974 battles
in the Paracel Islands.43
The 1985 establishment of the Tanmen Militia, named for a fishing village
near Qionghai, is directly relevant to understanding the South China Sea in the
1980s. This militia’s founder played a central role in spreading word about the fish
resources available in the Spratly Islands, and between 1985 and 1988 he organized investment in new boats and expeditions to the distant fishing grounds.44
The efforts of the Tanmen Militia directly link China’s growing exploitation of
resources in the South China Sea to Beijing’s efforts to assert control and jurisdiction in disputed areas and provide mutual support between the PLAN and
paramilitary maritime forces. The ties between the PLAN and the Tanmen Militia deepened quickly, and militia forces played a direct role in the first Spratlys
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MAP 1

The South China Sea, shown from the perspective of mainland China, in an oblique orthographic projection.
Source: Author.

construction campaign, in 1988.45 The Tanmen Militia continues to be involved
in high-profile clashes, such as the incident at Scarborough Shoal in 2012 and the
Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig standoff in 2014.46
Cold War geopolitics made the international environment of 1988 fundamentally different from the current situation. During the 1980s, China and the United
States were closely aligned against a common enemy, the Soviet Union, including
in the form of U.S. arms sales to the PLA, signals-intelligence cooperation, and
Chinese support to arm the Afghan mujahideen.47
Immediately relevant to the South China Sea was the other common enemy
that China and the United States then shared: Vietnam.48 Although China’s 1979
invasion of Vietnam was short, it was bloody, and the border conflict continued
throughout the 1980s, with occasional major battles, particularly in the Laoshan
sector from 1984 to 1987.49 One of the last phases—and the only primarily naval
phase—of the long limited war between China and Vietnam took place in 1988.
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PHOTO 2

Soviet air and naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 1987.
Source: A High-Altitude View and Map of the Soviet Base at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, 6412398, 1987, photograph, National Archives
and Records Administration.

On the other hand, the logic of shared enemies steadily deepened ties between Hanoi and Moscow through the 1970s and 1980s, and the strength of this
relationship was clearly evident at the closest major military base to the Spratly
Islands: Cam Ranh Bay. The United States had expanded Cam Ranh greatly
during its war in Indochina. Afterward, the Soviets continued the expansion for
their own benefit; by the mid-1980s, Cam Ranh Bay hosted the largest number
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of Soviet warships based outside the Soviet Union, while Soviet medium-range
bombers with antiship missiles were based at the adjacent airfield.50 Sino-Soviet
relations improved with the rise of Gorbachev in 1985, but the PLA did not shift
its strategic focus formally away from its northern neighbor until 1993.51
The CCP leadership had paid attention, albeit with inconsistent focus, to the
South China Sea since the founding of the People’s Republic. The PLA conquered
Hainan in 1950, occupied part of the Paracel Islands in 1970, and seized the rest
of the Paracels from a collapsing South Vietnam in 1974. Indeed, the architect of
the reform era, Deng Xiaoping, personally oversaw the 1974 operation from the
offices of the PLA General Staff.52 Given Deng’s personal experience and Zhao’s
focus on the new Hainan Province as a flagship reform project, in the 1980s the
South China Sea became an important issue for the most-senior leadership.53
The PLAN of 1988 was a pale shadow of the naval force into which it has
evolved today, but important developmental trends were well under way in the
1980s. Several excellent studies have discussed the role of Admiral Liu Huaqing
in creating the modern PLAN in the late 1970s and the 1980s, most of them
derived from Liu’s published memoirs.54 The force structure of the 1980s increasingly centered on a core of China’s first generation of indigenously built
warships, such as the Type 051 destroyers and Type 035 submarines. The 1980s
also saw important progress in developing second-generation combatants, such
as the Type 052 destroyers and improved Type 053 frigates, that would debut in
the 1990s and set the stage for the PLAN’s modern, twenty-first-century fleet.55
But beyond Liu’s modernizing reforms and advocacy of aircraft carriers, it is
important to recall that Liu was the standard-bearer for a different kind of navy
for a different kind of China. When Liu became PLAN commander in 1982,
China was only six years removed from the peak influence of the “Gang of Four,”
whose members represented both a radical bloc that “opposed the development
of an oceanic navy” and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution that had stagnated
Chinese naval and commercial maritime development.56 Following the death of
Mao and the rise of Deng, the path was clearer for Liu to call for changing the
PLAN’s strategy from “near-seas defense” to “offshore defense,” with a long-term
goal of developing a blue-water navy.57 Swanson wrote, in 1982, that the five years
since the arrest of the Gang of Four had launched a “tremendous maritime renascence” for China, although Bernard Cole argues that the period of ideological
impediments to naval modernization only fully ended with the Gang of Four’s
trial in 1981.58 The PLAN made important early steps toward its goal in the 1980s
with the mastery of underway replenishment and the service’s first overseas
goodwill cruise, in 1985, to Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.59
Seen within this context, the scope of the PLAN’s operations demonstrates
that the Spratlys occupation was not a small, isolated skirmish but actually
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constituted the PLAN’s first blue-water campaign. Beijing formally approved
the establishment of a permanent Spratlys presence at the end of 1987, and
construction began, with heavy militia support, at Fiery Cross Reef in February
1988.60 A major focus of the PLAN’s campaign was logistics support to outpost
construction, but the PLAN also sustained a large presence of combat forces
during and after the 14 March clash at Johnson Reef, which left one Vietnamese
vessel sunk, at least one more damaged, and a number of Vietnamese sailors
dead. In mid-1988, the PLAN deployed some forty warships over five hundred
nautical miles from the nearest friendly harbor.61 The ships came from all three
PLAN fleets; the deliberate use of units from across the navy is notable as a parallel to the PLA’s rotation of ground forces to the Vietnam border throughout the
1980s, to distribute combat experience across the force.62 By July, construction
was complete at Fiery Cross Reef and five other previously unoccupied features.
In interviews, Chen Weiwen, the PLAN commander in the Johnson Reef battle,
described efforts to fortify the newly occupied features, particularly in light of
the threat of Vietnamese air attack. Chen, who previously had participated in the
1974 Paracels battle, was promoted to rear admiral in September 1988, went on
to serve in a variety of senior PLAN positions, and attended the Central Party
School.63
The 1988 campaign was, in many ways, the operational manifestation of the
narrative of naval power that the PLAN and the CCP leadership were building.
Not unlike the makers of Heshang, China’s navalists were advancing a controversial argument about pulling China toward a bluer future. This meant advocating
for a more capable navy, selling its importance to national development, and
demonstrating its effectiveness in battle.64 On one level, such advocacy was typical parochial behavior by a military bureaucracy—the costs of naval development
can be a hard sell in all political systems. John Garver concludes that “although
the rationale for Chinese expansion in the South China Sea during the 1980s
shifted from primarily geostrategic to primarily economic, the operations were
intimately related throughout the 1970s and 1980s to PLAN efforts to modernize
and to the domestic fights over budget to finance this.”65
China continued to commit to building naval power and militarizing its
South China Sea outposts throughout the following year; even as CCP leaders
debated how to respond to student protests in 1989, the PLAN worked to solidify its presence. The PLA in 1989 enlarged the airfield at Woody Island in the
Paracels and “a Spratly Front Line Headquarters was established to command a
six-month campaign of intensified construction.”66 Given the growing focus on
ocean resources and early indications of the importance of trade, the economic
imperatives attached to naval power were starting to become clear to Chinese
leaders in 1988.
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THE CULTURAL AND STRATEGIC IMPETUS BEHIND
CHINA’S MARITIME IDENTITY
Although Lambert indulges in some uncompelling caricatures of China and
the Chinese navy, his core thesis on the centrality of culture to sea-power identity nonetheless has great value for considering the evolution of the naval and
maritime consciousness of China from the 1980s to the present. Like Heshang,
more-recent cultural phenomena also have given a sense of the Chinese popular
conception of the country’s relationship to the global maritime economy and
the PLAN’s role in the international system. The recent action blockbusters Wolf
Warrior 2 and Operation Red Sea have nothing in common with Heshang in terms
of tone or style, but they do share a vision of a proud, international China that
fully participates in (and defends) the blue economy.67 They also share a perhaps
unexpected level of popularity; Heshang and Red Sorghum became national and
international sensations in 1988, while the 2017 and 2018 action films are two
of the three highest-grossing Chinese films of all time and garnered tremendous
attention abroad for the popularity of their jingoistic messages.68 A more direct
comparison might be between Heshang and the 2006 twelve-part China Central
Television documentary 大国崛起 (Daguo Jueqi, or The Rise of the Great Powers), which aired twice and was a “ratings miracle.” Andrew Erickson and Lyle
Goldstein describe how Daguo Jueqi summarizes the conclusions of China’s top
scholars who study the path to greatness of both land powers and sea powers.69
Daguo Jueqi, like Heshang, concludes that maritime power and international markets are key to China’s future; however, unlike Heshang, Daguo Jueqi was squarely
consistent with the party line of 2006.
Foreign analysts tend to fixate on the tactical events of the 14 March 1988
clash at Johnson Reef and play down the larger importance of the 1988 PLAN
campaign. At the national level, neither validating military strategy nor testdriving Liu’s modernizing PLAN appears to have been a motivation for the
1988 campaign, but there is a compelling argument that the clash with Vietnam
and successful militarization of the Spratlys served as what Rebecca Lissner
calls a “strategic crucible” that gave Beijing real-world combat experience that
confirmed its ability to pursue a more maritime approach to grand strategy.70
Lissner’s work discusses China in regard to the initial 1979 invasion only briefly,
but the addition of the 1988 naval case study would support her conclusion that
conflict with Hanoi validated the PLAN modernization program, PLA theories
of limited conflict, and Beijing’s overall approach to expanding control steadily
over the South China Sea. These events undoubtedly are salient in the living and
institutional memory of the officers running the PLAN today.71 The flagship of
the PLAN task force at Johnson Reef (the frigate Yingtan, No. 531) has been on
display at the Qingdao Naval Museum for decades. In early 2020, a new memorial
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hall to Chen Weiwen and the March 1988 battle was set to open in Chen’s hometown in Guangdong Province, on the thirty-second anniversary of the battle (the
COVID-19 pandemic delayed the event).72
Is all this simply a matter of historical coincidence, or does a cultural artifact
such as Heshang truly help explain the rise of Chinese sea power? Given that the
Spratly Islands campaign was well under way when Heshang aired, would China’s
quest to become a maritime great power have been inhibited had this documentary never appeared on television? Heshang mentions naval power at several
points but never specifically invokes the PLAN, which is somewhat surprising
in the context of events in the South China Sea that were reported publicly at
the time. This omission could suggest that the creators of Heshang were far more
interested in political and cultural reform than the nature of maritime power
within the international system. Nevertheless, Heshang’s praise for the entrepreneurial class and the maritime economy is consistent with the “constituents
of seapower” that build public and elite support for naval power.73 This theme
in Heshang helps explain why the massacre of June 1989 had little effect on the
PLAN. The PLAN played no role in suppressing student demonstrations, but it
also suffered no political backlash for its embrace of what many in China might
see as Western, imperialist ideas of what a navy ought to be. In a different political era, the post-Tiananmen backlash could have sought to reel back the PLAN’s
move toward “blueness.”
In both the political and maritime arenas, China in 1988 was destined for
violence. The naval development under way in 1988 proved itself in combat and
carried forward into decades of pro-PLAN policies, while the CCP crushed the
cultural and political openness of that decade at Tiananmen Square.
That the PLAN successfully continued to promote a blue-water identity after
1988–89 owes much to the leadership of Liu Huaqing in the 1980s and modernizers such as Zhang Wannian in the 1990s. But it also suggests that the creators
of Heshang were onto something. By 1988, parts of the CCP leadership, the
PLAN, leading commercial interests, and prodemocracy intellectuals all believed that China’s future was “blue.” This conviction is undoubtedly far greater
now within the PLAN than it was in 1988. On this narrow but profound point,
both the PLAN and Heshang were “selling the sea” at the same time. The 1989
crackdown and the entrenched authoritarianism that has reached new heights
under Xi Jinping have sought to exorcise notions of democracy and openness
from China’s maritime identity, but otherwise China has embraced the “blueness” called for in part 6 of Heshang. The experience of 1988 makes evident that
China’s pursuit of sea power and a maritime future was well under way three
decades ago. Heshang proved tragically wrong in terms of the prospects for
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transforming the PRC into a democratic state, but it was quite right about the
emerging Chinese maritime identity.
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THE MIDDLE KINGDOM RETURNS TO THE SEA ,
WHILE AMERIC A TURNS ITS BACK
How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime Industry, and
the Implications for the World
Christopher J. McMahon

The condition of the American Merchant Marine is such as to call for
immediate remedial action by the Congress. It is discreditable to us as a
Nation that our merchant marine should be utterly insignificant in comparison to that of other nations we overtop in other forms of business.
We should no longer submit to conditions under which only a trifling
portion of our great commerce is carried in our own ships. To remedy
this state of things would not merely serve to build up our shipping interests, but it would also result in benefit to all who are interested in the
permanent establishment of a wide market for American products, and
would provide an auxiliary force for the Navy.
PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT,
ANNUAL MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, 1901

Command of the marine transportation system has long acted as the
stage on which great powers compete. . . . The infrastructure facilitating
the transport of maritime commerce—ocean-going vessels, deep-water
ports, high-speed railways, and fiber optic cables—descend from technologies Western powers once leveraged in the 19th and 20th centuries
to expand their access to foreign markets. Today, the MSR [China’s
Maritime Silk Road] mimics these strategies, for example, by building
railways in Africa or laying transoceanic data cables. In some locations,
new MSR projects are literally replacing colonial projects. The MSR is
a strategic economic policy, intended to promote the Chinese workforce,
build bilateral ties, foster dependence, and ensure near-exclusive access
to foreign ports for Chinese controlled or affiliated vessels. . . . Through
MSR projects, China can advance both economic and non-economic
objectives simultaneously.
REPRESENTATIVE SEAN PATRICK MALONEY (D-NY), CHAIR,
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND
MARINE TRANSPORTATION, 17 OCTOBER 2019
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S

ince the founding of the United States during the Revolutionary War, nearly
every president has recognized and called for congressional support of a strong
U.S. maritime industry.1 As the United States supposedly is a maritime nation
with a massive international trading economy, it seems obvious that control of,
or at least strong influence over, America’s seagoing supply chains is important.2
Through the first half of the nineteenth century, the U.S. Merchant Marine was
one of the largest and most efficient of its kind in the world—partly because of
public and political support.3 In those decades U.S.-flag clipper ships dominated
many trades, including—ironically—the China trade. But the second half of that
century saw the industry go into steep decline—in some measure because political support had evaporated. For economic and strategic reasons during the first
half of the twentieth century—specifically, immediately prior to World Wars I
and II—Congress intervened, taking critical steps to support the industry. But
today that past support of the industry has disappeared once again, and the U.S.
maritime industry engaged in international trade is in a perilous state of affairs.
This has occurred as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has become, by far, the
leading commercial maritime power in the world.
The lack of a vibrant U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade places
the strategic and economic interests of the United States and its allies in grave
jeopardy. This is particularly so given that the PRC now dominates most sectors
of the world’s maritime industry, and consolidation in all sectors is occurring at a
rapid rate that benefits the PRC. The influence and the effectiveness of the PRC’s
political and governmental intervention and funding in all sectors of China’s
maritime industry are causing numerous other companies in the global industry
simply to cease operations or suffer absorption by Chinese companies. There is
a strong prospect that within little more than a decade, or even sooner, China
virtually will control the world’s seagoing supply chain. The consequences of this
happening for the United States and the world as a whole are staggering. As a nation dependent on maritime transportation for its economy and for the movement
of its military forces, the United States must take decisive and immediate steps to
promote the reestablishment of U.S.-flag shipping and further enable all sectors of
the U.S. maritime industry to compete in a significant way in the global industry.
ONCE UPON A TIME
It was the winter of 1979–80. A buzz was going around the offices of the New
Orleans–based Lykes Brothers Steamship Company (also known as Lykes Lines)
and through its fleet of forty-five vessels. Word had it that SS Letitia Lykes was
loading full and down on the West Coast of the United States with eighteen thousand tons of cargo bound for Shanghai, China. Letitia would be the first U.S.-flag
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ship to call on a mainland Chinese port since World War II. This event was the
result of the ongoing rapprochement between the PRC and the United States that
followed President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit to China in 1972 and followon efforts by Presidents Gerald R. Ford and Jimmy Carter. The opening of this
new market indeed was cause for celebration.4
At the time, Lykes was one of dozens of U.S.-flag ocean-shipping companies.
With its forty-five vessels, Lykes was one of the larger U.S. companies, but not the
largest; that honor fell to SeaLand Services Corporation, which in 1979 was by
far the largest container-shipping company in the world. But in 1980, even with
more than 860 merchant ships, the U.S.-flag industry operated only about 3.8
percent of the world’s merchant vessels, which then totaled about 22,872 ships.5
That percentage was down from a 1946 high, when the United States operated
some 70 percent of the world’s commercial shipping.6 By 1960, this number had
fallen to 16.9 percent of the world’s fleet. Even so, in 1980 U.S.-flag shipping still
was significant. Plus, the U.S. maritime industry had made massive technological
innovations that revolutionized the industry, such as the introduction of container shipping and lighter-aboard-ship (or LASH) vessels.
SS Letitia Lykes, like all Lykes ships, had been built in a U.S. shipyard, supported by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) through the Construction
Differential Subsidy (CDS) program. U.S.-flag shipping companies were owned
and operated by American citizens without any foreign corporate interests involved. Profits stayed in the United States. U.S. shipping companies, particularly
SeaLand Services, owned or leased and operated dozens of container terminals
in U.S. ports and in ports throughout the world. While the United States at the
time was in the process of implementing a treaty to turn over operation of the
Panama Canal to Panama, the United States still exercised significant influence
in the canal’s affairs.7
Although in these years the United States did not possess the largest merchant
marine in the world, the size and influence of its industry still were considerable
in global maritime affairs, and with its large navy the United States rightfully
could be called a maritime nation, according to the criteria of naval historian
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, as laid out in his influential book The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660‒1783. Mahan believed that history
demonstrated that a truly maritime nation required a sizable merchant marine
in addition to a powerful navy.8
TWENTIETH-CENTURY SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.-FLAG
SHIPPING INDUSTRY
In the decades leading to World War I, American agricultural and industrial
exports increased dramatically and America became the leading economic
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superpower, even as the U.S. Merchant Marine continued to decline. Americans
and American-owned businesses were confident that inexpensive foreign-flag
shipping would remain bountiful and readily available as needed to provide the
seagoing logistics the nation required. This proved to be a false assumption. With
the outbreak of war in 1914, the American economy, dependent on international
trade, suffered from a lack of availability of commercial ships. The European nations that had provided the commercial sealift for the American economy withdrew their vessels for political reasons and for wartime purposes. This caused
widespread disruption in trade; manufactured products piled up on American
docks, in railcars, and in warehouses, and agricultural goods spoiled because
they could not be brought to overseas markets. The American economy suffered
greatly because of the lack of available commercial shipping.9
The extent of the damage to the American economy caused by the shortage of
U.S.-flag shipping in 1914 was so serious that Congress finally decided to act, but
this took time, and the insufficiency of commercial shipping continued to imperil the economy. Following numerous and lengthy hearings, Congress passed
the Shipping Act of 1916, which created the United States Shipping Board. The
board was designed specifically to promote and assist the U.S. Merchant Marine.
By the time the board was fully established, however, it was apparent the United
States would enter the war soon. This placed the board on a wartime footing. In
October 1917, the board requisitioned the entire U.S. Merchant Marine.10
In 1917, the Shipping Board initiated a huge shipbuilding program through
the creation of the Emergency Fleet Corporation. Eventually, the board contracted for more than 1,700 merchant vessels. Despite this unprecedented effort,
only 107 ships were delivered before the armistice was signed in November
1918. However, the remaining vessels were completed by 1922, and it was hoped
that U.S.-flag companies would purchase them, and some did. Following World
War I, the United States ranked number one in the world, at least in numbers of
potentially available merchant ships. But the country never followed through on
this advantage.11 By the 1930s, the U.S. Merchant Marine again was in a perilous
condition owing to political neglect. And ominously, the challenges of World War
II were on the horizon.
Other legislation that attempted to support U.S.-flag shipping included the
so-called Jones Act. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (Pub. L. No. 66-261) was
sponsored by Senator Wesley L. Jones from Washington State. A major purpose
of the act was to support the rights of American seafarers by solidifying laws
passed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, the
act gave seafarers the right to sue their employer for workplace (shipboard) injuries. A second provision of the act would establish procedures for transferring
the U.S. government‒owned merchant vessels built in response to World War I to
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private ownership. The lessons learned from World War I included recognition
that the U.S. Merchant Marine was critical to national security. The preamble to
the Jones Act included the following summary: “It is hereby declared the policy
of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and encourage
the maintenance of a merchant marine . . . sufficient to carry the greater portion
of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated by citizens of the United
States.”12
As one way to support and maintain the U.S. Merchant Marine, the Jones Act
also renewed cabotage legislation that Congress had established and maintained
during the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth. The policy
required trade between U.S. ports to be restricted to U.S.-built, U.S.-owned, U.S.flag, and U.S.-crewed merchant ships. (The very first piece of legislation that
Congress passed under the Constitution, in April 1789, established a tariff on imported goods to protect U.S.-flag shipping. This was followed by the Navigation
Act of 1817, which expressly excluded foreign-flag vessels from trading between
U.S. ports.)13 Cabotage legislation, including the Jones Act, always has ensured
that there are U.S.-flag vessels to serve coastal, inland, and island trades, and it
has continued to provide jobs for mariners, who then have been available to serve
on strategic sealift vessels in times of national emergency. But this legislation was
suspended prior to World War I because of the lack of U.S.-flag ships.
The key legislation that clearly defined support for the U.S. Merchant Marine
in the twentieth century was the Merchant Marine Act of 1936. From the time the
law was enacted through the next forty-five years, the U.S. Merchant Marine enjoyed generally strong support from Congress and presidential administrations.
The act established the U.S. Maritime Commission (later renamed the Maritime
Administration). It established the CDS program, which provided funds to support the construction of ships in U.S. shipyards. The act also established operating differential subsidies (ODSs), which provided funds to enable and encourage
shipping companies to operate their ships under the U.S. flag. Finally, the act established the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, an institution dedicated to educating and training merchant marine officers. It is not an exaggeration to state that
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 played a pivotal role in preparing the United
States for World War II and, following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the quick construction of the largest and most capable merchant marine the world had ever
seen, despite huge losses of ships and mariners during the early years of the war.14
In an effort to support U.S.-flag shipping further, Congress passed two companion bills in 1954, the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act
(Pub. L. No. 83-480) and the Cargo Preference Act (Pub. L. No. 83-664), which required a percentage of government-impelled cargo, such as food aid, to be carried
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on U.S.-flag ships.15 These requirements, overseen by MARAD, have guaranteed
cargoes for U.S.-flag ships and provided financial support for the industry.
With the support of Republican president Nixon, a Democratic Congress
passed the Merchant Marine Act of 1970. This legislation increased the subsidies
provided by MARAD’s CDS program, which substantially increased the construction rate of new merchant ships in U.S. shipyards, yielding dozens of ships.
As a result, relatively large numbers of new and technically innovative ships
joined the U.S.-flag fleet in the 1970s, and the shipbuilding industry in these
years was particularly healthy, as was the U.S. maritime industry in general.16
Many of these same shipyards built warships for the Navy, and the large numbers
of both commercial and Navy contracts enabled economies of scale that allowed
shipyards to build vessels at lower per-ship costs.17
THE GLOBAL MARITIME WORLD CHANGES—THE U.S. MARITIME
INDUSTRY TODAY
When SS Letitia Lykes departed Shanghai on the transit back to the United States
from its historic voyage in the spring of 1980, its cargo holds were nearly empty.
In those years, the Chinese had little to sell to a U.S. market. With only twentysix PRC-flag vessels in international trade, the Chinese shipping industry was
equally insignificant.18 While Chinese shipyards built some small coastal trading
vessels and fishing boats, they produced no large vessels. There were few or no
Chinese companies operating in other countries, and certainly no Chinese companies operating ports and terminals outside China.
What a difference forty years makes! The U.S. maritime industry has retreated
on all fronts, whereas the Chinese industry has exploded in size to become, by
far, the largest in the world, in nearly every category. This has been the result of
public, corporate, and political apathy in the United States and quite the opposite
in China; in the latter, government and industry have partnered for decades to
implement strategic plans to grow all sectors of the industry. In the United States,
it also is the result of a public and political lack of understanding of the role the
maritime industry plays in the strategic and economic health of the nation. The
U.S. maritime industry engaged in worldwide trade had been in decline since
World War II; however, those American companies still operating ships in international trade into the 1980s entered a steep decline at that time, eventually going
bankrupt and ceasing operations.
When the Reagan administration came into office in 1981 it almost immediately eliminated the CDS shipbuilding program provided by the Merchant
Marine Acts of 1936 and 1970. Over the next several years, this action, in turn,
forced the closure of numerous commercial shipbuilding companies across
America. In 1975, U.S. shipyards produced seventy deep-sea commercial ships.19
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The Reagan administration’s abolition of the CDS program crippled the industry.
Today no subsidies are provided to build vessels in U.S. shipyards. As a result,
only a few shipyards remain in the United States that are capable of building
deep-sea commercial ships, and the future financial health of these remaining
yards is in question. The only commercial ships built after 1980 have been for
Jones Act trades, which require ships built in U.S. shipyards.
In 2016, the number of commercial ships constructed in U.S. yards averaged
only five vessels per year during the previous five years, in a context of a worldwide production average of 1,408 vessels per year.20 Ironically, whereas to some
the elimination of shipbuilding subsidies had the apparent effect of reducing
costs to the taxpayer, the actual impact may be the opposite. Navy vessels and
Jones Act vessels were and still are required to be built in U.S. shipyards, but
with fewer shipyards building fewer vessels, economies of scale could not be
realized, so the unit cost of each ship became far greater.21 Between 1987 and
1992, an average of fewer than two commercial seagoing vessels were built per
year; as noted, between 2010 and 2016, the average was five.22 Equally serious
has been the loss of shipbuilding infrastructure and shipbuilding jobs, with a
concurrent loss of shipbuilding skills and expertise. These are capabilities that
cannot be turned on with the flick of a switch.
Since 1980, the size of the U.S.-flag fleet in international trade likewise has
declined dramatically. In the early years of the Reagan administration, actions
were taken to eliminate the ODS that enabled many companies to conduct operations under the U.S. flag.23 These subsidies were provided by contract, so these
payments had to be phased out over time as contracts expired. As ODS contracts were not renewed, the majority of U.S.-flag companies ceased operations
or simply went bankrupt. This created a crisis for the military, which requires
a capable U.S. Merchant Marine to carry equipment and supplies in the event
of a national emergency. To remedy this situation, the Department of Defense
spent billions of dollars to purchase and convert dozens of older, foreign-owned,
-built, and -operated vessels, which were placed in a Ready Reserve Force (RRF)
maintained and operated by MARAD (since 1981 part of the U.S. Department
of Transportation).24 In addition—and with the urging of the Defense Department—Congress in 1996 established the Maritime Security Program (MSP),
which MARAD manages. MSP essentially provides a subsidy for sixty U.S.-flag
ships—notably similar to the original ODS program created by the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.25 Currently, the MSP program is funded at five million dollars
per ship, per year.26 Considering the high cost of establishing and maintaining
the RRF in combination with the MSP program, it is questionable whether the
taxpayers benefited at all from the elimination of the ODS program; the reverse
probably is true. In any case, the results have included the loss of nearly all U.S.
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shipping companies, a great reduction in the number of U.S.-flag vessels, and the
loss of thousands of skilled mariner jobs.
The MSP law requires that U.S.-flag vessels be owned and operated by a U.S.
company under the management of U.S. citizens, and the sixty MSP ships indeed
are “owned and operated” by U.S. companies registered in the United States.
However, nearly every one of these sixty ships is owned by a U.S. company that is
merely a subsidiary of a foreign company—and the parent companies and their
countries may have interests different from those of the United States. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),
in 2018 there were 94,169 commercial deep-sea vessels in the world, of which
50,732 were merchant ships.27 Today, including the sixty MSP vessels, there are
only about eighty U.S.-flag vessels operating in international trade.28
As if political reversal of support for the U.S. Merchant Marine were not
enough to decimate the U.S.-flag industry, attacks on the cabotage provisions of
the Jones Act—periodically vigorous—have reached a new height in the last two
years. Spearheaded by the Cato Institute and other special-interest groups, efforts
have been made in the form of dozens of articles, conferences, and even recent
proposed legislation on Capitol Hill to overturn the law.29 While presenting no
substantive and verified cost data to show that the Jones Act causes significant
financial burdens to U.S. consumers in states, commonwealths, and territories
served by the act compared with using foreign-flag carriers, Jones Act detractors
fail to understand the law’s strategic importance. First, elimination of the Jones
Act poses the possibility of causing Jones Act companies to cease operating under
the U.S. flag, thus further reducing the number of available U.S. merchant ships.
(This would be particularly true if foreign-flag companies, subsidized by their
governments, were allowed to enter Jones Act—that is, domestic American—
trades.) Second, with the loss of the jobs that Jones Act companies now provide,
the pool of qualified U.S. merchant mariners virtually would disappear. This
would make it impossible to crew the ships of the RRF and other strategic sealift
vessels. This in turn would cripple military logistics, which is dependent on these
ships in a national emergency. From a security standpoint, overturning the Jones
Act has the potential to enable foreign companies (particularly those subsidized
by their governments) effectively to assume control of inland transportation
in the United States, with the result that thousands of foreign nationals would
be operating vessels inside the United States—a potential security nightmare.
Finally, under similar laws, U.S. airlines are afforded the same protections the
U.S. maritime industry enjoys under the Jones Act. Some airline industry professionals believe that if the Jones Act were repealed these airline protections might
be eliminated as well, possibly causing the demise of the U.S. domestic airline
industry, similarly to what happened to the maritime industry.30
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Regarding port ownership and operation, whereas U.S. companies such as
SeaLand Services once operated containership ports around the world, that
company, like many U.S.-flag shipping companies, ceased to operate when it was
purchased by a foreign-owned company. The ports and terminals once owned by
SeaLand now are owned or operated by foreign port operators. The only U.S. port
operator with terminal operations outside the United States is SSA Marine, which
operates slightly more than a dozen terminals in ports around the world, in addition to its North American terminals. However, nearly half the interests in SSA
are held by foreign nationals.31 In a reversal from the past, numerous foreign port
operators and interests have purchased or leased control of many ports and terminals in the United States, which has caused national-security concerns.32 The
United States no longer is involved in crucial maritime infrastructure in other
countries. For example, there is little or no U.S. involvement in the Panama Canal; a Chinese company operates ports and terminals on both ends of the canal.33
In short, if a maritime power is defined as a nation possessing a powerful
navy, a sizable merchant marine, and capable maritime industries such as shipbuilding—a definition propounded by Alfred Thayer Mahan—then the United
States clearly is no longer a maritime power. Instead, the United States probably
is described better as a maritime-dependent nation, and likely is defined even
better as a maritime nation that soon will be dependent on the Chinese maritime
industry.
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM—HISTORICALLY A MARITIME POWER?
Understandably, given its huge terrestrial presence in Eurasia, for much of its history China primarily has been viewed as a continental nation. However, China
also has had a strong maritime connection and has a rich maritime past. Geography encourages China to look toward the sea, particularly in the south, where
mountains block easy access to the interior and there are thousands of populated
islands off the coast. For centuries, southern seaboard provinces and islands have
had large populations, but a dearth of available land has made it difficult to support those populations locally, making the sea critical for transportation, trade,
fishing, and communication with other Chinese regions.34
Today, China’s land border is 13,743 miles long, and the country abuts fourteen other nations. Through its thousands of years of history, China has pursued
countless wars of both aggression and defense against its many neighbors. Most,
but by no means all, of these wars have been fought primarily with land forces.
But China also has more than nine thousand miles of saltwater coastline, thousands of offshore islands, and several major rivers that connect to the sea, and
the majority of the nation’s population always has resided in coastal regions.
Therefore China, to varying degrees, always has kept an eye on its maritime
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interests. Chinese naval warfare began as early as the tenth century BCE and was
common during the Warring States period (475‒221 BCE). One story holds that
in 471 BCE the great Chinese philosopher Confucius sought a leadership position
with the Kingdom of Yue but was turned down because he lacked knowledge of
naval operations.35
Throughout most of its very long history, China has been a major manufacturing power, oftentimes the world leader. For thousands of years countries across
the Eurasian landmass have sought Chinese goods. The long, overland passage
called the Silk Road emerged as the major east–west trading route in the fourth
century BCE.36 Over the centuries that followed, the Silk Road continued to be a
major trading route between China and the Middle East, and even to Europe;
Chinese goods found their way to the Roman Empire. Eventually, the Silk Road
expanded to include seagoing routes across the Indian Ocean to Middle Eastern and African ports. In his book China as a Sea Power 1127‒1368, author Lo
Jung-pang notes that “China tried to become a seapower (in centuries past); in
particular, during the Qin and Han dynasties and later during the Sui and Tang
dynasties.” He further notes that during the three centuries from the Southern
Song to the early Ming period (twelfth century CE to fourteenth century CE), the
maritime and overseas activities of the Chinese were so great that China was
more of a sea power than a land power. It was by using its naval and maritime
power, across many centuries, that China went abroad to trade, and even to colonize other Asian lands.37
Chinese maritime power in centuries past reached its height during the
first Ming period (1405‒33), and especially during the reign of the third Ming
emperor, Yongle (1402‒24). He dispatched the renowned military commander
Zheng He (1371‒1433), known as the “Ming admiral.” From 1405 to 1433, Zheng
completed seven extraordinary voyages, during which he sailed with as many as
250 ships and upward of thirty thousand men to destinations in southern Asia,
the Middle East, and East Africa.38
The main purposes of these military-oriented voyages were to expand Chinese
influence throughout the Indian Ocean area and the Middle East, seek tribute
for the Chinese court from local rulers, expand Chinese cultural influence, and
improve trade. According to Naval War College professor Andrew Wilson, a key
difference between European and Chinese efforts to seek trade during the early
European age of exploration is that the Ming voyages did not seek trade so much
as “the gravitational pull of the Chinese market (from these voyages) brought
trade to [China]”—a phenomenon seemingly similar to the dynamic favoring
China in the twenty-first century.39
During the Ming period, China’s navy and merchant marine clearly were the
largest and most powerful in the world, and their sphere of influence expanded
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wherever Zheng’s fleet landed. At the time, Chinese maritime technology far
surpassed that of the Europeans. For example, the Chinese invented the compass
and the rudder, which were huge innovations that enabled mariners to navigate
and control vessels better on long voyages. Zheng’s fleet included ships over four
hundred feet in length. (By comparison, Columbus’s Santa María was somewhere
between sixty-two and eighty-five feet in length.) It is reasonable to assume that,
had the Chinese wished to pursue ocean exploration and trade into the Atlantic
and the Mediterranean and to Europe and even the Americas in the decades after
Zheng’s voyages, they likely would have become the dominant maritime power
on earth, eclipsing European efforts.40
For a complicated set of reasons, however, the Chinese abandoned their efforts
to pursue great voyages beyond local Chinese waters after the death of Emperor
Yongle. Following Admiral Zheng’s seventh and final voyage, the new Ming emperor had the fleet destroyed, after which harsh punishments were decreed and
imposed on those who even attempted to trade beyond Chinese waters.41 One law
imposed the death penalty for building a ship with more than two masts, and a
later law did the same for a ship with more than one mast.42 In essence, except for
coastal trade and fishing, the Chinese, under the second Ming dynasty, largely
abandoned the ocean.
This happened at the time when European countries were on the cusp of the
age of exploration that was made possible by the development of new maritime
technologies—many of which were based on lessons learned from Chinese
nautical technological innovations such as the compass and the rudder. As the
Europeans came to dominate global trade in the seventeenth through nineteenth
centuries, the Chinese would pay dearly for their lack of maritime power. Their
navy was largely ineffective and they no longer possessed a capable merchant
marine by which to trade with other nations. For centuries this enabled the Europeans increasingly to impose countless demands on the Chinese and control
Chinese seagoing trade, eventually resulting in “the century of shame” (extending
from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century).43 This fact has
not been lost on the leadership of the PRC in recent times, and it helps to explain
why the Chinese have taken such great steps to become not only a global maritime power but the dominant maritime power in the world today.
European control of China’s seagoing trade continued into the twentieth century, following the collapse of the Qing dynasty in the early 1900s.44 The world
wars, Japanese occupation in the 1930s and ’40s, and the civil war between the
Nationalists and Communists decimated the Chinese economy. Following World
War II, virtually all Chinese seagoing trade, both foreign and domestic, was carried in foreign-owned and -flagged ships. In 1950, the PRC merchant marine
officially consisted of only seventy-seven ships, and the majority of these were
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either unseaworthy or lying at the bottom of rivers and ports. Through the 1950s,
China enjoyed a rather close relationship with the Soviet Union, and the Soviets
encouraged Polish ships to carry Chinese seagoing trade; in fact, for many years
the Polish merchant marine was China’s primary provider of ocean transportation. During these years, there actually were no Chinese-flag ships engaged in
international trade. As far as PRC ports and shipyards went, the picture was
equally dismal in the 1950s. There were no shipyards capable of building oceangoing ships, and ports were hugely inefficient and few in number.45 The Chinese
did not own, lease, or operate any port terminals outside the mainland.
Despite the poor condition of the Chinese maritime industry in the early years
of the PRC, the Communist Party’s leadership fully grasped the importance of
the industry and placed great emphasis on building a capable maritime industry
in all sectors: ships, ports, shipyards, and mariners. It was clear to Mao Zedong’s
government that China needed a domestic maritime industry, particularly in
coastal and river trades to compensate for the poor quality of roads and railroads.46 With Soviet maritime expertise and the use of Soviet-built equipment,
particularly engines, China began building domestic ships in the early 1960s. The
initial building rate reached ten ships a year in 1960, but this fell to two following the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. The shipbuilding picture remained
poor for many years because of the lack of Chinese technology and engineering
capability and the inability to develop and build critical elements such as ship
engines. In terms of ship ownership, in 1961 the state-owned China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) was formed under the Ministry of Communications.
COSCO owned and controlled vessels under both Chinese and foreign flags. (In
the 1960s the PRC began relying on foreign flags to operate many Chinese-owned
ships. At the time, this included use of the British and Somali flags.)47 The first
voyage of a PRC-flag ship outside Asian waters was by SS Heping, which carried
cargoes from China to the Republic of Guinea in West Africa in 1962. The Chinese merchant marine continued to grow through the 1960s, reaching more than
three hundred ships by the early 1970s. Shipbuilding during this period remained
a very limited industry, particularly since China did not have the expertise to
develop and build nautical equipment and engines.48
Through the 1970s and into the 1980s, the PRC continued to emphasize
the development of its maritime industries, including shipping, shipyards, and
ports. The number of PRC ships engaged in international trade doubled during
this period. More ships were added to the Chinese flag-of-convenience fleets,
particularly using the Somali and eventually the Panamanian flags. During these
years, PRC ships began “cross trading,” which involved carrying cargoes to and
from ports other than China, and charging freight revenues in U.S. dollars, making the practice a good source of hard currency. In 1978, the number of PRC ships
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in international trade surpassed that of the United States, and by 1982 China’s
merchant fleet ranked seventh in the world in size.49
Of particular note during these years was the development of China’s port and
shipbuilding industries. Major efforts were undertaken to modernize Chinese
shipyards, and with technical assistance from European, Japanese, and Singaporean shipbuilders the Chinese began building ships for domestic and export markets. Costs per ship were so low and demand was so high that Chinese yards had
to suspend order books until shipbuilding capacity could be increased. During
this period, ports also radically improved in capacity and capability. From 1959
to 1979, there was a 3,750 percent increase in cargo throughput in Chinese ports,
but dock capacity had increased by only 30 percent. Given this serious situation,
major efforts were undertaken to develop and build port infrastructure, including the introduction of container-handling equipment.50 Through the next three
decades, Chinese leaders continued to increase the capability and capacity of
their maritime industries dramatically, in ship ownership, shipbuilding, port development, and a multitude of related industries. Today, China’s maritime industry, in all sectors, is the largest in the world by far, and it still is growing rapidly.
THE CHINESE MARITIME INDUSTRY TODAY
The PRC government’s decades-long support of the Chinese maritime industry
has included substantial, even aggressive, financial subsidies, laws, and policies designed to enable all sectors of the industry to grow at phenomenal rates.
Currently, with more than 5,500 merchant ships engaged in international trade,
Chinese companies (including Hong Kong‒based companies) own more ships
than those of any other nation on earth.51 Chinese container-shipping companies
combined carry more containers than the world’s number one carrier, Maersk
Line. This represents nearly 20 percent of all the containers carried by the top
twenty carriers.52
Chinese companies own or operate more ports and terminals around the
world than those of any other country.53 These Chinese companies include
Hutchison Ports, COSCO Ports, China Merchants Ports, Shanghai International
Port Group, and Qingdao Port International.54 In fact, by 2015 “two-thirds of
the world’s top fifty container ports had some degree of Chinese investment
in them, if not majority ownership and control, and this number is growing.”
These ports handle 67 percent of the world’s shipping containers.55 Chinese port
companies in all ports around the world handle 39 percent of the total volume
of containers—nearly double the share of the next largest port operator, which
is headquartered in Singapore.56 Of the top twenty ports in the world by cargo
throughput (2016‒17), fourteen are located in China.57 Almost “under the radar,”
Chinese port companies acquired 49 percent ownership in France’s CMA CGM
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port operations, which has given Chinese companies operational control of
Houston’s Terminal Link port and South Florida Container Terminal in Miami.58
COSCO has long-term lease/operations stakes in the ports of Los Angeles and
Seattle as well.59
By 2017, China was the number one shipbuilder in the world, as measured by
the number of ships completed, new orders, and pending orders. Over 40 percent
of the world’s commercial ships now are built in China, and this percentage is
growing as shipyards in other countries no longer can compete and are shuttered.60 (Notably—and troubling from a USN perspective—during a mere eightyear period, from 2009 to 2017, the Chinese developed and built eighty-three
warships for the Chinese navy, which now is the second-largest navy in the world,
and within a few decades or less is expected to be the largest.)61 With 150 modern
cutters and hundreds of other vessels, the China Coast Guard is the largest such
service in the world.62 Numbered at more than two hundred thousand vessels,
China’s fishing fleet also is the largest in the world.63
One of the secrets of Chinese successes in the incredible growth of the nation’s
maritime sector is the Chinese emphasis on maritime education—in nautical science, marine engineering, and maritime business. More than 115,000 students
attend the several Chinese maritime universities and colleges.64 Finally, China is a
global leader in ship finance, providing funds for international shipping companies
seeking to buy, build, or lease ships, particularly those from Chinese shipyards. In
2008, no Chinese bank was listed in the top ten of the world’s shipbuilding-loan
institutions; a decade later, the top two banks were Chinese—both state-owned
institutions.65 By 2025, it is projected that Chinese banks will provide 50 percent
of all shipbuilding loans.66 This means that, although China may not own or
operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it will have influence, if
not control, over a majority of the world’s merchant fleet, because it will hold the
mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned by companies in other countries.
China has made no attempt to hide its aspirations to influence, if not dominate, the world’s maritime industry. In 2015, the Shanghai International Shipping
Institute, a state-owned research institute, released a report, “China Shipping
Development Outlook 2030.” The report offers several conclusions. First, “China
will remain the largest cargo trader in the world and will take a dominant role
in global container shipping.” Second, China will double its shipping engaged in
worldwide trade and control at least 15 percent of that trade. To do this, China
will become the number one shipowner in the world. (It already is.) Ship operators will evolve to become “global logistics providers” (much like other large
containership operators, such as Maersk). The report notes that privately owned
Chinese shipping companies will account for “over 70% of China owned ships.”
(However, this runs contrary to the current trend in China of state ownership,
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which does not allow private-sector companies into the industry.) The report
suggests that Chinese foreign-flag fleets will comprise upward of 90 percent of
Chinese-owned ships. With regard to ports, the report notes that “throughput at
Chinese ports will reach 505 million TEUs [twenty-foot-equivalent containers]
by 2030.” Without providing specific metrics, the report indicates that “Chinese
enterprises will build port networks around the globe, especially investing in
port networks in South America, Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and
other developing countries with strategic cooperation with China.” Finally, the
report emphasizes China’s role as a global leader in ship financing and marine
insurance.67
HOW CHINA IS REALIZING ITS MARITIME AMBITIONS: CHINESE
MARITIME STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
China’s Qing dynasty ruled the country from 1636 to 1912, a period of gradual
but persistent incursion by Europeans, and eventually by the Japanese, into
Chinese trade and influence. The Opium Wars with the British in the midnineteenth century saw Chinese military forces destroyed by the British, who
then forced the Chinese to allow the British Empire to import opium into China
in exchange for Chinese goods. Thus began “the century of shame,” during which
Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan essentially carved China up into
spheres of influence.68
Following the civil war in China that ended in 1949 with the defeat of Nationalist forces by Communist forces on the mainland and the establishment of the
PRC, China’s economy was in complete shambles. For the next several decades,
under the absolute rule of Chairman Mao, China essentially pursued a policy of
isolationism and self-reliance under which the Chinese people were expected to
produce agricultural and manufactured goods without the influence or assistance
of outside nations.69 Mao’s policies further destroyed the Chinese economy and
caused the death of untold millions of people by starvation.
Following Mao’s death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping came to power and relentlessly pursued a policy of opening up China to the rest of the world by boldly
seeking foreign investment and trade. Knowing that he could not abandon the
façade of communist/socialist ideology, but likely knowing the failures of pure
communism and socialism, Deng adhered to a strict policy of pursuing what he
called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”70 The Chinese Communist Party
continues to use the phrase today. It is purposefully imprecise, but in broad terms
it refers to an economy that the state essentially controls while allowing varying
degrees of private investment and ownership.
Under Mao’s leadership, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were established in
all sectors of the economy. These SOEs essentially operate as companies owned
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by the state. SOEs, in China, typically are managed at a provincial or even municipal level. Others are managed at the central government level by the StateOwned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC).71 The
problem—as is typical of many government organizations worldwide—is that
SOEs, lacking financial incentives, are inherently inefficient and often become
bloated with choking bureaucracies and unproductive workers.
Deng knew this, and therefore introduced market-based reforms, including
the potential for private investment and ownership. Notably, Deng focused on
commercial shipbuilding as a critical industry, and under his leadership in 1982
the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) SOE was established. In 1999,
a second SOE was formed out of CSSC: the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). These two SOEs dominated shipbuilding in China.72 In 2019, they
were reunited into one larger SOE.73
Over the decades since Deng, the role of SOEs has continued, with them exercising control over certain sectors of the Chinese economy but with private investment in SOEs being introduced to varying degrees and with varying success.
(Of Chinese SOEs, 66 percent are listed on the Chinese stock exchange.) Today,
privately owned companies actually employ more workers than SOEs, and these
privately owned companies account for the majority of China’s gross domestic
product (GDP).74 However, in certain sectors SOEs maintain absolute control.
One such sector is the maritime industry, which China views as a strategic industry vital to the interests of the nation.75 Despite statements in 2015 from Jin
Jiachen, a director at the Shanghai International Shipping Institute, that Chinese
ocean-shipping companies would privatize to a large degree, there is little evidence this has happened or will do so.76 Furthermore, under Chinese president
Xi Jinping there is new emphasis on and support of SOEs and less interest in
privatizing many industries, including Chinese maritime industries.77
COSCO is an SOE. The company operates a fleet of well over fifteen hundred
vessels calling on over a thousand ports worldwide. The COSCO fleet includes
most types of merchant ships, such as tankers, bulk ships, roll-on/roll-off (RO/
RO) vessels, and containerships. In 2015, COSCO merged with the SOE China
Shipping Group, retaining the name of China COSCO Shipping Corporation.78
COSCO expanded further in 2017 with the government-funded $6.7 billion
acquisition of Orient Overseas Container Line (OOCL), a public company
formerly based in Hong Kong. COSCO now is the third-largest containership
operator in the world.79 Even before its acquisition of OOCL in 2017, COSCO for
a time had taken the lead as the number one container-shipping company in the
world. With its acquisition of OOCL and its continued aggressive expansion policies, it is quite possible that COSCO will take the number one spot in container
shipping permanently.80
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For years, the global trend in the container-shipping business has been increasing consolidation, leaving fewer and fewer container-shipping companies.
China has taken full advantage of this trend, using the power of COSCO. A
United Nations think tank associated with UNCTAD contends that there are now
too few container-shipping companies left to ensure adequate competition.81 By
mid-2018, the top ten container-shipping companies carried 75 percent of the
world’s shipping containers, with COSCO as the number three carrier, carrying
over 12 percent of the world’s containers. The UNCTAD report notes that the
top container companies have formed three alliances that effectively are cartels.
On the positive side, these alliances potentially reduce costs and rationalize service, which can lower freight rates; on the other hand, according to UNCTAD,
they instead can create a serious risk of establishing corporate oligopolies that
will reduce competition and constrain service.82 The Ocean Alliance consists
of COSCO and CMA CGM (of France); the 2M Alliance links Maersk (of Denmark) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC, of Switzerland); THE Alliance combines Hapag-Lloyd (of Germany), Yang Ming (of Taiwan), and ONE (of
Japan). An effort by Maersk, MSC, and CMA CGM in 2014 to form an alliance
to be known as the P3 Alliance was blocked by the Chinese government—a clear
example of governmental intervention designed to support COSCO. Notably, in
2015 the Export-Import Bank of China (CEXIM) agreed to provide a billion dollars in loans or credit to the French CMA CGM to build new ships—in Chinese
shipyards. Since that time, Chinese ties between COSCO and CMA CGM have
continued to deepen.83
As noted earlier, in the port sector China is the global leader in owning, leasing, and operating ports and terminals around the world. Most Chinese companies in the port and terminal business are SOEs; these include COSCO, Shanghai
International Port Group, China Overseas Port Holdings, and China Shipping
Group. China Merchants Holdings and Hutchison Port Holdings are additional
Chinese companies engaged in global port ownership and operation that ostensibly are private companies but have Chinese government investment and
oversight.84 In 2013, China Merchants purchased a 49 percent share of France’s
CMA CGM’s Terminal Link, which operates in many countries, including the
United States. Of particular note, reports in September 2019 indicated that China
Merchants Holdings was in discussion with CMA CGM to invest further in that
company’s port assets. These actions give rise to speculation, if not concern,
regarding how much more of CMA CGM’s shipping and port operations the
Chinese will purchase.85
China’s shipyard sector grew from the 1980s through the first decade of the
twenty-first century, with some 1,647 shipyards built in China. By 2010, China
had become the number one shipbuilder in the world.86 As noted earlier, the
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largest Chinese SOEs in the shipbuilding business were CSSC and CSIC; they
merged in 2019. Following the financial downturn in 2008, many Chinese
private-sector shipyards went bankrupt, while the shipbuilding SOEs received
massive government loans and subsidies. By 2014, three-quarters of all new orders went to Chinese SOE shipyards.87
Despite possible, if not probable, inefficiencies within maritime SOEs, they
enjoy numerous advantages over private-sector companies. They have easy access
to huge loans and subsidies from the central government. In 2017, for example,
the Chinese government announced it would invest $26 billion in COSCO over
the five-year period ending in 2022. Given that COSCO already is number
three in container shipping, an investment of $26 billion easily could propel the
company into the number one spot, possibly leaving in its wake the bankruptcy
of other major container-shipping lines, which already are becoming fewer in
number each year owing to ongoing consolidation.88 In addition to the possible
infusion of substantial state funds to help SOEs compete with private-sector Chinese and international companies, SOEs also enjoy blanket protection in times of
fiscal downturns and uncertainty, as well as huge preferences in terms of government policies and regulatory treatment.
China can use its substantial market power in shipping to achieve dominance
over its competitors. A classic example of this involves the Brazilian corporation
Vale SA. Vale is a large iron-ore mining company based in Brazil. As a major
consumer of iron ore, China has been a crucial customer of Vale for many years.
No doubt to save transportation costs and better manage logistics to China, late
in the first decade of the twenty-first century Vale’s leadership made the decision
to build ultralarge iron-ore bulk carriers instead of chartering vessels to carry
the company’s iron ore to China.89 Vale chose Chinese shipyards to build these
vessels. However, when the vessels were completed and began carrying iron ore
to China, Chinese officials would not let the Vale bulk ships enter Chinese ports,
citing their immense size as a “safety issue.” Vale was forced to sell the vessels to
COSCO, which in turn leased them back to Vale on long-term charter.90 Presumably this somehow must have made the ships safer, because they then were allowed to enter Chinese ports. This is a clear example of protectionism; COSCO’s
leverage as an SOE prevented Vale from entering the trade except on terms that
COSCO accepted.
Chinese government banking entities clearly support the Chinese maritime
industry in all sectors, including shipping, ports, and shipbuilding. Huge sums
of capital have been made available to the industry for projects that promote
Chinese geostrategic goals, not merely normal business investment. The $26
billion that Chinese banks provided to COSCO, mentioned earlier, is a good
example of this. In 2017, the chairman of SASAC noted “the importance of SOEs
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as a mechanism for the government to direct the economy and achieve political
objectives.”91
THE “NEW SILK ROAD,” THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE—
PART OF CHINA’S MARITIME STRATEGY
China has been an economic and manufacturing powerhouse for much of its
very long history. Since ancient times, Chinese goods have found their way west
via the overland Silk Road through Central Asia, and eventually they traveled
across maritime trade routes through the Indian Ocean that were established by
Arab traders. As noted earlier, over the period from the fifteenth century into
the twentieth century Europeans gradually eclipsed Arab traders as European
countries and companies took virtual control of all Chinese imports and exports,
resulting in the “century of shame.” When the PRC was established in 1949, this
clearly was a situation its government was determined to change. It has done so
slowly but steadily through the decades since 1949.
At the Eighteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in
2012, China for the first time “elevated the construction of a strong maritime
country” to the level of a national goal.92 By 2013, China had become the world’s
dominant commercial maritime industry leader. But far from being content with
the country’s maritime achievements, President Xi announced in 2013 that the
PRC would establish a 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, later called the One
Belt, One Road initiative, and eventually the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).93 The
vast majority of BRI funding comes from Chinese policy banks (SOEs), such as
the Chinese Development Bank and CEXIM, as well as large Chinese financial
institutions, including the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the Bank of China,
the China Construction Bank, and the Silk Road Fund. These institutions are
state owned, or at least state controlled. To date, these Chinese financial institutions have invested, or committed to do so, nearly one trillion dollars in loans for
ports and terminals, railroads, power plants and grids, and other transportationrelated infrastructure.94 With little exaggeration, the BRI can be called the most
expansive, aggressive, and costly transportation and infrastructure scheme ever
developed in human history. Currently, thousands of BRI infrastructure projects
already have been built, are under construction, or are in the planning stages.95
The Chinese have indicated that the BRI ultimately will involve a total of
eight trillion dollars in investments in sixty-eight countries that are home to 65
percent of the world’s population.96 Its two major initiatives are the Silk Road
Economic Belt, an overland route to Europe via railroads and roads, and the Silk
Road Maritime Road, an east–west route via the sea. While the BRI has both land
and sea components, the maritime aspect is the dominant one by far. In 2016,
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for example, 1,700 trains carried cargo from China to Europe via land corridors
through Central Asia, carrying an estimated 150,000 containers. With BRI investments in these corridors, the Chinese estimate that in 2020 the number of
containers carried by BRI roads and railroads will have risen to five hundred
thousand. By comparison, the maritime sea routes from China to Europe in
2014 alone carried some twenty-two million containers, and BRI investments
along the Maritime Silk Road are projected to increase this number greatly in
the years ahead.97 According to the Chinese government, there are three “blue
passages,” or BRI maritime routes, one of which runs “from China to Africa
and the Mediterranean, another to Oceania [in the Pacific] and South Pacific,
and a third through the Arctic to Europe.”98 The BRI also includes projects in
Latin America and the Caribbean. Another major BRI initiative is known as the
Digital Silk Road.99
President Xi has thrown the full weight of his leadership and reputation behind the BRI, and it is hard to overemphasize the full implications of this massive initiative. The BRI may be an outgrowth of former Chinese president Jiang
Zemin’s Going Out policy; however, it is much more prodigious in scale. At the
Nineteenth Party Congress, in 2017, Xi projected that “by 2050, China will have
become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international
influence.” The BRI is a major factor enabling this evolution to happen at present,
and that will continue to be so. Currently, China’s maritime industry—its “blue
economy”—already represents 10 percent of the country’s GDP, and this number
will increase as maritime BRI projects reach fruition.100
China’s public statements on the BRI note “that BRI will greatly benefit humankind and create a new era of world trade and globalization.”101 According to
the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, the purpose of the BRI is to “promote
policy coordination (between countries), connectivity of infrastructure, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bonds.” Xinhua goes
further to suggest that, among other things, the BRI “will improve the marine
environment, promote development and eradicate poverty, enhance cooperation
on marine resource utilization, upgrade marine industry cooperation, facilitate
maritime transport, strengthen connectivity of information and networks, improve security and search and rescue, and create innovative growth.”102 These are
lofty goals, and it can be argued that there is some truth in many of these claims.
It is important to understand, however, that from a Chinese perspective the
BRI has many additional advantages. Successful efforts under the BRI will increase export markets for China, which means more money and jobs in China.
BRI projects themselves provide jobs for Chinese construction companies and
tens of thousands of Chinese construction workers, since one of the prerequisites
for a country to accept BRI funding is to employ Chinese construction companies
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and allow Chinese workers to build the targeted infrastructure in whatever
country receives the BRI loans.103 In BRI port projects, Chinese companies
and workers provide everything: finance, design, construction, operation, even
dredging.104 The Chinese construction companies that build BRI infrastructure
are almost all SOEs, such as the China Communications Construction Company, the China Harbor Engineering Company, and the China Road and Bridge
Corporation.105
However, there are many drawbacks and concerns regarding BRI. Some analysts conclude that in many cases BRI is nothing more than a “debt trap.” Poorer
nations that accept BRI infrastructure funding eventually become unable to
fulfill debt payments, resulting in Chinese takeover of the infrastructure. A 2018
study completed by the Center for Global Development noted that “twenty-three
countries are at risk of debt distress as a result of BRI loans from China.”106 The
port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka is a clear example of this. The Sri Lankan government received a Chinese BRI loan of one billion dollars to build a new port.
By 2017, Sri Lanka was unable to repay the loan. This resulted in China obtaining
a ninety-nine-year lease to control the port completely.107 In another instance, in
October 2019 the following was noted in testimony before the U.S. Congress: “In
2019, the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation reported it had obtained a leaked copy
of the agreement between China and Kenya for the construction [under BRI] of
the Mombasa–Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway Project. According to Kenyan
media, the contract states that China could take possession of the port of Mombasa should the Kenyan National Railway Corporation default on its $2.2 billion
repayments to China’s Exim Bank.”108
Chinese loans often are provided at a higher interest rate than comparable
loans from other countries and sources. The Chinese SOE banks are successful
in securing these loans at the higher rates because, in most cases, for a variety of
reasons, funds would not be available from any other source. In some cases, Chinese loans are sought because they do not come with the specific requirements
(“strings”) attached that other sources, such as the World Bank, often impose
on those seeking a loan. In the case of the port of Hambantota, for example, no
competitors were interested in providing Sri Lanka a loan.109
There are also real fears (and examples) of BRI funding leading to local corruption. Chinese companies involved in BRI projects have been “accused of
corruption and collusion with local politicians in Equatorial Guinea, Malaysia,
and Bangladesh, among many other countries.”110 The BRI SOE China Communications Construction Company and all its subsidiaries have been shown,
in multiple instances, to have used bribes to officials and their families in many
countries where the company and its subsidiaries had business or planned to
conduct business.111
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Perhaps most troubling are the political influence and favors that Chinese
authorities demand in exchange for BRI funding.112 Via such funding in 2016,
China’s SOE COSCO obtained a controlling interest (51 percent) in the port of
Piraeus in Greece; this proportion was due to increase to 67 percent in 2020.113 It
comes as little surprise that in 2017 Greece and Hungary (also a recipient of BRI
funding) vetoed a “joint EU [European Union] statement criticizing China based
on human rights.” The year before, both countries had refused to sign a joint EU
statement that criticized China’s actions in the South China Sea.114
In some cases, BRI projects have failed to produce tangible benefits for countries even while at the same time saddling them with debt. Vanuatu is a case in
point. Under the BRI, the Chinese constructed a new cruise-ship pier in the country, at a cost of one hundred million dollars. Once completed, however, the new facility failed to meet expectations and adversely affected the country’s economy.115
As Forbes notes, “there are often some key differences between how Chinese
maritime companies operate internationally and what their projects look and
feel like. . . . While China’s new array of port holdings are fundamentally economically motivated projects, there is a glaring political dimension as well.” By
controlling major ports in key countries, China maintains more control over its
import and export supply chains. Through investment and ownership, China
in many cases can exercise political influence over other countries and help ensure that these countries stay friendly to Chinese interests. According to Forbes,
“China is creating a new paradigm in the twenty-first century where economic
leverage is the key.”116 In African countries, through loans and BRI investments,
China has gained considerable political leverage. In Djibouti, for example, China
holds over 80 percent of the nation’s debt. In Zambia, it is reported that China will
take over the power grid because of the country’s inability to pay back Chinese
loans.117 Following the 2008 financial crisis, Iceland was in serious financial peril
as a result of banking failures. In response to this, and in the absence of EU and
U.S. support, Iceland accepted Chinese loans and investments that stabilized the
economy. Since that time, Chinese-Icelandic relations have blossomed, which
provides support for China’s BRI efforts in the Arctic.118
SUMMING UP THE THREATS FROM CHINESE
MARITIME DOMINANCE
In all respects, China is a global power, and the United States and other countries
can expect it to assert its interests, as is normal. However, as numerous observers
have noted, in some industries China has acted in a particularly aggressive manner, with a determination to dominate those industries globally. This certainly
is the case with the maritime industry. While Chinese SOEs in the maritime
industry certainly seek to make money, they also serve the political interests of
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the Chinese state, and in some instances they take actions that result in expected
financial losses because those actions serve the policy goals of the Chinese government. While it is true that Chinese initiatives such as the BRI stand to benefit
dozens of countries and their populations in some ways, Chinese BRI funding
and the related maritime dominance give China sizable political leverage and
influence. According to Carolyn Bartholomew, chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a “major goal of BRI [and the concurrent dominance of China’s maritime shipping industry] is to open more markets
for Chinese goods, displacing goods and services currently provided by the U.S.
and other countries.”119 Since the United States has retreated almost completely
from the global maritime industry through a lack of interest in U.S.-flag shipping
and international port ownership and operation, Chinese goals of controlling access to overseas markets have become ever easier to achieve.
As China’s maritime dominance in shipping, global port ownership, maritime
finance, and shipbuilding continues to grow—as is expected and detailed in
Chinese strategic plans and documents—China concurrently will gain political power and influence. It would be naive to think this will not affect nations
around the world, including the United States and members of the EU. One
only need consider the recent debacle that occurred during the summer of 2019
when a National Basketball Association (NBA) general manager expressed support for protesters in Hong Kong. The government in Beijing was outraged and
demanded an apology. The situation threatened the NBA’s multibillion-dollar
business in China. The result: the NBA backpedaled. The association released a
statement in English that “affirmed both Beijing’s concerns and the league’s support for individuals educating themselves and sharing their views on matters of
importance to them.” But—unbeknownst to most people—the NBA also issued
a different statement in Mandarin that stated, “We are extremely disappointed in
the inappropriate comments by the General Manager.”120 Similarly, a flight attendant working for a subsidiary of Cathay Pacific, an airline based in Hong Kong,
voiced her support for the Hong Kong protesters. The PRC government ordered
the airline to dismiss the flight attendant, and it did so.121 While these events
were relatively minor, one only can imagine the demands that China could make
on countries, including the United States, given further dominance in the global
maritime industry. In 2016, for example, the Dalai Lama visited Mongolia, which
greatly displeased the Chinese. So China closed its border with Mongolia—which
is landlocked. This severely affected Mongolia’s economy.122 In yet another example of Chinese bullying, a November 2019 New York Times article noted that
Chinese officials recently had been outraged with the Czech Republic. Developing relations between the two countries and massive Chinese “investment, trade,
and business deals” had prompted the Czech president to declare that “the Czech
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Republic would become China’s gateway to Europe.” All was well until various
events caused Czech leaders to question the commitment their country had made
to the “one China” policy, and even to venture to demonstrate support for Taiwan.
The result was soured relations with the Chinese, who then backed away from
PRC-Czech business deals. China even implemented a policy restricting Chinese
tourists from visiting Prague.123 Recent history is replete with other examples of
China bullying countries and companies, including firms in the United States,
into complying with its wishes—“or else.” Increasing dominance in the global
maritime industry through ship and port ownership, maritime financing, and
BRI funding will ensure the Chinese have ever-increasing leverage to do the
same in the decades ahead. Meanwhile, the United States stands idly by. As far as
international shipping and port operations are concerned, the United States has
absolutely no leverage at all. What is worse is that lack of action on the part of the
United States clearly threatens America’s global trade.
Chinese control in the global maritime industry is the result of aggressive strategic planning coupled with favorable government policies backed by the power
of SOEs and subsidies and other forms of government funding. There simply is
no way for private-sector companies in the global industry to compete with this
on their own. No matter what the economic conditions, SOEs have access to
massive capital that the private sector simply cannot marshal. Further, to protect
SOEs, the Chinese government can restrict outsiders’ ability to compete and can
enact laws and implement other policies that benefit its SOEs—and it has done
so. The Chinese have shown themselves to be masters at this as they developed
and promoted their maritime industries over decades.
A major concern is that the global maritime industry has been consolidating
in all sectors, meaning that with each passing year there are fewer and fewer companies in all sectors of the industry. This is true in shipbuilding, ship operation,
and port ownership and operation, despite the fact that the industry continues to
grow as the global economy becomes more integrated.
Container shipping is but one powerful example of this. Forty years ago,
it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the ocean shipping companies that operated freight vessels carrying global trade; there were
hundreds of such concerns, including dozens of U.S.-flag companies. Today,
container-shipping companies carry some 60 percent of all seagoing trade, and
there are many more and larger vessels carrying freight (now mostly in shipping
containers). But the number of companies has been reduced drastically through
acquisitions and mergers. In early 2018, the top fifteen containership operators
carried 70 percent of the global trade; just six months later the number had been
reduced to ten companies carrying the same portion of the trade.124 In 2019, the top
five companies carried the majority of shipping containers.125 In order by size, these
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were A.P. Moller / Maersk (Danish), Mediterranean Shipping Company (Swiss),
COSCO (Chinese), CMA CGM (French, with an association with COSCO), and
Hapag-Lloyd (German). The existence of fewer and fewer companies restricts
competition and can affect service. As noted in an earlier section, UNCTAD
contends that too few container-shipping companies remain to ensure adequate
competition.126
To make matters worse, the companies noted above operate within only three
shipping alliances, which also include smaller companies. These shipping alliances
are essentially cartels, thereby further restricting competition. These alliances—
the 2M Alliance, the Ocean Alliance, and THE Alliance—together control 91
percent of global container shipping.127 The large numbers of megacontainerships
built over the past few years or on order have created overcapacity that will linger
for many years. This has resulted, and for the foreseeable future will continue to
result, in lower freight rates, which could force other companies out of business,
spurring even more consolidation in the industry.128 The largest of the containership operators, Maersk, even has suggested that severe competition will result in
only three large companies carrying the vast majority of global trade in containers—no doubt with China’s COSCO being one of those three, if not number one.129
The presence of fewer and fewer companies in any industry tends to result in
higher costs to consumers and poorer service. As COSCO takes more control
over the world’s container shipping, the Chinese government will gain more and
more political leverage over countries that rely on its container-shipping services
and port ownership and operation for their international trade. Economic theory
suggests that if there are too few companies in an industry, such that service and
pricing affect consumers adversely, new companies will form to enter the industry, improve competition, and positively affect costs and service.
Unfortunately, this will not happen in the ocean shipping industry—unless
host governments subsidize the new companies. Entering the global shipping
industry, particularly container shipping, requires billions of dollars and many
years to build vessels, establish service, and obtain port and intermodal connections. It would take years to receive positive returns on investment, and the
likelihood of positive returns would be questionable in any case. In other words,
the likelihood of attracting investors to form new container-shipping companies
is poor, given the economics and time considerations involved.
Still another concern is the current profit margins in container shipping. One
of the reasons the industry has consolidated is that in trying to compete and in
building large fleets of megacontainerships, freight rates have been driven down,
which has pushed companies and investors out of the industry, fueling ongoing
mergers and acquisitions that have reduced the number of companies drastically.
Naturally, investors are motivated by profits, and if profits are lacking there is an
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understandable desire to sell unprofitable assets and move on to greener pastures.
With the power of subsidies and other forms of government financing as well
as favorable legislation and policy assistance, Chinese SOEs in shipping and the
maritime industry at large can weather financial storms and economic downturns. They further have the funding and capability to buy out private-sector
companies during economic downturns. Yes, Chinese SOEs, like private-sector
companies, are motivated by profit, but they also are motivated by Chinese government policy and political ambitions.
This all makes for a potentially dangerous situation as far as the global
container-shipping industry is concerned. For example, A.P. Moller / Maersk is a
public company owned largely by the Maersk family and other investors; MSC is
completely privately owned, by a Swiss family; and CMA CGM is a public company owned by investors, as is Hapag-Lloyd. What will happen if global container
rates, already depressed, reach a point at which shipping families and investors
grow tired of poor profit margins and decide to withdraw from the business to
put their funds into more-profitable ventures? In December 2018, Moody’s cut
Maersk’s credit rating—already not the best—from Baa2 to Baa3, “which is at
the bottom of the investment grade bond rating.”130 In the fall of 2019, CMA
CGM reported a second straight quarterly loss and, as was noted earlier, previously had sold 49 percent of its global port-operations entity, Terminal Link, to
a Chinese company to reduce its debt. (There are no data on the second-largest
container-shipping company, MSC, because it is entirely privately owned by a
Swiss family.) In total, container shipping worldwide is on shaky ground, and
further consolidation is likely. This author speculates that the Chinese government, through COSCO and other Chinese companies, will be more than happy
to purchase any containership companies that fail. This happened as recently as
2017, when COSCO purchased the 150-year-old OOCL. So further consolidation in the container-shipping industry is possible, with China benefiting and
COSCO taking even more dominant control of the global industry, which will
result in greater leverage, political and otherwise, for the Chinese government.
Throughout, this article has referred numerous times to how the Chinese
government subsidizes the country’s maritime industries in every sector, and the
degree to which it does so. This is despite the fact that in 2001 China became a
member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). WTO rules expressly prohibit government subsidies.131 In the maritime sector, the Chinese simply ignore
these WTO rules, and apparently the rest of the world acquiesces. One Harvard
study indicated that in the shipbuilding industry alone China subsidized shipyard costs by between 13 and 20 percent from 2006 through 2016.132 It is clear
that vast Chinese government funding has been provided to ocean-shipping giant COSCO as well. Given the implied acceptance of this by the rest of the world
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and on the basis of past performance, there is no reason to expect the Chinese to
stop subsidizing their maritime industries. One might argue that Chinese government subsidies of the country’s maritime industry benefit other nations and
people by providing lower-cost shipping, but subsidies distort the market and
ultimately can result in the creation of oligopolies or even monopolies, which
then can dictate service and costs, and in the case of China can exert political
influence as well.
While China merely is poised to dominate the world’s container shipping,
it already dominates shipbuilding and global port ownership and operation.
For decades, the top three shipbuilding countries in the world have been Japan,
Korea, and China. Over 40 percent of the world’s commercial ships now are
built in China, and this percentage is growing as shipyards in other countries no
longer can compete and so cease to operate.133 China is the global leader in ship
finance by providing funds for international shipping companies seeking to buy
and build ships, particularly in Chinese shipyards.134 This means that, although
China may not own or operate large numbers of the world’s commercial ships, it
has influence, if not control, over more than just Chinese-owned ships, because
it holds the mortgages on a major percentage of ships owned or operated by companies throughout the world. In 2017, for example, Chinese SOE banks provided
ship-construction loans of over twenty billion dollars, primarily for construction
in Chinese shipyards. Chinese strategic plans call for China to increase its leadership in ship-construction financing in the decades ahead.135
From a military point of view, in 2015 the Chinese government issued new
guidelines to Chinese shipping companies and shipyards, Technical Standards for
New Civilian Ships to Implement National Defense Requirements. These guidelines
lay out construction and equipment requirements to ensure that Chinese ships
can support the forces of the People’s Liberation Army, including the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). These guidelines pertain to containerships, RO/RO
vessels, bulk ships, and general-cargo ships.136 These measures will give China—as
the number one shipowner in the world, with thousands of ships under its control—unparalleled strategic sealift capabilities, if not greater overt military power.
Also a matter of concern is the possibility that ports that China constructs or
operates under a BRI initiative ultimately may be used by its military, particularly
the PLAN. The Chinese already have constructed and are using a PLAN base
in Djibouti. In July 2019, the Chinese defense minister commented that “China
is willing to deepen military exchanges and cooperation with the Caribbean
countries and Pacific island countries under the framework of OBOR [BRI].”
Chinese laws compel Chinese companies and SOEs to comply with requests and
demands from Chinese security and intelligence organizations and the military.
This enables these agencies to have global and easy access to intelligence in
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the sixty-eight countries receiving BRI funding and throughout the thousands
of other maritime and BRI projects. Chinese intelligence agencies will benefit
further as BRI funds are made available to install Huawei 5G equipment in BRI
ports and terminals throughout the world.137 When COSCO gained ownership
and control in the Greek port of Piraeus, for example, the company replaced the
network infrastructure with all-Huawei equipment.138
Senior U.S. military personnel and members of Congress have raised the concern that Chinese dominance in the port industry around the world ultimately
could restrict access to critical ports the U.S. Navy needs. Chinese intelligence
agencies’ obvious penetration into these ports will affect U.S. military interests
and security adversely.139 Might China, through its BRI funding or through
bribes, demand that foreign governments deny access to the U.S. military? It is a
very real possibility. Djibouti, for example, has been a recipient of BRI funding,
and China holds the majority of Djibouti’s debt. As noted, the country now has a
PLAN military base. Djibouti also happens to be an important logistics hub for
the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Central Command. Might the Djiboutian government
restrict or deny USN access to this base as a result of Chinese influence, funding,
or bribes?140 Might this same tactic be used in other regions of the world where
the U.S. Navy and other elements of the U.S. military operate?
In 2015, Michael P. Pillsbury, the director of the Center on Chinese Strategy at
the Hudson Institute, authored a book, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s
Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. The title supplies
the book’s thesis. The author is not only a China expert but a fluent speaker and
writer of Mandarin, which gives him particular insights into what the Chinese
really are thinking. As he frequently notes in the book, the Chinese often say
one thing in an English text but something completely different in the Chinese
version of the same text. With this approach, the Chinese often are able to fool
Western scholars, journalists, and political leaders who do not read and write
Mandarin about what their true motives are. In fact, Pillsbury notes that one of
the main strategies the Chinese have used throughout their history has been to
deceive others about their true intentions. The ancient Chinese military thinker
Sun-tzu, for example, emphasized the importance of deception more than any
other military doctrine.141
Yet as the Chinese have become the world leader in all aspects of the global
maritime industry, including ship ownership, port and terminal ownership
and operations, shipbuilding, ship finance, and maritime education, they have
demonstrated plainly their intention to use the maritime industry to further the
strategic, economic, and political goals of the PRC. Dominance in the maritime
industry, along with concurrent multitrillion-dollar efforts through the BRI,
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will give China truly unparalleled power. The Chinese clearly are trying to sell a
positive message—that these efforts are designed “to kindle a new era of globalization, a golden age of commerce that will benefit all. . . . As Western countries
move backwards by erecting walls, China is contriving to build bridges, both
literal and metaphorical.”142 And to be sure, there are positive aspects to what the
Chinese are doing. China’s decades-long dominance in manufacturing has provided the world with a plethora of consumer goods at moderate prices, which has
raised the standard of living for people around the world. Not surprisingly, the
Chinese are pursuing maritime ambitions as a source of revenue, trade, and jobs
for the Chinese people as well. These alone are not nefarious actions. Still, huge
Chinese maritime SOEs with access to massive government funds and subsidies
and the protection of Chinese laws and policies give the Chinese government
astonishing political leverage and control—on a scale potentially greater than
anything seen in human history.
There are those in the EU and the United States who have expressed concerns
over BRI and the global dominance of the Chinese maritime industry. But these
voices are too few and too often essentially have been ignored, leaving a lack
of action by Western governments. If the Chinese are not “secretly planning to
replace the U.S. as the global superpower,” as Pillsbury suggests, they seemingly
are attempting something very close to it. Their actions prove this, and the West’s
inaction makes their success more possible every day. The time is long overdue
for the United States to reinvigorate its maritime industries and challenge the
Chinese in the same game by using the very same techniques the Chinese have
used to gain dominance in the global maritime industry. The private-sector
maritime industry cannot do this alone—the U.S. maritime industry simply cannot compete against the power of the Chinese state. The United States and allied
governments must bring to bear substantial and sustained political action, policies, and financial support. To do anything less is to cede control of the world’s
maritime industry and global supply chains to China, and perhaps to force the
United States and its allies to enter their own “century of shame.”
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ONE APPROACH, T WO RESULTS
The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault
during the World Wars
Ethan S. Rafuse

I

n the past few decades, students of military affairs have looked repeatedly to
the first half of the twentieth century, and the efforts of military organizations
to adapt to the changing tools of war during and between the two world wars,
to understand why some military organizations are successful on the battlefield
and others are not. It is safe to say that few, if any, military organizations have
fared worse at the hands of students of the interwar period than the French army.
This is not surprising. The disastrous 1940 campaign seemed to offer a compelling verdict on the contrasting approaches that French military institutions and
their German counterparts took to develop uses for the military tools that were
introduced in the previous war. In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps traditionally
has received high marks for its efforts during the interwar period. This, too, is
not surprising, as its solution to the problem of how to make a successful opposed
amphibious landing was a key contribution to the U.S. victory over imperial
Japan.1
What follows is another look at the innovation efforts that the French army
and the U.S. Marines made during the interwar period and the methods they
brought to the World War II battlefield and the particular problems they faced.
There is little doubt that there were significant difEthan S. Rafuse is a professor of military history at
ferences both in their organizational approaches to
the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Colthese problems and in the results those approaches
lege and was the Charles Boal Ewing Distinguished
Visiting Professor at the U.S. Military Academy in achieved on the battlefield. To be sure, the starting
2018–19. He received his PhD in history and political
point for assessing any military organization must
science from the University of Missouri–Kansas City.
be its effectiveness on the battlefield. Yet closer
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examination of the problems each faced and the
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answers they developed reveals more in common between the French army and
the Marines than the operational results they achieved suggest, and offers a compelling reminder when studying the past to heed Sir Michael Howard’s famous
admonition to do so in width, depth, and context.2 It is not the intent of this article either to deny the Marines their well-merited laurels by association with the
defeated French army, or to ignore the serious issues with the latter that make it
a useful subject for considering undesirable qualities in a military organization.
Still, there is a danger that making battlefield outcomes the sole determinant of
how we assess military organizations can lead to insufficient appreciation of context, contingency, and detail, and thus an incomplete understanding.
BREAKING THROUGH THE TRENCHES
Of course, the military organizations that prepared for and fought the Second
World War did so with the Great War’s oppressively heavy shadow cast over nearly everything they did. The problems illustrated by the tactical and operational
stalemate that prevailed on the western front for most of the war, and its eventual
resolution, weighed most heavily. When the western front consolidated at the end
of the dramatic maneuvers of 1914, the French army and its British and Belgian
allies had fended off defeat but faced what proved to be a formidable task—that
is, driving the German army off the soil of France and Belgium before the strain
and hardship of their societies’ near-complete mobilization for the war became
unsustainable.3 With the German flanks effectively secured by the mountainous
Swiss border and the English Channel, turning movements and envelopments
were unfeasible. Consequently, the French had to figure out how to conduct successful frontal assaults on fortified enemy positions that would create a tactical
penetration deep and broad enough to be exploited operationally. The means
available to French commanders were effectively limited to artillery and infantry;
new technologies such as the tank and airplane were too immature to play more
than a supporting role. This simplified their operational problem considerably
and made the solution rather obvious: use artillery to smash the enemy’s lines,
then send foot soldiers “over the top” to cross the deadly ground and attack the
enemy’s lines. They hoped that the artillery bombardment would weaken the defenders sufficiently that the attackers could find a hole in the line or, with effort,
create one that was large enough for a complete penetration to be accomplished,
which would set the stage for a full tactical and operational exploitation.4
If the concept was simple enough, successful execution was another thing
altogether. The problem was not that artillery was incapable of creating conditions for a tactical penetration. From the time the method first was applied, the
French and their allies demonstrated that, while crossing no-man’s-land was
costly, afterward infantry usually could find the enemy sufficiently weakened
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by the preliminary bombardment to achieve a tactical penetration—a “breakin” that gave the Allies possession of part of the enemy line. The problem was
sustaining the assault’s momentum to turn the penetration into a breakthrough.
In essence, once a penetration had been created, the two sides found themselves
in a race. With the assault force exhausted and bloodied by the effort of creating
the penetration, the tactical commander then had to send reserves up in the right
place to exploit the breach before the tactical defender could bring up his own
reserves to contain it and launch a counterattack. It was exceedingly difficult for
an attacker on the western front to win this race. It invariably took more time
for reports of a successful penetration to reach the headquarters of the attacking
commander than it did to reach the defender’s, who also would have been alerted
by the attacker’s bombardments to begin moving up reserves. Any penetration
site was necessarily in range of the defender’s artillery and the high density of
manpower and infrastructure on the western front meant that the attacker’s own
artillery support was less effective the farther he advanced. The defender’s rear
area also was usually better ground over which to move reserve forces than was
the artillery-chewed expanse of no-man’s-land that attacking reserves had to
cross.5 The French and their allies made notable improvements and refinements
to the type and employment of their artillery, such as the development of the rolling barrage, that forced the Germans to make fundamental changes to their defensive tactics; however, they remained unable to turn tactical penetrations into
tactical breakthroughs that could be exploited to achieve operational success.6
By 1916, a growing number of commanders concluded that the problems
associated with the frontal assault in the face of modern firepower meant that
efforts to achieve an operational breakthrough were not realistic. Even French
commander Joseph Joffre, who had been an enthusiastic supporter of offensive
operations early on, accepted the merit of this argument, albeit reluctantly.7
Improvements in artillery and infantry techniques kindled hopes for a breakthrough after tactical successes at the Somme and Verdun in 1916. However, the
Germans then developed the defense-in-depth concept in response, negating
those offensive innovations and leading to the catastrophe of the Allies’ Nivelle
offensive in April 1917. After that failure, Philippe Pétain, who had been skeptical
of pursuing breakthroughs since the beginning of the war, became head of the
French army and brought, in the words of historian Douglas Porch, “a sobering
note of reality to . . . operations.”8
Pétain advocated what some referred to as a “bite and hold” approach. Heavy
artillery was employed as before, leveraging refinements in both tools and
techniques, to saturate and destroy as much of the enemy front line as possible.
Infantry then went over the top, with a rolling barrage preceding its advance.
This necessitated a tightly planned, phased advance over a broad front, and
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the discretion granted to lower-level commanders was circumscribed tightly to
ensure that troop movement was coordinated with the barrage. This enabled
enough men to reach the enemy lines to achieve a tactical penetration. Unlike
before, though, the idea of exploitation was eschewed, so once the enemy lines
were seized there was no “race” to expand the penetration or bring up reserves.
In line with plans developed by higher headquarters, the infantry then would
halt and, instead of attempting to turn the penetration into a breakthrough,
would stay under the cover of its own artillery and repel enemy counterattacks.
The infantry would consolidate its new position while heavy artillery was moved
forward. “The artillery conquers the positions,” Pétain famously explained, “the
infantry occupies them.”9
The effectiveness of these tactics was hard to dispute. By the end of 1916,
improvements in heavy artillery enabled attackers to inflict unsustainable destruction on defending troops packed in forward defensive lines. This led to significant reductions in the number of troops holding forward defensive positions,
which made tactical penetrations all the more achievable. Under Pétain, the
French successfully resumed offensive operations in late 1917, providing a muchneeded boost to morale in the French ranks following the mutinies that broke
out after the failed Nivelle offensive.10 In 1918, these methods were incorporated
into a broader offensive approach by conducting a series of limited and methodical operations at one point along the German line before moving on to another.
While tanks and aircraft played a role in these operations, it was improvements
in the efficiency and effectiveness of artillery, and its liberal use, that were “the
true artisan of victory,” in Hew Strachan’s words. In the process of methodically
pushing the enemy back—while also conserving French manpower—these operations imposed enough casualties on an exhausted German army that its leaders had no choice but to throw in the towel in November 1918. Thus, the French
were able to claim victory at the end of the war, not through the dramatic blows
on the battlefield envisioned at its start, but by exhausting the enemy through the
accumulation of numerous limited tactical gains over time.11
INTERWAR DOCTRINE DEVELOPMENT IN
FRANCE AND GERMANY
Despite their success in World War I, there were significant issues with France’s
methodical tactics. First, these methods do not produce quick, dramatic, or decisive battlefield results. Consequently, they could not be employed by a belligerent
whose strategic and operational situation required a quick battlefield decision.
The differences in the broader strategic contexts in which France and Germany
found themselves thus drove divergent doctrine development models in the leadup to the next war.
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France Commits to the Bataille Conduit
As Robert A. Doughty and other historians have chronicled, France’s methods
also contained the seeds of a problematic military culture and a faulty approach
to innovation during the interwar period that translated into disaster for the
French in 1940. During the 1920s, French doctrine anchored itself to “the bataille
conduit, or methodical battle,” which “resembled the methods used in World War
I, but it represented an intensification of those methods,” “a step-by-step battle
in which units obediently moved between phase lines and adhered to strictly
scheduled timetables. . . . [A]rtillery provided the momentum and the rhythm
for the attack.” Infantry was expected to make only relatively shallow advances “to
remain under the umbrella of artillery protection.”12 Whatever the merits of these
tactics, there is no dispute that they had significant ramifications for the culture
of the army that adopted them. By their nature, they required a very top-down
approach to tactical planning and battlefield execution, as the employment of
infantry and artillery had to be tightly coordinated, and plans had to be followed
as close to the letter as possible, leaving little room for lower-level initiative.13
In service of this doctrine, French leaders systematically purged the aggressive and audacious spirit of Napoléon from the minds of their officers in favor of
“rigid centralization and strict obedience,” and thereby undermined their ability
to respond effectively to unexpected developments on the battlefield.14 It also
led the French to take flawed approaches to the study of World War I and the
possible employment of armor. Focusing almost exclusively on operations that
validated the methodical battle doctrine, they failed to recognize new possibilities suggested by the war and improvements in air and armor technology. They
tied tanks and infantry to the use of firepower rather than empowering them to
exploit tactical penetrations dynamically and aggressively on their own. Furthermore, the hierarchical, top-down culture fostered by the methodical battle doctrine had the effect of discouraging open discussion of new ideas and concepts,
especially in the country’s institutions of professional military education, which
became little more than inculcators of doctrine. This precluded the sort of honest, realistic consideration of doctrine and organizational agility that might have
enabled the French army to recognize and address problems in its planning and
execution of operations in 1940 more quickly. “France committed the glaring
mistake,” Doughty concludes, “of trying to impose her way of war on the enemy
without having suitable recourse should this attempt fail. . . . The notion of a carefully controlled and tightly centralized battle belonged to another era.”15
Germany’s Dynamic Response
Further damaging “bite and hold” tactics in the eyes of historians is the contrasting
and more dramatic approach that the German army took to tactical innovation
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during and after World War I. By late 1917, German resources had been exhausted
to the point that it was impractical for army leaders to follow the French approach
of relying on large amounts of heavy artillery and methodical operations. Moreover, the need for a dramatic victory before American matériel and manpower
irreversibly tipped the scales against them on the western front meant that any
approach that could not achieve a tactical and operational breakthrough was
inadequate to Germany’s strategic needs. The result of German efforts to address
the problem was the infiltration tactics of 1918, which also laid the foundation for
the army’s doctrinal and organizational development during the interwar period
and were directly connected to the victory of 1940.16
The fundamental issue, as noted earlier, was how to employ artillery and
infantry to enable the attacker not just to achieve a penetration but to win the
race between his effort to exploit and the defender’s effort to contain that tactical penetration. Instead of following the French massed artillery and infantry
approach to wear down the enemy, the Germans applied speed and maneuver to
the problem. Rather than pursuing destruction of enemy positions through heavy
bombardments, German doctrine used short, concentrated bombardments
with the objective of neutralizing defenders through disruption. This would
be followed quickly by probes to identify weak points in the enemy defenses.
Sturmtruppen (storm trooper—also called Stoßtruppen) assault units then would
come up to maintain momentum against the assault’s preeminent objective
and bypass strongpoints and pockets of resistance, push deep into the enemy
position, and attack headquarters and rear areas. Sustaining the momentum of
the advance and focusing more on the depth of attack than on maintaining a
continuous line, in combination with the high tempo of the German advance,
frustrated the ability of defenders to bring up reserves to contain penetrations by
disrupting command and control. With command broken down and Germans in
their rear, bypassed positions would be taken not through attritional battles but
by the defenders concluding that further resistance was pointless and giving up
the fight.17 In contrast with French methods, in which the artillery dictated the
pace of advance, which produced an “entire system . . . designed to be propelled
forward by pressure from above, rather than by being pulled from below,” the
German tactical system dictated that the pace and direction of the battle be determined by the efforts of the frontline infantry, with junior officers encouraged,
indeed required, to exercise tactical initiative aggressively.18
The results of these methods when applied in the initial German offensives of
1918 were impressive. With remarkable speed, German attacks achieved dramatic penetrations of the enemy line and reached depths in Allied positions that had
not been seen on the western front since the beginning of the war. Unfortunately
for the Germans, while they had figured out how to break through the enemy
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position fast enough to win the tactical race between the offense and defense,
this simply meant that the race then shifted to the operational level, where they
were less prepared. The Germans did not have the means to win this race, as the
Allies were able to slow down and contain breakthroughs owing to their ability to
bring up operational reserves and to the exhaustion of the German attack troops.
The German effort was undermined further by the high command’s desire to
maximize lower-level initiative at the expense of adequate planning to connect
tactical successes to a larger operational framework.19
Although they ultimately failed to achieve a favorable operational or strategic
decision in World War I, imperial Germany’s tactics have won praise from students of military affairs, who believe they seeded Germany’s successful interwar
innovation, which produced decisive victories in the opening campaigns of
World War II and sustained high combat effectiveness throughout the war. The
fact that they offered a qualitative approach and solution to the problem, in contrast to the more quantitative French methods, also contributed to their appeal
to students of war, who generally have viewed strategies of attrition negatively,
especially those in the United States who faced the challenge of countering Soviet
mass on potential Cold War battlefields.20
Moreover, just as appealing as the tactical methods themselves is the process
that the Germans used to approach the problem and how it shaped, and was
shaped by, German military culture. In the process of developing doctrine during the war and continuing to develop it afterward, the Germans demonstrated
a salutary and impressive openness to ideas (even those that were not their own,
as illustrated by their debt to concepts proposed by French junior officer André
Laffargue). The German approach was characterized by a willingness to listen
to frontline commanders, engage them in the process of doctrinal development,
and encourage them to exercise aggressiveness and initiative on the battlefield.
Thus, the Germany army went into the interwar period with a dynamic approach
to doctrine, as well as an offensive mind-set that translated into a commitment to
maneuver and the ruthless exploitation of battlefield opportunities, in contrast to
the French, whom one scholar described as “frozen in time somewhere between
Verdun and the autumn offensive of 1918.” Altogether, the German army’s aggressive mind-set, in Williamson Murray’s words, “provided a solid framework
for thinking” about the problems of the modern battlefield. This translated into
the doctrine and organizational ethos that proved so deadly in 1939 and 1940.21
Although infiltration tactics did not deliver operational or strategic victory in
1918, the methods and the process by which the Germans developed and built on
them during the interwar period and the dramatic results they produced on the
battlefield have been lauded as manifestations of a “genius for war” that contrasted conspicuously with their more insular and hidebound French counterparts.22
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THE AMPHIBIOUS PROBLEM AGAINST JAPAN
Western Europe was not the only place where the first half of the twentieth
century saw militaries confronting the challenge of figuring out how to use the
modern tools of industrial warfare effectively. As the United States contemplated
the prospect of a military contest for the western Pacific—something strategists
had been doing for decades by the time Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941—it was clear that it faced compelling and challenging problems. For a
United States that sought to restrain and contain Japanese power in Asia, it was
a question of how to project combat power across the world’s largest ocean. Of
particular concern in this context was the task of securing possession of small islands between Hawaii and mainland Asia so they could be used to support a drive
across the Pacific by the U.S. Navy’s capital ships. The U.S. Marine Corps, partly
as an act of organizational self-preservation, took up the challenge of figuring out
a solution to one of the critical military problems confronting American strategists: how to conduct successful amphibious attacks that would enable American
forces to wrest control of those islands from the Japanese.
Few challenges appeared as formidable in the interwar period as making an
opposed amphibious landing. If conducting a successful frontal assault on continental Europe seemed daunting in light of the experience of World War I, an
opposed landing in the face of modern firepower to seize the small islands that the
United States would need to defeat Japan seemed so hazardous that few were eager
to take up the challenge. Although the first few decades of the twentieth century
saw Western militaries conduct several successful amphibious operations, these
largely validated, in historian Allan R. Millett’s words, “a similar basic concept for
successful landings: land where there is no opposition from ground forces.” Meanwhile, the miserable, unsuccessful effort of the British and French at Gallipoli in
1915 cast a dark shadow over the question of how to conduct amphibious operations against a beach defended by a belligerent equipped with modern firepower.23
However, the operational and strategic objective that amphibious operations
were to serve—securing western Pacific islands to support the U.S. Navy’s offensive drive toward Japan—was critical to American prospects for success. Of
particular interest were islands that could serve as air bases to support the U.S.
Navy’s capital ships against the Imperial Japanese Navy in the course of a grand
naval offensive across the western Pacific toward Japan—islands that otherwise
the Japanese would use to support their resistance against the American advance.24 The problem, of course, was that, while there were many islands between
Hawaii and Japan, the need for islands that could support airfields narrowed the
geographic options significantly, and it could be assumed safely that islands the
American planners identified as operationally desirable also would be obvious to
Japanese planners. Thus, the possibility that there would be islands of strategic
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and operational value that remained unoccupied appeared slim. Moreover, many
of these islands would be small enough, and offer so few practicable landing sites,
that the most effective approach to amphibious operations—namely, landing
where there will be no resistance—would not be available.
There were, to be sure, many problems unique to the opposed amphibious
assault. “Moving men and equipment across open water in the face of carefully
calculated fire is an extremely dangerous proposition,” historian Jerold E. Brown
laconically notes. “Furthermore, the defender has the advantage of time and space
. . . and he often has time to prepare his defenses.”25 On top of this were the headaches associated with coordinating land, sea, and air elements. In addition, since the
United States would be conducting these operations as part of a massive strategic
and operational exercise in power projection across the world’s greatest ocean, there
were a host of logistical issues that were incomparable in both scale and character
to what those charged with developing doctrine for the battlefields of Europe faced.
Given these difficulties, it is not surprising that, in contrast to the travails of
the French army, the story of how the U.S. Marine Corps solved the problems of
opposed amphibious operations in the Pacific often has been cited by students
of innovation as a great example of institutional effectiveness. In line with the
concept for a war with Japan laid out in War Plan ORANGE, the visionary Marine
commandant John A. Lejeune entrusted a young, somewhat eccentric, lieutenant colonel named Earl “Pete” Ellis with the task of studying the theater of operations. Ellis’s observations, laid out in Operation Plan 712 along with careful
study of maneuvers conducted during the 1920s, then were incorporated into an
effort to think critically about and develop doctrine—in contrast to the French
schools, where the mission was to inculcate doctrine and “school solutions”—in
which vital work was done by students and faculty at the Marine Corps schools
at Quantico. Throughout, the Marines demonstrated the sort of commitment
to rigorous professional military education; to entrusting critical tasks to junior
officers such as Ellis and Majors Charles Barrett and DeWitt Peck; and to open,
honest discussion of problems that was absent in the French army. The product
of these efforts—more remarkable because the Marines simultaneously were
analyzing their ongoing operations in the “Banana Wars,” producing the Small
Wars Manual, which remains an invaluable work on the subject to this day—was
the 1934 Tentative Manual for Landing Operations.26
This document, officially adopted as doctrine by the U.S. Navy and distributed as Fleet Training Publication 167 (FTP 167) in 1938, laid out the conceptual
framework for addressing the problems of amphibious landings. After continuing to refine the implementation of its concepts using the results of landing exercises, the Marine Corps took its amphibious doctrine to war. The first tests, at
Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1942 and 1943, although bloodier and tougher than
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initially expected, validated the doctrine. They also validated the organizational
approach and culture that produced that doctrine, especially the Marines’ process of continual refinement as they conducted the grueling offensives that put
American forces into position to bring about the total defeat of imperial Japan.27
Contributing to the contrast between history’s glowing judgment of the Marines
and that of the French army is that, while there were many differences in the specifics (French commanders did not have to devote attention to the merits of rubber
landing craft or the construction of wharves, for instance), the fundamental problem the Marine Corps faced and addressed so successfully was in essence the same
as the one the French army faced in Europe. Like the French and the Germans in
World War I and during the interwar period, the Marines had to figure out how
to combine fire and maneuver successfully to assault defenders equipped with
modern firepower. The Marines’ success, of course, demonstrates the methods and
qualities we associate with military organizations that innovate effectively, so one
must think that surely their solution more closely followed the Germans’ aggressive
maneuver doctrine than the French preference for mass, right?
Wrong. If the Marines demonstrated a more commendable (and Germanic)
organizational ethos in the process of innovation, their solution to the amphibious assault problem was in fact more Gallic than Teutonic. Like the French doctrine of methodical battle, Marine doctrine placed heavy emphasis on firepower.
In line with historical experience (not to mention common sense), FTP 167
posited that, in light of the difficulties associated with landings, “superiority of
force, particularly at the point of landing, is essential to success,” and that consequently “[b]eaches strongly organized for defense should be avoided if possible.”
In the event that an opposed landing could not be avoided, once an island had
been selected for assault the U.S. Navy would endeavor to isolate it, to prevent the
enemy from reinforcing it before, during, or in the aftermath of the assault. The
“attacking force,” consisting of “two elements of major importance, namely—The
landing force [and] Naval gunfire,” then would go to work.28
First, naval gunfire would pound the island. In its treatment of the effect
sought, FTP 167 made a distinction between neutralization (“by short bursts of
fire of great density to secure the advantage and effect of shock and surprise”)
and destruction. The manual expressed a decided preference for the former,
declaring, “Destruction should only be attempted under favorable conditions.”
Once firepower had done its job, Marine infantry would make a frontal assault to
break through the enemy’s defenses—not on a narrow front, with an eye toward
infiltration and deep penetration, as in the German system, but on “a wide front
in order to increase the speed of the landing,” avoid exposed flanks, and facilitate
coordination with suppressive fire support ahead of the advancing infantry. Marine infantry would seize the enemy frontline positions that had been neutralized
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by fire and then push far enough inland to secure the beach, while staying within
the range of naval fire support. FTP 167 advised that “initial assault echelons
are particularly apt to become disorganized during and immediately after the
landing, and they cannot be expected to make deep penetrations against strong
opposition,” which made it “often desirable . . . to have leading assault units secure a limited objective.”29 On a small enough island, such as those that would be
encountered initially in the drive across the Pacific from Pearl Harbor, anything
beyond that would be unnecessary.
The Marines then would consolidate the positions they had gained, fighting
off any enemy counterattacks attempting to dislodge them. Then, once the island
or islands capable of supporting airfields were secured, the Navy would continue
its westward advance to the next island chain. This way, U.S. forces would work
their way methodically toward victory much as the Allies had on the western
front in 1918. They would leverage superior resources to attack and seize one
island chain, then another, attriting the Japanese armed forces as part of a larger
strategy that, in cooperation with allies, also cut Japanese access to resources.
Then, if the decisive naval engagement envisioned in both Japan’s “interceptionattrition” strategy and Plan ORANGE took place, the Japanese would be at a grave
disadvantage. If not, the Japanese war effort in the western Pacific would collapse
from the exhaustion of matériel and manpower.30
Of course, it is a truism that no plan, no matter how commendable the effort
to produce it may be, survives first contact with the enemy, necessitating modification of the initial assumptions and plans. This was certainly the case for the
Marines and their doctrine for an opposed amphibious landing, which first was
tested truly in November 1943 in Operation GALVANIC, targeting the Gilbert Islands. Planners identified wresting possession of Betio Island, the main island in
the Tarawa atoll, from its five thousand Japanese defenders as the most important
objective. For the most part, the Marines’ doctrine and the process that developed
it were proved to be generally sound; however, the operation also demonstrated
that they needed some modifications—ones that pushed Marine doctrine further
in a Gallic direction.
As noted, the fire-support doctrine in FTP 167 preferred neutralization over
destruction. Yet, as one Marine who landed at Tarawa later explained to an interviewer for the World at War series, this was not what the landing teams were
told to expect. “They thought they would level the island and completely demolish everything,” he recalled, “[t]hat there wouldn’t be a living soul on the island.”
Unfortunately, the Marines who made the initial assault found that, contrary to
the boasts of some naval officers, this was not the case at all.31 Setting aside the
stated preference in FTP 167 for neutralization over destruction, Colonel Merritt
Edson, the Second Marine Division chief of staff, and Lieutenant Colonel David

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

131

126

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Shoup, the commander of the initial assault force, developed a plan in which the
assault on Betio would be preceded by several days of preparatory air and naval
bombardment. Naval planners, however—afraid of leaving their vessels exposed
in the event of an appearance by a significant Japanese naval force (as had happened in August 1942 at Guadalcanal, producing an embarrassing defeat at Savo
Island)—refused to provide it. Instead, although there would be air and naval
strikes for a few days before the actual attack, for the real work on the day of the
assault warships would provide only a three-hour bombardment.32
Those who presumed that the use of artillery in a short bombardment for
“neutralization,” along the lines of the German tactic, would be sufficient were
badly mistaken.33 As the Marines began their assault, they were greeted with
ferocious Japanese artillery and small-arms fire. The ordeal was made worse by
the inability of the Higgins boats that many were using for the assault to cross the
reef in front of the landing beaches, which compelled Marines to wade forward
about six hundred yards under fire. Ultimately, enough Marines were able to
reach shore to win the battle and secure the island—one that was not even three
miles long and at no point was more than eight hundred yards across. However,
even with a three-to-one manpower advantage it took American forces three days
of brutal combat to eliminate Japanese resistance and claim victory—at a cost of
over one thousand dead and more than two thousand wounded.34 Not surprisingly, the heavy casualties suffered and the fact that the fight for Betio had been
much, much tougher than expected provoked considerable discussion among
Marine and Navy officers about how to improve their performance.35
“[N]ot the least” of the lessons learned, historians Benis Frank and Henry
Shaw declare, “was the importance of naval gunfire.” Marine planners who had
chafed at the limits the Navy had imposed on naval gunfire prior to the assault
on Betio had been proved correct, and in the future it was accepted that “the
preliminary bombardment had to be heavier and sustained for a longer period.”36
If the difficulties at Tarawa were not to recur in future assaults and casualties
were to be kept to an acceptable level, a few hours’ bombardment with an eye
toward neutralization was not enough. “One of the great lessons learned about
naval gunfire,” James Stockman observes in a 1947 study for the Marine Corps
Historical Section, “was the need for destruction rather than neutralization. . . .
[P]reparatory bombardment and shelling to be delivered on enemy-defended
islands similar to Betio would have to be increased in duration and weight, all
of this with an eye toward . . . total destruction.” After Tarawa, writes Joseph H.
Alexander, perhaps the foremost modern scholar of Marine amphibious operations in the Pacific War, “[t]he duration and effectiveness of preliminary shelling improved . . . but the Marines always wanted more.”37 That this lesson had
been absorbed fully would be evident a few months later. When the Marines
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conducted Operation FLINTLOCK in the Marshall Islands in early 1944, bombardments would be longer (two days for the landing at Kwajalein Atoll, as compared
with three hours at Tarawa) and heavier, with the effect that the landings were
accomplished handily and the operation’s objectives attained much quicker than
initial plans had anticipated.38
SIMILAR CONCEPTS, DIFFERENT RESULTS
Why were the Marines so “French” in their approach to assault tactics? The
answer is, obviously, the similarity of the specific problems they faced. Williamson Murray identifies specificity—by which he means “the presence of a
specific military problem the solution of which offered significant advantages to
furthering the achievement of national strategy”—as one of the critical factors
that contributed to success or failure in innovation during the interwar period.39
First, like the French in their approach to the German problem, the U.S. Marine
Corps did not have a compelling need to bring about a quick strategic decision
in its contest with the Japanese. Both the French and the Marines faced an enemy
that was inferior in resources—at least if the French fought as part of a coalition,
which they correctly presumed would be the case. The presumption of matériel
superiority would translate naturally into the ability to bring heavy firepower
to the battlefield. In addition, unlike the Germans, for the French and the U.S.
Marines a successful frontal assault was a tactically sufficient and satisfactory
accomplishment, whereas the Germans needed tactical assaults to set the stage
for operational exploitation.40 The small size of the islands the Marines first had
to take in the drive across the Pacific envisioned by Plan ORANGE effectively
eliminated the requirement for operational exploitation by the assault force.41
Once the Marines seized the wrecked enemy front lines—and with the small size
of those islands precluding the Japanese from using defense in depth to preserve
manpower—they effectively had control of the island. The French army, bearing
heavy scars from repeated failed efforts to translate tactical success into operational opportunity on the western front, and confident in its ability to prevail in
a war of exhaustion, sought to deliver victory without the extraordinary costs
that exploiting tactical penetrations produced. For all the success that the German army’s infiltration tactics achieved in terms of territory gained, it came at a
heavy price.
Interestingly, in a replay of what happened on the western front, improvements in the fire support provided by the Marines and Navy for amphibious
landings caused the Japanese to alter their tactics as the operational geography
changed. As the fighting reached closer to the Asian mainland, the islands that
the Marines needed to assault were much larger than the small atolls of the central Pacific. Eschewing their earlier notion that the “enemy will be destroyed at

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

133

128

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

the beach,” and having been crushed under the weight of American firepower
in the Marshalls, Japanese commanders took advantage of the larger islands on
which they now were fighting to abandon the method of defending forward on
the beach, where their men could not hope to maintain combat effectiveness under the weight of USN gunfire.42 Instead, echoing the German shift to defense in
depth after 1916, Japanese commanders at Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa pulled
back from forward positions on the beaches to concentrate their defenses inland.
Consequently, American forces found themselves facing limited resistance to
their initial landings, only to face a murderous task as they pushed beyond the
beaches. True to the pseudo-French methods they adopted, the Marines did not
approach this task by aping German tactics, which relied heavily on an assumption that disrupted defenders would surrender out of shock rather than fight to
the death, and thus were ill suited for use against Japanese forces that were willing to fight to the death. Instead, they relied on heavy firepower and methodical
advances to grind down the Japanese defenders in grueling, murderous battles of
attrition.43 Had such methods been briefed in 1934, it is not hard to imagine a far
more friendly reception from a French audience than a German one.
Comparing the French army’s and U.S. Marines’ approaches to doctrinal development offers a compelling reminder that the ultimate test for assessing military
organizations’ approach to tactical problems is how well suited they were to the
specific problem that particular military faced. It also underlines the need to be
skeptical of overly simplistic conclusions about linear cause-and-effect relationships among innovation, methods, and battlefield results. As Carl von Clausewitz
noted when discussing the value of historical examples to guide how to think about
problems, “If anyone lists a dozen defeats in which the losing side attacked with divided columns, I can list a dozen victories in which that very tactic was employed.”
Unfortunately, he laments, a tendency to search for simple prescriptive lessons that
results in insufficient attention to both the broader and the deeper contexts that
shaped past events often has led to “superficial, irresponsible handling of history”
that then produced “hundreds of wrong ideas and bogus theorizing.”44
Industrial-age firepower presented the military organizations that fought the
world wars with the daunting challenge of figuring out how to employ firepower
in ways that made it possible for offensive maneuver to secure tactical, operational, and strategic objectives at an acceptable cost. In assessing how well they
addressed this problem, paying attention to context is critical. To paraphrase
Clausewitz, while one can point to the French experience in 1940 as one case in
which methodical, firepower-heavy tactics produced failure, one also can point to
the experience of the Marines in the Pacific as an example where it produced success. For that matter, General Matthew Ridgway successfully employed firepower
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and methodical advances in Korea to attrit and exhaust the enemy rather than
achieve a quick, decisive battlefield victory—the same strategic context in which
the French and Marines developed their doctrines.45
France’s and Germany’s efforts to address the frontal-assault problem led them
down different paths, to be sure, with the latter’s approach seeming to have received unimpeachable validation in 1940. Yet looking at these organizations and
their operations by comparing them with the efforts of the Marines complicates
the picture, as does considering them in depth, as historians Robert Doughty
and Williamson Murray have. Although critical in their assessments of French
doctrine and institutions, in their accounts of the 1940 campaign Doughty and
Murray identify an array of other factors—errors in operational planning, the
by no means predetermined outcome of specific tactical events, and even plain
luck—that must be weighed just as heavily as, if not more so than, doctrinal and
institutional issues to explain the campaign’s course and outcome. In the process,
they offer a strong reminder to be cautious in identifying cause-and-effect relationships when assessing innovation, since but for a different break here or there,
firepower-heavy methodical operations may well have received validation from
operations in both Europe and the Pacific.46
Of course, they did not. Nonetheless, while giving due weight to battlefield outcomes, we must take care, to borrow from Dennis Showalter, not to approach the
study of the military past in the spirit of Calvinist theology, “interpreting victory
and defeat as judgments on the military righteous,” and assume that our task is
merely to validate and catalog the virtues of the blessed and the sins of the fallen.47
It is important not to let this all-too-frequent bias, or the understandable desire to
identify concrete cause-and-effect relationships that can be applied to the process
of innovation today, prevent us from taking full account of contingency, specificity, and context in studying the past. After all, it is in considering and taking full
account of all the factors that shape the course and outcomes of the efforts of
military organizations in the past that Clausewitz places our best hope of avoiding
“wrong ideas and bogus theorizing”—and their consequences—in the future.48
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LONDON AND WASHINGTON
Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite Strategic Differences
during Operation EARNEST WILL
Richard A. Mobley

We share the Americans’ long term wish to uphold freedom of navigation
in the Gulf, but we differ fundamentally from them in short and medium
term aims and tactics.

T

JOINT MEMO FROM U.K. DEFENCE MINISTER AND
FOREIGN SECRETARY TO PRIME MINISTER, JULY 1987

he United Kingdom (U.K.) and the United States cooperated successfully
to help end the Iran-Iraq War, but national-level differences over how to
protect reflagged Kuwaiti tankers revealed surmountable fissures in coordinating operations between the two navies, judging from recently declassified documents.1 Mutually committed to a cease-fire, freedom of navigation, and a halt to
attacks on commercial shipping, the two nations were poised to maintain their
rich history of national-level policy coordination and naval cooperation when
the American effort to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers—Operation EARNEST
WILL—began in July 1987.2 Throughout the operation, Royal Navy (RN) units
continued operations in the southern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, passing
exercises with USN ships, and joint meetings with USN staffs. However, London’s
suspicions about the risks and viability of EARNEST WILL hindered Britain’s ability to fulfill all of Washington’s “asks,” despite a largely successful record of cooperation. Perhaps anticipating notional U.S. accusations of free riding, London
rightly argued privately and publicly that it already was doing its fair share for the
protection of shipping in the Gulf and continued
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to insist on national sovereignty. The benefits of
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reflagged Kuwaiti tankers in the Persian Gulf starting in 1987, but hundreds of
recently declassified British records reveal London’s misgivings about the effort.3
In particular, the sources provide background to London’s efforts to distance
the Royal Navy from U.S. control in the Persian Gulf and additional evidence
about the United Kingdom’s initial rebuff of American requests to send mine
countermeasure (MCM) vessels (MCMVs) to the Persian Gulf in mid-1987.4 Unfortunately, some of these issues—notably, London’s initial reluctance to deploy
MCMVs to the Gulf—also became public, and probably gave Tehran a heartening
perception of disarray in the Western camp.5
The British archival documents illustrate the challenges of coalition warfare
even under good circumstances. They also provide material for an early case
study about these challenges in the Middle East, in this case coalition warfare
with a close partner, one with whom the United States enjoyed excellent communications at all levels of the chain of command, agreed on long-term strategic
objectives and perceptions of the adversary, and shared a rich history of naval
cooperation. This article relies primarily on the archival material, with some corroboration from memoirs and published histories of the Iran-Iraq War.
The trove of evidence includes summaries of cabinet meetings and leadership exchanges with senior U.S. officials, talking papers supporting such events,
written correspondence between U.S. and British national leaders, and message
traffic between London and its embassies involved in monitoring the Persian
Gulf. Topically the documents address assessments of U.S. naval strategy and
reliability, the costs (to Britain) of the operation, and preferable courses of action,
as shared among British leaders, including Prime Minister Margaret H. Thatcher,
Defence Minister George K. H. Younger, Foreign Secretary Sir R. E. Geoffrey
Howe, and Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Sir John D. E. Fieldhouse. They
were informed by frequent sharing of information among working-level British
embassy staffs and members of the U.S. National Security Council, Department
of Defense, and State Department, as well as at higher levels.
CONTEXT FOR EARNEST WILL
EARNEST WILL was an American response to Kuwait’s request for maritime
protection during the Iran-Iraq War, a conflict that by 1987 was stalemated. Iraq
had expanded the war to the Gulf in 1984 to force Iran to accept a cease-fire and
hinder Tehran’s ability to export oil, the latter country’s primary source of foreign
exchange. Iran, unwilling to accept a cease-fire, reciprocated; generally, however,
it responded to Iraqi ship attacks on a tit-for-tat basis while preferring to confine
the war to land, where it enjoyed significant advantages.6
The two countries’ approaches to conducting ship attacks differed considerably. The Iraqi air force typically attacked merchant ships that were in the
Iranian-declared exclusion zone by launching Exocet antiship cruise missiles
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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(ASCMs) at suspected but not positively identified targets in or near the zone—
an imprecise targeting technique that contributed to Iraq’s inadvertent attack on
USS Stark (FFG 31) in May 1987.7 (See “Key Events” sidebar for a chronology of
events through mid-1987.)
In contrast, Iran often was more selective in choosing its victims, in an attempt
to dissuade Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries from supporting Iraq,
and to attempt to alter oil prices. In particular, Iran attacked ships associated in
trade with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait because of those countries’ significant financial and logistical support to Iraq. Tehran typically would identify the target using
maritime-patrol aircraft or its own warships, and the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) (according to declassified CIA analytic products) assessed that
Iranian intelligence could identify which ships transiting the Gulf were associated
with the United States and that Iran’s navies could identify these ships for attack.8
Both sides occasionally laid mines (of different types) even before EARNEST
WILL started, a practice that Tehran employed to blame Baghdad for the Iranian
minelaying campaign. Iran and Iraq also deployed different variants of the HY-2
ASCM, the so-called Silkworm, with Iraqi B-6D bombers using one version while
Iranian shore batteries used another—a similarity that Iran, again, used to try to
blame Iraq for missiles that Iranian forces fired.
These dynamics changed in 1987. Following Iran’s September 1986 boarding of
a Soviet ship, the Soviet navy began escorting Soviet merchant ships in the Gulf.9
To protect against an increasing number of ship attacks, Kuwait asked for Soviet
and U.S. assistance in March 1987. The Soviets were prepared to reflag or lease
all the tankers Kuwait required and provide for their protection—a move that
spurred U.S. interest in reflagging Kuwaiti tankers.10 Kuwait ultimately chartered
three Soviet tankers.11 A Soviet combatant—typically a minesweeper drawn from
the USSR’s small Indian Ocean squadron—escorted each tanker. It was a relatively
low-profile operation—at least compared with EARNEST WILL.12 Three Soviet
minesweepers routinely operated in the Persian Gulf, while a cruiser and a frigate
joined their parent squadron, which also included several support ships.13
The costs of not aiding Kuwait would have been high for the United States, according to a State Department assessment published in July 1987. Had the United
States refused to aid Kuwait, the Soviet Union would have seized the opportunity
to increase further its presence and role in the Gulf, likely including gaining access to area port facilities it would need to maintain any substantial protection
commitment over the long run.14
Iran perceived Kuwait to be a near cobelligerent with Iraq, given the economic aid Kuwait was providing and its willingness to allow its ports to be used
as primary arms transshipment conduits to Iraq.15 Tehran viewed American
assistance to Kuwait City as a step that would widen the war, tilt the balance
toward Baghdad, and sharply increase the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf—all
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1
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Key Events in 1987 before U.K. Decision to Deploy MCMVs to
Persian Gulf
25 March

United Kingdom is aware of U.S. decision to reflaga

17 May

Iraqi air force inadvertently attacks USS Stark

4 June

President Reagan requests enhanced U.K. naval cooperationb

8–10 June

Seven Power Economic Summit takes place in Venicec

9 June

Britain holds bilateral meeting with U.S. Secretary of State
Shultzd

17 July

Prime Minister Thatcher meets with President Reagane

20 July

UN passes UNSCR 598 in attempt to end Iran-Iraq War

24 July

Bridgeton strikes mine

25 July

Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff requests that United
Kingdom prestage MCMVsf

27 July

Senior British cabinet officials formally oppose deployment of
MCMVs to Gulf g

30 July

U.S. ambassador delivers request for U.K. minesweeping
assistanceh

30 July

Prime minister agrees that Britain should not send minesweepers to Gulf i

31 July

Secretary of Defense Weinberger also requests that Britain stage
MCMVs j

31 July

Assistant Secretary of State Murphy discusses MCM support with
U.K. ambassador k

3 August

National Security Advisor Carlucci meets with U.K. leadershipl

a. Private secretary (FCO), “Protection of Shipping in the Gulf.”
b. FCO, “Venice Economic Summit: 8–10 June 1987”; private secretary (FCO) to private
secretary (prime minister), memorandum, “Venice Summit: Shipping in the Gulf,”
8 June 1987, Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files, box FCO 8/6816,
UKNA.
c. FCO Research Department, “Iran Annual Review, 1987.”
d. FCO MED, “Venice Economic Summit: Secretary of State’s Bilateral with Mr. Shultz.”
e. Private secretary to Galsworthy, “Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington: Meeting with
President Reagan.”
f. FCO to U.K. embassy Washington, “Shipping in the Gulf: Possible US Approach
on Minesweepers”; defence minister and foreign minister, “Shipping in the Gulf”;
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Chief of Defence Staff, message, 25 July 1987.
g. Private secretary (MOD) to principal staff officer (Chief of Defence Staff), memorandum, “The Gulf: Minesweeping,” 29 July 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office:
Registered Files, box DEFE 13/2390, UKNA.
h. Private secretary (FCO) to private secretary (prime minister), “Shipping in the Gulf:
US Request for Minesweeping Assistance.”
i. Private secretary (prime minister) to Lyn Parker (FCO), memorandum, “The Gulf,” 11
August 1987, Defence Ministry: Private Office: Registered Files, box 13/2390, UKNA;
Moseley, “Minesweeper Request Rejected”; DeYoung, “Britain Rejects U.S. Plea.”
j. Ambassador Price letter.
k. U.K. embassy Washington to FCO, “Shipping in the Gulf: US Approach on
Minesweepers.”
l. FCO, “Call by Mr. Carlucci.”
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developments it was determined to avoid. Its attitudes toward Moscow were
more tolerant—probably a reflection of Soviet efforts to improve diplomatic
relations with Tehran and an Iranian desire to avoid confronting two superpowers simultaneously.
Perceiving such threats to Kuwait City, London urged diplomatic steps to help
the United Kingdom lower the Royal Navy’s profile in the Gulf.16 Nevertheless,
the Reagan administration was willing to protect the tankers, probably as an outgrowth of the Cold War and owing to a commitment to freedom of navigation and
a desire to buttress its credentials with American allies in the GCC after the IranContra affair in 1986 revealed that Washington had provided weapons to Tehran.17
After bitter congressional debate, EARNEST WILL started with a bang in July
1987 when Bridgeton, a reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, struck a mine near Farsi Island
in the northern Persian Gulf while proceeding in the first EARNEST WILL convoy. Rather than constituting a single dramatic event, however, the escort regime
evolved into a series of incidents, some occurring without warning, and intermittent American and British responses.
EXTENSIVE NATIONAL AND NAVAL COOPERATION
IN THE GULF . . .
The United Kingdom and the United States worked closely at the national
level while maintaining extensive naval ties in the Gulf. They pursued an
overarching diplomatic strategy to help end the Iran-Iraq War and persuade
the belligerents to halt attacks against neutral shipping, at least temporarily.18
Before and during EARNEST WILL both maintained combatants in theater to
protect national shipping, shared operational intelligence, and worked on
naval interoperability.
London and Washington perceived that ship attacks that had been occurring in the Gulf since 1984 were an outgrowth of the Iran-Iraq War and
pursued separate but coordinated measures to stop the war writ large and
attacks against commercial shipping in particular. The two nations worked
in concert to persuade the other members of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) to endorse unanimously a resolution—UNSCR 598—that
called for a cease-fire to end the war. The council passed the resolution in July
1987, a decision that Baghdad welcomed and Tehran, surprisingly, did not
reject. UNSCR 598 called for Iran and Iraq to observe an immediate ceasefire and withdraw all forces to internationally recognized borders; requested
that the secretary general explore the question of charging an impartial body
to inquire into responsibility for the conflict; and prescribed that the UNSC
would meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance
with the resolution.19
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Iran, however, consistently rebuffed attempts to end the war and refused to
accept a cease-fire. Given its unwillingness to comply with UNSCR 598, Washington and London pursued a second resolution that might impose sanctions
against Tehran for refusing to comply; but while doing so they needed to appear
to be neutral actors, to persuade the widest audience to support the problematic
follow-on resolution.
Both Britain and the United States worked successfully to achieve temporary
halts in ship attacks against merchant ships. London and Washington also agreed
that the “Tanker War” might be paused if Baghdad could be persuaded to stop
maritime attacks against Iranian interests. They judged that Iran’s approach to
the Tanker War operations was generally retaliatory; Tehran’s ship attacks tended
to follow Iraqi maritime air strikes. Both the United Kingdom and the United
States judged that Iran might halt its ship attacks if Iraq did so.20 The Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO) in November 1987 reminded its posts of the need
to maintain pressure on Iraq to stop air attacks, “which fuel the tanker war and
obscure the issue of compliance.”21
Consequently, Washington and London repeatedly agreed to pressure Baghdad directly or via its GCC allies to halt ship attacks in the hope that Tehran
would do likewise.22 In fact, the cabinet concluded on 23 July 1987 that the most
important requirement in the immediate future was to end the ship attacks. The
record of that meeting states as follows: “The government was doing everything
possible to mobilize pressure for this on Iraq and Iran. There was hope that the
message might have some effect.”23 Iraq reluctantly agreed to halt ship attacks;
there was a hiatus in the Tanker War for much of August 1987. Then Baghdad
resumed air strikes against tankers and oil installations on 29 August, and Tehran
resumed ship attacks two days later.24
The Royal Navy and U.S. Navy both operated in the Gulf to protect national
shipping and cooperated in the operational and logistics spheres, although the
United Kingdom, to maintain its image as a neutral player in the Gulf, preferred
not to publicize some of this activity.
• Logistics: U.K. tankers supplied fuel to U.S. units in the Gulf of Oman,
according to a Ministry of Defence (MOD) memo written in May 1987.25
Prime Minister Thatcher instructed senior British officials in July 1987 to
remind the Americans of the help the United Kingdom already was providing them through Diego Garcia, its base in the Indian Ocean.26 At U.S. request, London in July 1987 allowed Washington to use Diego Garcia to move
American minesweeping helicopters into the region.27
• Armilla patrol: London established the Armilla patrol in 1980, using two
combatants to protect U.K.-flag and -registered ships transiting the Strait of
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Hormuz and portions of the Persian Gulf extending as far as Bahrain.28 British officials wrote that the patrol, with its deliberately low profile, had been
broadly successful in protecting British shipping.29 Proud of the Armilla patrol’s record, they wrote in June 1987 that the United Kingdom “protects far
more ships and has a far greater proportion of its resources in the Gulf than
the U.S.”30—an assertion that the U.S. State Department seconded. Britain
announced then that the patrol had escorted a hundred British vessels in the
area over the previous year.31
• Expanded RN presence: Britain added a third combatant to its Armilla
patrol in spring 1987 to enable more-frequent patrols in the Persian Gulf and
to allow RN units to be near most British merchant ships passing through
the Strait of Hormuz.32 After initially turning down Washington’s request,
London also committed four Hunt-class MCMVs and a support vessel to the
Gulf in August 1987.
• Joint operations: An MOD memo issued in May 1987 stated that the United
Kingdom had agreed to exchange information on threat assessments, daily
shipping movements, and force dispositions with local USN forces. The ministry also endorsed briefings with U.S. Middle East Force ships. Although
praising the value of exercises with U.S. carrier strike groups outside the Gulf
to enhance British antiair warfare capability, it discouraged RN exercises
with USN units inside the Gulf as of May 1987—to avoid giving the impression of being “in bed with” the Americans.33
• Command, control, and communications: USN and RN ships regularly
established secure voice communications with each other. The United States
also provided assistance to Britain in accessing the Airborne Warning and
Control System (i.e., AWACS) downlink in the Gulf.34
Given this background of a long-term naval presence and existing cooperation
with the United States, London was sensitive to potential insinuations of free riding and pressures from Washington for it to contribute more to a naval coalition
to execute EARNEST WILL. In talking points prepared for the foreign minister in
June 1987, his subordinates wrote that congressional pressure following Iraq’s
accidental attack on USS Stark in May 1987 had led to American pressure on
allies for more burden sharing, “preferably in a U.S.-led integrated naval force.”
Although London was attempting to help the U.S. government get through its
temporary period of pressure, the drafters wrote that “we are already playing our
full part,” given the Armilla patrol’s activities.35
The FCO offered similar arguments to its embassies that month: “[Y]ou can
confirm that we appreciate the pressures on the American administration at present but believe we are already playing our full part in the protection of shipping.”
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The FCO wrote that it had provided to the United States—notably, Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger—a statement on the Armilla patrol to give the administration ammunition with which to “overcome the American public’s almost
total ignorance of what we are doing in the Gulf.”36
The foreign secretary and defence minister in July 1987 jointly reflected
similar concerns about possible blowback from a British refusal to deploy minesweepers in response to a hypothetical U.S. request. Acknowledging the U.S.
Navy’s limited MCM capability, they wrote that the United States was turning to
NATO and other friends for help in the Gulf, and suggested that “refusal could
fuel U.S. criticism that the Europeans are unwilling to pull their own weight.”37
However, they also judged that there were strong counterarguments, which are
addressed in the next section.
. . . DESPITE RESERVATIONS ABOUT SENDING MCMVS TO
THE GULF
Despite Britain’s close naval cooperation with the U.S. Navy, however, its foreign
and military policy throughout EARNEST WILL consistently also called for its
warships to fall under national control, stay neutral, and pursue a de-escalatory
policy in the Gulf while enabling a diplomatic solution to the war and protecting
U.K.-flag shipping. For example, a draft negative response to a request from Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral William J. Crowe Jr. for the United Kingdom to deploy MCMVs to the Gulf stated that the “long term policy of keeping
U.K. and U.S. policies in the Middle East separate[—]and both our governments
have reaffirmed this separateness[—]is in our mutual regional interest.”38
These broad objectives of British policy would prove problematic for the
United States, which was interested in creating a joint naval command structure
in the Gulf; sought additional, visible international support for EARNEST WILL;
and had a lower threshold for engaging in contingency operations against Iran
than did the United Kingdom. Several contentious issues arose from these different tactical approaches:
• Risks of escalation resulting from unpredictable Iranian challenges and potential preemptive or disproportionate U.S. responses
• How to maintain neutrality—a status both countries claimed regarding the
war
• Size, number, type, and potential operational areas (OPAREAs) of ships the
Royal Navy might send to the Gulf
• Frequency of and publicity accorded to joint training with the U.S. Navy in
the Persian Gulf
• Naval command-and-control relationships in the Gulf
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• Zones of responsibility
• U.K. responses to U.S. rules of engagement to facilitate a policy of “distress
assistance” in 1988
Although subject to increasing U.S. pressure after the Stark and Bridgeton incidents, the United Kingdom’s national leadership initially refused to send more
ships to the Gulf. Ultimately it would be actions by Tehran—not pressure from
Washington—that provided the catalyst for Thatcher to commit British MCMVs
to the Persian Gulf in mid-August 1987.
Before that happened, changes in U.S. national-security policy and the war itself forced London to review repeatedly key elements of Britain’s Gulf naval strategy between March and July 1987. Even in early 1987, London understood that
Washington was considering a reflag venture with Kuwait City and was interested
in forming a joint naval command in the Persian Gulf to protect shipping more
efficiently.39 Through that spring and early summer, American requests—albeit
remaining informal—became more focused and urgent, particularly after rising
tensions in the region made the issue of allies and burden sharing more salient
in U.S. domestic debates over EARNEST WILL. American requests—perceived or
delivered in 1987—included the following:
• The foreign minister’s private secretary wrote on 25 March that the United
States would want Britain and other countries to participate in joint naval
operations in the Gulf as an outgrowth of the reflag effort. He summarized,
“[T]hey remain keen on multilateral naval activity in almost any combination
of participants.”40
• The British ambassador in Washington reported on 29 May that the U.S. National Security Planning Group had confirmed recommendations for action
regarding EARNEST WILL. Although Washington was not then asking London
to increase the U.K. naval presence, it sought London’s help in persuading
other countries to make at least token contributions.41
• According to an FCO briefing, President Reagan wrote to Prime Minister Thatcher in early June to see whether the United Kingdom would find
occasions to affirm publicly the importance of the region and highlight
publicly what it was doing to further Western interests there. He also asked
Britain to undertake “visible naval exercises with our ships”42—a request
that the FCO interpreted as a proposal to increase the number of passing
exercises in the Gulf and publicity accorded to them.43 A message from the
FCO to its posts on 8 June called for a guarded response, telling them that it
had advised U.S. officials that the United Kingdom would consider issuing
“further statements as requested and, perhaps, slightly enhanced passing
exercises in the Gulf.”44
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• CNO Admiral Crowe wrote to ask the U.K. chief of defence staff on 25 July—
the day after the Bridgeton mine strike—whether Britain would consider
moving MCMVs closer to the Persian Gulf to reduce potential response
time.45
• U.S. ambassador Charles H. Price II on 30 July met with the foreign secretary
to request RN minesweeping in the Gulf.46
• Secretary of Defense Weinberger wrote to his U.K. counterpart on 31 July to
request that Britain preposition mine-clearing assets in or near the Gulf.47
• On 31 July, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs Richard Murphy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Richard Armitage noted U.K. reluctance to deploy MCMVs in
their discussions with the British ambassador in Washington. Armitage said
that the Pentagon would want to have further discussions about how to achieve
de-escalation in the Gulf without leaving Russia in a dominant position.48
• Frank C. Carlucci III, the assistant to the president for national security affairs (i.e., national security advisor), met with several senior U.K. officials,
including the prime minister, on 3 August.49 Acknowledging that London was
reluctant to send additional ships to the Gulf, he told the cabinet secretary,
Sir Robert T. Armstrong, that Washington was anxious for a tangible manifestation of U.S./U.K. collaboration in the Gulf and asked him for suggestions
about how that might be achieved.50
London thoroughly debated these requests during the spring and identified
potential ways to help Reagan through his administration’s “domestic political
difficulty” (in the words of an FCO overview) without compromising Britain’s
independent national-security strategy.51 Just before the United States began
lobbying for international support for freedom of navigation in the Gulf in June
1987, the FCO notified its posts that “ministers are travelling to Venice in a mood
to help the Americans over a period of increased congressional and public scrutiny of their protection of shipping in the Gulf.”52 The FCO wrote then that the
United Kingdom was “willing to help the United States while not compromising
our basic posture of not provoking the Iranians, compromising our impartiality
in the conflict, or being sucked into an unpredictable conflict through integrated
operations.”53 In talking points prepared for a bilateral meeting with Secretary of
State George P. Shultz in the same conference, the FCO wrote that the “U.K. will
do what we can to help weather Congressional scrutiny in the aftermath of appalling USS Stark incident.”54
Given this context, the declassified documents collectively offer a complex set
of reasons for initially demurring to repeated U.S. requests for the deployment of
additional U.K. forces to the Gulf. A list of London’s “cons” about EARNEST WILL
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and deploying MCMVs to the Gulf probably would include the following arguments, judging from the raw reporting.
EARNEST WILL Was a Flawed, Escalatory Operation
Talking points prepared for Thatcher on 15 July 1987 warned that the reflag
decision carried risks of superpower competition and a counterproductive confrontation with Iran.55 The foreign secretary and defence minister jointly agreed
on 27 July that it was U.S. action that had exacerbated the crisis by reflagging and
convoying tankers. Supporting such an operation raised the risk of being drawn
“further into involvement with U.S. policy, and into an operational crisis in the
Gulf, which would in turn increase the risk to British vessels.”56 They subsequently wrote on 29 July that U.K. policy had been to avoid joint operations with
the Americans in the Gulf because “of the likelihood that they would lead to our
being included in a U.S. confrontation over which we had no control. Once initiated, such a confrontation could last a very long time.” By joining in, the United
Kingdom “might actually increase the risk to British shipping.”57
The two leaders concluded that Britain would have to turn down the U.S. request for MCMVs despite any strains that caused on the alliance. They acknowledged that it would not be “an easy message to present to the Americans.”58 And
yet, only thirteen days later, even after they had submitted a strongly worded
memo against deploying MCMVs to the Gulf, the prime minister would overrule them.
America Might Lack the Commitment to Sustain Prolonged Operations
against Iran
In talking points for briefing the prime minister in March 1987, the FCO warned
that joining in the U.S. operation had potential downsides, including a potential
replay of the Multinational Force in Lebanon experience following the October
1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing. “We should not encourage a U.S./Iran
confrontation in Gulf from which U.S. might in due course need to withdraw,
leaving Arab friends worse off than before.”59 Younger and Howe wrote in July
1987 that “the Americans were unwise to rush into their policy of protecting Kuwait tankers without proper consideration how they could sustain their commitment; their credibility is on the line.”60 Summarizing U.K. thinking on 30 July, the
FCO advised its embassy in Washington as follows: “We remain doubtful about
assuming commitments which cannot be sustained.”61 In recapping a meeting
in October 1987 with Edward W. Gnehm Jr., the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Near East and South Asia, the FCO notified its posts that, although
Secretary Weinberger’s trip to the Gulf had confirmed Gulf-state support for U.S.
actions, the Arabs continued to doubt longer-term U.S. resolve.62
Perhaps aware of such doubts, when National Security Advisor Carlucci met
with the prime minister on 3 August 1987 he attempted to reassure London of
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Washington’s determination to execute EARNEST WILL and to protect U.S. interests. Speaking shortly after the Bridgeton mining, he opined that if there were
further incidents directly traceable to Iran, Reagan would face considerable pressure to retaliate. Carlucci judged that there was a risk that Iran could conclude erroneously that it could divide opinion in the United States. Given this perception,
he averred that if there was any hostile action public opinion would rally behind
the president; it would not be another Lebanon.63
Independence in Foreign Policy and Naval Operations Buttressed London’s
Image as a Neutral
Throughout EARNEST WILL, the United Kingdom remained adamant that the
Royal Navy would not conduct integrated operations under U.S. control, although it allowed informal coordination among local naval commanders. When
British officials met with Assistant Secretary of State Murphy on 5 June 1987, they
“made it clear our non-provocative and independent policy continued and we
had serious reservations about any more integrated operations.”64
The prime minister wrote in July 1987 that “there are formidable practical as
well as political problems in the way of a multinational force. . . . [S]uch a force
might in practice have a higher profile than the present arrangements.”65 She
then directed the cabinet to prepare for discussions about bilateral coordination
in the Gulf while making it clear that the RN presence would not include joint or
integrated operations.66
Even when Defence Minister Younger called Defense Secretary Weinberger in
mid-August 1987 to announce that London would deploy MCMVs to the Gulf,
he reminded Weinberger that “Armilla’s role and AOR [area of responsibility]
would remain unchanged.”67 Talking points prepared for the defence minister’s
use noted that Armilla would not go into the northern Gulf because “the risks of
integration with the United States were too high to contemplate.”68
When EARNEST WILL was well under way by March 1988, R. Rand “Randy”
Beers, policy coordinator in State’s Political-Military Affairs Bureau, told officials in the MOD and FCO that the United States was considering extending
protection for neutral shipping in the Gulf, an effort in which allies might be
asked to provide more ships and integrate more closely with the U.S. Navy, or
at least integrate more among themselves. The British responded that there was
no likelihood the United Kingdom would alter its position on integration with
the U.S. Navy. If the Royal Navy sent more ships to the Gulf, they would support
U.K.-flagged/owned ships only.69
Publicizing RN Cooperation Would Undermine London’s Low-Profile Strategy
Consequently, Reagan’s request that Britain highlight its actions to promote
Western interests and undertake more-visible operations with the United States
in the Gulf was problematic, although talking points that the FCO prepared for a
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

151

146

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

meeting with Secretary of State Shultz concluded that “we can meet both of Reagan’s requests presentationally without giving much of substance.”70 U.K. officials
had written earlier that the U.S. public had “almost total ignorance” of U.K. operations in the Gulf and that more publicity might reduce congressional pressure for
further burden sharing.71 However, the notes for the Shultz meeting continued,
“Publicity for exercises would look like participation in a Gulf war and will need
very careful handling.”72
EARNEST WILL Might Lead to Preemptive or Disproportionate
U.S. Military Operations
Monitoring U.S. press and official activity, London’s staffers watched for signs of
escalatory American military activity, such as a preemptive attack on the Silkworm ASCMs that had appeared in the Gulf in 1987.73 Minutes prepared for a
briefing of the prime minister in March 1987 warned that “if naval discussions
suggest U.S. seriously thinking of contriving to attack Silkworm sites we may
need to express our doubts in Washington at high political level.”74 The foreign
secretary then was willing to consider limited coordination of RN activity with
the United States, on the strict condition that the agreed aim was to deter Iran
and “not to contrive an excuse for, say, striking the Silkworm missiles.”75 Despite
such willingness to cooperate, the FCO characterized the U.S. mood as being
“aggressively anti-Iran” at the end of July 1987.76
British officials repeatedly approached their American counterparts to assess
the risks of a preemptive U.S. attack on the Silkworms, a course of action that by
June 1987 was not being considered seriously in Washington, according to their
interlocutors.77 In preparing Prime Minister Thatcher for a visit to the United
States in July, FCO officials raised the risk of a confrontation with Iran and wrote
that they hoped the United States would be as “non-provocative as possible.”78
When Thatcher met with Reagan on 17 July, she told him it was important not to
escalate the conflict. Reagan agreed and said that the United States would attack
only in self-defense against an Iranian attack.79
These agreements did not reassure the FCO after further Iranian provocations. Following Iran’s Silkworm attack on the reflagged Kuwaiti tanker Sea
Isle City on 16 October 1987 and the U.S. retaliatory attack on two Iranian oil
platforms in the Persian Gulf three days later, the FCO prepared talking points
for use with the prime minister; they warned of a “continuing need to counsel
restraint and proportionality in response to Americans—wise counsels may not
always prevail.”80
In the subsequent cabinet meeting, the foreign secretary opined that the
Gulf had become tenser than ever before. He commented that it might become
increasingly difficult for the United States to respond to Iranian actions in ways
that were both “constrained and effective.”81 Such doubts led Britain to seek early
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notifications of U.S. contingency operations in the Gulf, a consideration repeatedly accorded to the United Kingdom.82
Such concerns, repeated British requests, and the Royal Navy’s presence in
the Persian Gulf may have contributed to Washington’s willingness to share
with London the broad outlines of U.S. military planning and to warn London
and U.K. forces in the Gulf of impending military operations. U.S. officials
assured their counterparts that the United States intended to provide such
warning, and the British seemed satisfied that the system was working.83 For
example, as the United States was planning Operation PRAYING MANTIS to retaliate for the mining of USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) on 14 April 1988, the
British embassy in Washington reported that “U.S. officials have assured us that
we will be informed in advance of any operation, as on previous occasions.”84
CNO Crowe telephoned Chief of the Defence Staff Fieldhouse shortly before
the operation started.85 General Colin L. Powell, the national security advisor,
the next day updated Thatcher’s personal secretary on U.S. thinking regarding
next military steps.86
Minesweeping Was Neither Viable nor Currently Necessary
In late July 1987, Britain’s foreign and defence ministers wrote that currently there
was no mine threat in the Armilla OPAREA, although they acknowledged that
could change with little warning. Moreover, in a long staff study they made a case
against minesweeping, arguing that MCMVs could not clear a large area, would
be confined to daylight operations at speeds not greater than eight knots, and
would slow down merchant ships significantly if they tried to sweep ahead of a
convoy. Additionally, Iran could reseed minefields easily. Destroying Iran’s mine
warfare infrastructure would expand the conflict greatly.87
London preferred to use diplomacy and GCC MCM assets over deploying
U.K. MCMVs, although the U.K. strategy for turning down the U.S. request was
to offer technical naval counterarguments, in what its officials acknowledged
would be a “difficult” process of declining the U.S. requests.88 In answering Admiral Crowe’s request for MCMVs, Foreign Secretary Howe in July 1987 recommended that the chief of defence staff should “quote technical military arguments
demonstrating that it was not militarily sensible to use minesweepers, that they
were too far away to do the job properly, and that a large number would be required, etc.”89
The ministers argued in July 1987 against even repositioning minesweepers to
staging areas closer to the Gulf, as Admiral Crowe had requested. They characterized the measure as a “temporizing response” that would “soon become public and
create an expectation that we would join the U.S. operation.” Staging MCMVs also
would have costs to the United Kingdom: “It would then be virtually impossible
not to proceed without giving the impression that our nerve had failed.”90
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Diplomacy Should Not Be Undermined by Naval Incidents
Throughout EARNEST WILL, Washington and London focused foremost on ending the Iran-Iraq War by reaching a truce that, through negotiations, might yield
a lasting peace. They reasoned that a cessation in ship attacks might support the
broader initiative.
Seeking to create diplomatic breathing room to allow time for a cease-fire in
ship attacks to occur in July 1987, Prime Minister Thatcher told ministers drafting a response to the U.S. request for MCMVs that the West should avoid raising
the profile of its military forces in the Gulf while a moratorium on ship attacks
held. Her private secretary told National Security Advisor Carlucci on 1 August
that the U.K. government “took the view that it was better not to increase the
profile of the Western military presence at this juncture while there was a chance
of progress on the diplomatic front towards de-escalating tension in the Gulf.”91
THATCHER REVERSES HER MCMV DECISION
Prime Minister Thatcher was attuned to threat conditions in the Persian Gulf,
maintenance of good relations with the United States on issues such as burden
sharing, and the importance of apparent cohesion in the Western alliance to
enhance its diplomatic credibility and regional deterrence. These factors influenced her to reconsider in early August 1987 her refusal to provide MCMVs to
the Gulf.
In part, she was struck by the rapidly deteriorating regional security situation
in midsummer 1987. Thousands of Iranian pilgrims rioted in Mecca on 31 July
1987, with hundreds of people being killed.92 Attacks against the Saudi, Kuwaiti,
and French embassies in Tehran followed on 1 August and were accompanied by
official Iranian calls for the overthrow of the Saudi government.93
By 4 August, the prime minister concluded that Britain’s posture on Persian
Gulf strategy needed to be “looked at afresh,” and related taskers began to flow
to the bureaucracy.94 Iran’s mining of Texaco Caribbean in the Gulf of Oman off
Fujairah, United Arab Emirates, on 10 August 1987 provided the immediate
catalyst for her decision the next day to send four MCMVs and a support ship
to the Gulf.95
Meeting with Carlucci on 3 August 1987, Thatcher expressed concern about
developments during the past few days and the prospect that Gulf tensions would
continue to escalate in the form of maritime guerrilla warfare and possibly direct
attacks on U.S. ships. The chance for diplomacy to reduce tensions had diminished. She concluded that the main requirement was action by every means at the
UN and elsewhere to isolate Iran.96
Thatcher told the cabinet on 4 August 1987 that there had been a qualitative
change in the situation in the Persian Gulf that mandated a new look at the United
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Kingdom’s Gulf policy. She judged that it was unrealistic to think any longer in
terms of a window of opportunity to de-escalate by diplomatic measures. Rather,
Iran was intent on terrorist actions against the United States and GCC and might
engage in further mining or other attacks. Britain’s main priorities must be to take
further diplomatic steps to isolate Iran, maintain GCC morale, and demonstrate
the West’s unity of purpose. The prime minister also was concerned that Britain’s
well-publicized decision not to send MCMVs to the Gulf—or even to preposition
them—had conveyed the wrong political signal. “Our failure to meet a request
for help from our closest ally had given an appearance of division and disunity
among the Western governments and had probably worried the Arab states of the
gulf. We should not think just in terms of British ships but acknowledge a wider
duty to help uphold freedom of navigation.”97
Her taskers to the cabinet had diplomatic and military dimensions. Diplomatically, the United Kingdom was to press hard and visibly for a further UNSC resolution imposing an arms embargo against Iran for not following UNSCR 598, and
Britain also should promote a resolution condemning the mining in the Gulf and
upholding freedom of navigation. London would urge Moscow to put all possible
pressure on Tehran to desist from mining and garner Soviet support for the arms
embargo against Iran envisioned in the follow-on resolution to UNSCR 598.98
On the military side, the government would consider prepositioning MCMVs
to possible holding points, including Gibraltar, Cyprus, Port Said, Djibouti, and
Muscat. In the event they deployed, London would seek the “fullest consultation”
with Washington about strategy in the Gulf. Early consideration would be given
to other assets the United Kingdom might send to the region. Britain would prepare for further arms requests from the Arab countries in the region.99
By 7 August 1987, Thatcher continued to weigh in to soften the United Kingdom’s initial rejection by amending the British defence minister’s draft response
to Secretary of Defense Weinberger’s 31 July request for forward deployment
of MCMVs. She wanted to emphasize that Britain had “certainly not” ruled out
eventually deploying its MCMVs to the Gulf. Her private secretary summarized
her guidance for the revised letter as follows: “We are looking afresh at all our
contingency arrangements, so that we would be able to move the minesweepers
as quickly as possible. We are looking at the situation very closely, on a day to
day basis, and looking to see how we can help from the U.S. viewpoint, as well
as our own.”100
On 11 August, Thatcher decided to deploy immediately four Hunt-class
MCMVs and a support ship from the United Kingdom to the Persian Gulf, where
they arrived in mid-September.101 The order reflected a British assessment that
there was a heightened risk to the Armilla patrol following the discovery of mines
in the southern end of and outside the Gulf during the preceding twenty-four
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hours.102 The FCO prepared an overview that characterized the mining in the
Gulf of Oman as a “direct threat to British ships” that led London to “send minesweepers in support of British national interests.”103
Additionally, two maritime patrol aircraft were to deploy to Maşīrah, Oman,
by 14 August as a public demonstration of commitment.104 London would send
diplomatic notes requesting port access and logistics for the naval deployers to
the Gulf.105 The United Kingdom also prepared to encourage Western European
Union (WEU) participation by sending messages to the governments of France,
Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands notifying them of the MCMV deployment,
and adding that these countries would be assumed to be considering following
suit.106
BILATERAL COOPERATION FROM SEPTEMBER 1987 TO JULY 1988
The United Kingdom cooperated with the United States during EARNEST WILL
by providing support in the UN and elsewhere; serving as a gateway to WEU
countries—notably, Belgium and the Netherlands—for mine countermeasures
initiatives, particularly in the Armilla OPAREA in the southern Gulf and Strait of
Hormuz; recovering mines and continuing the patrol’s hectic mission of accompanying merchant ships; and pursuing diplomacy that helped the United States,
particularly after Operation PRAYING MANTIS in April 1988 and in the aftermath
of the Iran Air 655 Airbus shootdown in July 1988.
Although the United States did not then achieve the formal joint naval command structure it had proposed, by October 1987 Washington was “content with
the pragmatic coordination of minesweeping,” according to U.K. diplomatic
reporting.107 British MCMVs contributed directly by clearing five mines off Fujairah and four off Qatar by the end of November 1987, according to John Roberts’s
history of the Royal Navy.108
The British also encouraged the Dutch and Belgian navies, with whom the
Royal Navy had operated in a NATO context, to participate in the Gulf MCM
effort. The Dutch in September 1987 committed two minehunters, while the Belgians sent two minesweepers and a support ship, which arrived in the Gulf by late
fall.109 As of November 1987, the Royal Navy was liaising closely with both navies
in the Gulf, but their operations were not yet integrated.110 The three navies improved cooperation by February 1988 as the United Kingdom prepared to return
one of its four MCMVs to home waters.111 The FCO reported by April 1988 that
“cooperation with the Dutch and Belgians (under a WEU umbrella) has worked
well.” London also warned Washington that further U.S. pressure on its two allies
to keep ships in the Gulf might be counterproductive.112
The Royal Navy saw the opportunity to showcase the MCM capabilities of the
three navies in the southern Persian Gulf following the Roberts mine strike on 14
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April 1988. The U.K. MOD directed its senior naval officer in the Gulf to encourage the other two navies to join British ships in clearing the minefield near the
Roberts strike, as a good opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of trilateral
cooperation. However, the MOD urged that the Royal Navy be seen as taking the
initiative. In its guidance to RN senior commanders, the ministry added that it
wished to “avoid the suggestion that we are responding to a U.S. request or that
we are/will be under U.S. control or guidance.”113 In discussing the ongoing trilateral MCM operations on 21 April, cabinet talking points commented that the fortunate timing of the Roberts incident might persuade the Dutch and Belgians that
their presence in the Persian Gulf was “useful and should not be terminated.”114
By June 1988, the three countries had established a joint command consisting of
a flagship, supply ship, and five minehunters under U.K. control.115
In the aftermath of PRAYING MANTIS, Washington wanted to pursue further
initiatives in the UN and to improve coordination of naval operations in the
theater. Even as Secretary of State Shultz notified the United Kingdom of the operation on 18 April, he said that Iran’s actions “underscore the urgency of strong
international measures in the UN to pass a followon resolution to UNSCR 598.”116
On 22 April, Reagan wrote to Thatcher proposing a new, intensive diplomatic
effort in the UN to end the conflict, improve coordination among Western naval
forces in the Gulf, and enhance surveillance there to prevent mining, according
to U.K. diplomatic reporting. The FCO advised its posts that Defence Minister
Younger’s discussions with now–Secretary of Defense Carlucci on 27 April 1988
had reached no firm conclusions, but at least the principals had agreed to explore
greater coordination of MCM activity. Local commanders in the Gulf were to
meet aboard USS Trenton (LPD 14) on 1 May to discuss the matter.117
However, the cabinet remained wary of expanding the Royal Navy’s role and
advised a cautious response to Reagan’s letter. Concerned about the earlier U.S.
proposal for a review of the coordination of forces in the Gulf, the foreign secretary said in a late April 1988 cabinet meeting that the United Kingdom must be
careful not to allow “responsibilities to run ahead of the resources available.”118
The president’s letter also may have been prompted by the U.S. decision by 29
April 1988 to provide distress assistance to additional neutral merchant ships in
the Persian Gulf.119 The Cabinet Office assessment on 3 May offered a range of
complaints about the policy, noting that London long had urged Washington to
be cautious about extending the rules of engagement. The new policy was announced without proper consultation with the United Kingdom. It could lead to
pressure on Britain and other European nations to follow suit. The Royal Navy
lacked adequate resources to support it, and the initiative might interfere with
enhanced U.K. minesweeping coordination. Most seriously, a systematic policy
of distress assistance was likely to lower the threshold for U.S.-Iranian clashes and
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increase risks of Iranian attacks on shipping and offshore installations because
of a narrowing of military options. Although the FCO wrote that it “must give
general support [to] U.S. policy,” it began revising its response to Reagan’s letter,
concentrating its warnings particularly on the dubious European reaction, the
policy’s risk of lowering the threshold of conflict, and London’s concern that it
had not been consulted adequately on this initiative.120
Despite its misgivings, in a memo dated 24 May 1988 London determined that
British shippers would be permitted to accept distress assistance on the condition that the master of the ship requested help in each case.121 Given its residual
concern about perceived U.S. escalatory tendencies, the cabinet noted that the
United Kingdom had accepted the offer, but hinted clearly that London saw distress assistance primarily as a humanitarian initiative and held that its use should
not contravene the use of minimum force only. The note continued by observing
that several European partners harbored doubts about U.S. intentions in offering
distress assistance, which they considered provocative to Iran. Ultimately, in June
1988, the MOD provided British shippers with guidance on when to avail themselves of distress assistance, principally reminding them that such use should be
confined to situations in which their ships were distant from the Armilla patrol.122
The United Kingdom’s public messaging and private diplomacy also endorsed
U.S. operations during PRAYING MANTIS. U.K. officials proved to be unsympathetic audiences when Iranian diplomats approached them to protest apparent British endorsement of the operation in April 1988. For example, the FCO
reported that on 25 April 1988 M. Akhondzadeh Basti, the Iranian chargé in
London, told U.K. diplomats that the attacks had undermined Iranian attempts
to reduce tension. His British interlocutor countered that it was instead Iranian
provocations that had raised tensions, and that the United Kingdom applauded
the U.S. action. He continued that Iran should expect a strong reaction to laying
mines in international waters and dismissed as ridiculous Basti’s claim that the
Americans themselves had laid mines recently. Referring to the chargé’s warning
that U.K. support would threaten the Western world’s economy, he expressed the
hope that this was not a threat.123
London also took diplomatic measures to blunt a potential Iranian-sponsored
UN resolution against U.S. (and potentially all foreign) naval presence in the Gulf
after USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down an Iranian Airbus on 3 July 1988. That
day, London issued a public statement—which Thatcher and Howe repeated—
regretting the incident but noting that it “underlines the urgent need for early
end to the Iran/Iraq conflict including an end to all attacks on shipping.” Cabinet
discussions on 7 July 1988 revealed that Iran had requested a full meeting of the
Security Council and was canvassing its members regarding a draft resolution
condemning the United States and demanding withdrawal of foreign forces from
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the Persian Gulf. Public comment by British officials had stressed the right of
self-defense for U.S. naval forces in the Persian Gulf under article 51 of the UN
Charter, a policy the FCO urged that Britain continue, given the Armilla patrol’s
activities in the Gulf.124
Although the United Kingdom had its own reasons for supporting a naval
presence in the Gulf, its postshootdown diplomacy might have been reinforced
by a note from President Reagan to Thatcher on 11 July 1988. The missive argued
that the UN should not be used as a forum “to undermine our mutual interests
in the Gulf and the Western naval presence there, or as a means to undermine
UNSCR 598 as the basic framework for a settlement.” While inviting Thatcher’s
advice and support, he shared a diplomatic strategy in which the United States
would oppose a resolution that would distract from UNSCR 598. Rather, the
president judged that Security Council unanimity might be preserved better by a
statement from the Security Council president that regretted the accident; called
for an investigation; and, most importantly, urged the earliest implementation of
resolution 598.125
Preparing for the Security Council’s meeting on 14 July 1988 to discuss the
shootdown, the FCO advised its posts that “we are not prepared to let Iran use
the Council selectively. It has flouted the authority of the UN over UNSCR 598
and cannot now expect the Council to address the Airbus incident in isolation.”
London intended to keep UNSCR 598 at the discussion’s center and to refer to
the principles of freedom of navigation and self-defense.126 Following the debate,
the UN on 20 July 1988 passed UNSCR 616, which expressed “deep distress” over
the U.S. attack and “profound regret” for the loss of human lives, but also stressed
the need to end the war.127
THE CHALLENGES OF COOPERATION
The United States was fortunate to have such a good partner as the United
Kingdom during the prolonged and risky tanker-escort regime. Although other
countries reluctantly deployed ships to the region, none were so supportive—or
so critical to achieving our shared diplomatic objectives for ending the Iran-Iraq
War—as our partners in the United Kingdom. The Royal Navy worked closely
with its U.S. counterpart despite national-level reservations and under trying circumstances that foreshadowed those encountered in the more complex coalition
operations that followed.
A few observations about Anglo-American cooperation during EARNEST
WILL are discussed below.
• The U.S. diplomatic record in the 1980s was not persuasive to all U.K. officials, who raised doubts about it in internal memorandums and even in
discussions with the United States. Washington’s allies in Europe and the
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Gulf were sensitive to issues of U.S. reliability following American arms sales
to Iran as part of Iran-Contra and the country’s withdrawal of forces from
Lebanon in 1984 after committing them to the Multinational Force there,
alongside the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. The model that American policy makers offered—international cooperation to clear mines laid
in the Red Sea in mid-1984—was unconvincing to the British officials, who
pointed out that the 1984 effort was a poor analogy because countries in the
Persian Gulf either distrusted Western presence and commitment or were
active enemies, unlike those along the Red Sea.128
• Under domestic pressure to create an international coalition for EARNEST
WILL, U.S. officials at times appeared to be tone-deaf and insensitive to the
dynamics of London’s decision-making calculus. Washington’s demands
probably hardened London’s attitude and its responses to the United States;
its naval strategy in the Gulf did not change, for example, until the cabinet
concluded that the threat to U.K. interests—notably, the safety of the Armilla
patrol and U.K. shipping—had increased rapidly.129 Repeatedly pressing an
ally on the same issue is not necessarily effective, no matter how good the
working relationship.
• The United States might have used a more persuasive, low-key approach in
asking for the minesweeper deployments. When Carlucci met with the cabinet secretary on 3 August 1987, the national security advisor asked whether
it would have been advantageous for the United States to take “informal
soundings” of the British government before requesting the MCMV deployment to the Gulf. Sir Robert Armstrong responded that such informal communications certainly would have been helpful, if time permitted.130
• In meeting with other British officials the same day, Carlucci told them
that he thought the U.S. request for minesweepers—of which he and
Reagan had been unaware—had not been handled very skillfully. Carlucci asked the prime minister whether a request for British naval support
from the GCC rather than the United States would have been preferable.
Thatcher replied that there were advantages in an appeal from the GCC
for international cooperation to preserve freedom of navigation, but she
doubted the GCC countries collectively would request minesweeping. Another possibility would have been to call for international action to remove
mines, but she opined that that step would have been an invitation to the
Russians to get involved.131
• A low-key discussion about potential U.K. minesweeper deployments
earlier and at a much higher level might have been more effective. Instead,
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President Reagan started with a relatively undemanding request for additional bilateral exercises and more publicity about the U.K. naval commitment to the region, but then as regional tensions rose subordinates
requested more. As leaks occurred, both the U.S. request for MCMVs and
the U.K. rebuff received press coverage—to the detriment of both parties.
• British officials were aware of U.S. domestic politics and privy to internal
U.S. debates on EARNEST WILL.132 The sophistication of British policy makers probably contributed to their skepticism about some U.S. argumentation, since the United Kingdom apparently perceived American domestic
politics to be as much a driver of U.S. behavior as an increasingly threatening Iran.
• Both Washington and London encouraged cooperation among local commanders in the Gulf. This allowed de facto coordination, even though at the
time the United States never achieved its original objective of establishing a
formal multinational naval command under its control. In other words, there
were theater-level work-arounds within national constraints.
• Focused as Washington was on the maritime domain of war in a relatively
small arena against a weak adversary, it probably would have found facilitating international cooperation during EARNEST WILL to be a relatively
simple effort compared with planning for an intense, multidomain conflict
against a more robust enemy in the future—conditions that would be found
in many scenarios envisioned, and later encountered, by the United States
and its allies.
Britain’s collaboration with the United States demonstrated the benefits of having
sophisticated, capable partners, but it also reveals the challenges of working in
coalitions, even under the best conditions. To get the most out of such alliances,
U.S. policy makers need to develop as sophisticated an understanding of their
allies as they try to develop of their adversaries.
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BOOK REVIEWS

WAR WITHIN AND WITHOUT
Scratch One Flattop: The First Carrier Air Campaign and the Battle of the Coral Sea, by Robert C. Stern.
Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 2019. 328 pages. $44.99.

The Battle of the Coral Sea often gets
overlooked in history, taking place
as it did a month before the much
more dramatic Battle of Midway and
its exceptionally lopsided outcome.
Coral Sea, though, was the first battle
between aircraft carriers. It also was a
much more even contest than Midway,
with both the Americans and Japanese
losing one carrier. Robert C. Stern sets
out to correct this historical imbalance
with Scratch One Flattop. His book is an
impressive undertaking and certainly will
stand out as one of the more important
books on the Pacific naval campaigns for
a decade or two—or maybe even three.
Stern brings a good deal of experience
to the task, having written numerous
books on World War II naval history in
both the Atlantic and the Pacific. More
importantly, he develops the Japanese
side of this engagement, using the
official Japanese history, the 102-volume
Senshi Sōsho (War History Series). Such
books often are more a compilation of
military documents than an analytical
or narrative account; nonetheless, Stern
is able to develop the Japanese side
of this engagement relatively well.
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As a result, Stern does a good job of
showing the interaction between the
two opposing task forces. What one did
affected what the other could do. He
also understands and shows, without
confusing his readers, that both the
Americans and the Japanese were
operating with incomplete and often
inaccurate information. Other factors got
in the way as well, including sea conditions and other weather-related aspects.
The coverage ranges from the tactical
to the strategic. The stories of individual pilots on both sides often are
quite compelling—sometimes better
than anything Hollywood could create.
Major themes include how technology
often failed the Americans and how the
Japanese failed to anticipate the losses of
personnel that are inevitable in combat
or to plan for their replacement.
Stern rejects the judgment of Samuel
Eliot Morison that Rear Admiral Frank
Jack Fletcher lost the battle at the
tactical level. Fletcher, Stern argues, had
more-achievable orders than his Japanese
counterparts, Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi
and Rear Admiral Chūichi Hara. Stern
sees Fletcher as cautious, inconsistent,
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and unsure of himself—but also lucky,
in that he made fewer mistakes than
Takagi and Hara. More importantly,
the Japanese needed to maintain their
momentum, and that required an
outright victory. Much of Japan’s strategic
failure was the fault of Admiral Isoroku
Yamamoto, the fleet commander, who
did not give his men in the field enough
carriers to overwhelm the Americans
at a time when it was still possible for
the Japanese to do so; instead, it was an
even fight. “It had been his best (and
would prove to be his last) chance to
achieve an easy strategic victory over the
Americans, and he simply overlooked
it. Simply stated, this was a battle the
Japanese could have and should have
won, but chose not to; the opportunity
would not come again” (p. 282).
The book is not unblemished. For
example, Stern seems overly fond of
military acronyms. However, most of
its faults lie with the publisher rather
than the author. At forty-five dollars,
Scratch One Flattop seems to be priced
too high. Moreover, the quality of
maps, photos, and diagrams leaves
something to be desired. Still, all told,
Stern offers an intriguing and valuable
read that will be of interest and use to
students of World War II at all levels.

and, given the complex nature of
this interdisciplinary science, a
challenge that can boggle the mind
(pun intended). Artificial Intelligence
and Global Security is a trim volume
of interrelated chapters, skillfully
edited by Dr. Yvonne Masakowski,
that provides a timely primer on the
moral, ethical, and policy implications
associated with AI. While ostensibly
a book about technology, this is not
a technological book. Rather, Masakowski and the contributing authors
serve up thought-provoking and
relevant discussions that will challenge
the reader’s notions about AI when
juxtaposed against theories of just
war doctrine, individual and societal
morality, and the ethical constraints
and opportunities within the context
of the global security environment.

Artificial Intelligence and Global Security: Future
Trends, Threats and Considerations, ed. Yvonne
R. Masakowski. Bingley, U.K.: Emerald Publishing, 2020. 187 pages. $99.99.

With her education and experience in
psychology and philosophy, and her
recent professorship in the College
of Leadership and Ethics at the Naval
War College, Masakowski is uniquely
suited as editor of this volume. She
has assembled a clowder of established
scholars who are predominantly
trained in ethics and philosophy and
has interspersed a brace of programmatic and technical experts. Together,
these chapter authors examine a broad
swath of philosophical and ethical
issues, including in individual chapters
on the ethical dilemmas of AI and privacy, AI and moral reasoning, and the
particular challenges of AI and space
warfare, as well as several discussions
of future considerations for AI from
both ethical and policy perspectives.

Grappling with the technological,
policy, planning, and ethical issues
attendant to the emergence of artificial
intelligence (AI) is a daunting task

Among the book’s most engaging
chapters, William Casebeer’s discusses
the building of an artificial conscience
and the prospects for a morally

NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES
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autonomous AI. Currently a senior
researcher in human-machine systems
in the private sector, Casebeer’s central
question is whether AI can be used to
develop systems capable of reasoning
through moral issues. He makes an
argument for why we need to build this
artificial conscience soon, given that
AI already is being used in multiple
domains, then goes on to present a
rough blueprint for how to build one.
He describes how a machine with
an ethically grounded and morally
driven conscience may be coming to a
battlefield near you soon—no longer
bearing the tincture of science fiction.
The fulcrum chapter of the book, authored by John Shook, Tibor Solymosi,
and James Giordano on the ethical
constraints and contexts of AI use in
national security and warfare, is likely
to be of keen interest to readers of the
Naval War College Review. This chapter
describes a continuum from “soft”
to “hard” AI based on structural and
functional complexity that is useful in
determining attribution of actions—an
especially critical consideration for
the use of AI in warfare. The authors
contend that with soft AI, the human
fingerprint is evident and attribution is
readily detected, but as AI moves along
the continuum toward harder systems
that are autonomous and capable
of developing intelligence beyond
initial programming, attribution will
become far more problematic. Here,
a HAL 9000–like machine developing
actions and outcomes not intended
by human programmers and resistant
to “exogenous attempts at constraint,
imposition, and control” is the elixir
of science fiction. The value of this
chapter is in understanding the
essential characteristics of AI across
the continuum and in determining
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the bespoke development, application,
and constraints of all forms of AI.
The penultimate chapter of the book,
by Gina Granados Palmer, an interdisciplinary scholar, harvests the detailed
work in the preceding chapters and
develops a comprehensive summary of
the book’s themes. Here Palmer provides a thoughtful assessment of AI’s
overall security landscape and develops
four key considerations relating to
(1) the evolution of near-Turing-test
ethics in the human-machine team; (2)
the creation of short-, intermediate-,
and long-term strategies for ethical AI
development and use; (3) the development of dual-use ethics in relation
to dual-use AI; and (4) the urgent
need for strong ethical foundations to
underpin AI technological advances.
The volume concludes with a forwardlooking epilogue by Dr. James Canton,
a well-known futurist, who highlights
the opportunities as well as the
dangers of AI in the global security
environment. This final chapter, like
the future of AI itself, is simultaneously
hopeful and frightening. As Canton
points out, “we cannot fully fathom”
the full potential—both bright and
dangerous—of an AI-infused future.
He underscores that security at both
the local and global levels cannot be
conceptualized without fully envisioning how AI will evolve—a prophetic
and prescriptive admonition.
Artificial Intelligence and Global
Security is not a compendium of
information on current AI technology and its essential tools; given the
rapidly changing nature of AI, the
usefulness of such a book would be
fleeting and ephemeral. Rather, here
readers will discover a transcendent
and informed exploration of the
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ethical, moral, individual, societal,
and policy issues surrounding AI. It is
the book’s discussion of the enduring
nature of these issues that will be of
value and greatest significance to
the national-security community.
THOMAS CULORA

Six Victories: North Africa, Malta, and the Mediterranean Convoy War, November 1941–March
1942, by Vincent P. O’Hara. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 322 pages. $34.95.

In his latest book, Vincent P. O’Hara
adds to his previous works on the
Mediterranean during World War
II by analyzing the period between
November 1941 and March 1942. He
considers six decisive actions that
changed the tide of the naval war in
the Middle Sea, three of which went
in favor of the British (the actions of
Force K, the battle of Cape Bon, and the
first battle of Sirte [Sidra]) and three
in favor of the Italians (Alexandria, the
loss of Force K, and second Sirte).
The author’s detailed narrative reminds
the reader that the Mediterranean
war was one of naval attrition around
the sea-lanes crossing the theater.
An essential question in Six Victories
is the influence of intelligence on
naval operations. According to O’Hara,
while ULTRA provided critical data on
many occasions, information often
was untimely and was offset by Italian
counterintelligence. O’Hara’s thesis is
not entirely new; Italy’s leading scholar
working on ULTRA, Alberto Santoni,
reached similar conclusions in his 1981
study Il vero traditore, which is not
among the author’s references. O’Hara
claims that the higher ratio of Axis

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1

attacks against British convoys demonstrates that ULTRA did not affect the
operations significantly. The argument
is captious, since possessing intelligence
does not mean necessarily that it is
possible for one to attack; that possibility
was reduced severely for Britain in the
latter three of the “six victories.” However, when the British had the means, as
during the operations of Force K, ULTRA
allowed them to maximize the effectiveness of their limited forces, which were
numerically inferior to the enemy’s
and had fewer bases available to them
in the central Mediterranean. Finally,
the British ratio of success for attacked
convoys was better than that of the Axis.
Six Victories also puts great emphasis
on the consequences of the three Italian
victories. The destruction of Force K
ended a nightmare period for the Italian
convoys, while Alexandria allowed the
Axis to achieve preeminence in the
central Mediterranean. The pinnacle
was the second Sirte battle, defined as an
Italian victory—correctly reversing the
judgment of some British naval historians. Also, according to O’Hara, the battle
proved that the Italian surface fleet was a
credible deterrent, discouraging further
British attempts to resupply Malta (p.
254). Yet while the author’s conclusion
that second Sirte was an Axis victory is
persuasive as far as the destruction of the
enemy convoy goes, it is not so with respect to its consequences. The action did
not discourage further British attempts
to resupply Malta; instead, it encouraged
the Royal Navy to think that light surface
forces were sufficient to meet the Italian
fleet, preparing the way for the disaster
of HARPOON-VIGOROUS in June 1942.
Here the major shortcoming of
the book becomes apparent: not
putting the Italian actions into the
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broader context of the Mediterranean
naval war. If that war’s object was
communications, the Germans
achieved the majority of the tactical
successes that produced operational
and strategic consequences. Even
according to O’Hara’s data, 82 percent
of Allied losses during the period of
Six Victories resulted from German
actions (p. 259). Second Sirte is a
clear example of this; the delay the
Italian surface forces imposed was
not decisive, because it was German
aircraft that sank the enemy ships.
Despite this, O’Hara concludes that
the three Italian victories led to
Axis maritime control of the central
Mediterranean up to November 1942,
broken only by the coming of American naval reinforcements (p. 257).
This conclusion is not convincing.
First, it seems to confound surface
predominance with maritime control.
During summer–fall 1942, intelligence,
air, and underwater predominance—
critical elements of maritime control
during World War II—were in the
hands of the British, enabling them to
disrupt Axis communications despite
enemy surface predominance. Second,
this trend already was emerging
during the first period considered
by Six Victories (fall 1941). Current
Anglo-American and Italian scholarly
work agrees that the increased security
of Axis transports during early 1942
depended on the decline of Malta as an
operative base, itself caused by increasing German air attacks. O’Hara seems
unable to shake this argument, because
he only identifies a chronological connection in the improved situation of
the Axis convoys after the three Italian
victories (p. 127), possibly mistaking
correlation for causation. Surface
preponderance, the main result of the
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Italian victories, could not stop air and
submarine attacks against Axis convoys, Britain’s primary weapons against
enemy communications, which indeed
regained their momentum when German airpower shifted from the central
Mediterranean to assist Rommel.
In conclusion, O’Hara’s book offers a
detailed reconstruction of the naval
actions described, deserving credit
for proving that the effectiveness of
the Italian navy at a tactical level was
better than Anglo-American studies
usually have acknowledged. Less
convincing is the analysis of the
operational and strategic consequences
of the six “victories,” owing to an overemphasis on surface warfare, which
was only a part—and possibly not the
most important one—of the Mediterranean naval scenario in 1941–42.
Readers searching this book for lessons
relevant to modern antiaccess warfare
will need to bear this in mind.
FABIO DE NINNO

On War and Politics: The Battlefield inside Washington’s Beltway, by Arnold L. Punaro, with David Poyer. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
2016. 249 pages. $29.95.

On War and Politics is a remarkable
autobiography. It explores the life
and professional careers of Arnold L.
Punaro, a U.S. Marine Corps Reserve
(USMCR) major general and congressional insider; it also is a remarkable
portrayal of the day-to-day workings
of Congress and the Pentagon, so it
will appeal to a broad range of readers
interested in national-security affairs.
Punaro spent over thirty-five years as
a USMCR officer and worked closely
with the chairman of the Senate Armed
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Services Committee, Senator Samuel A.
Nunn Jr. (D-GA), for almost twenty-four
years. Nunn played an important role
in almost every major piece of defense
legislation and understood the intricacies of power politics inside the Beltway.
Punaro grew up a devout Roman
Catholic, and as a young boy entered
the seminary to become a priest, but
eventually left and attended Spring Hill
College for his undergraduate degree.
On graduation, he started talking to
military recruiters to avoid the draft, because his father warned him, “You don’t
want to get drafted. You’ll go to Asia
as an infantryman, and there’s nothing
grand and glorious about war” (p. 18).
Punaro was particularly impressed by
the sharp uniform the Marine recruiter
wore, so he decided to join the Corps.
Punaro’s dry wit and sense of humor
are evident throughout the book.
Describing his experiences during
Officer Candidate School (OCS) at
Quantico, he writes, “After being
shouted into a haphazard queue, I began
my introduction to the three eternal
truths in the military: hurry up and
wait, endless paperwork, and constant
changes to ‘the word.’” Punaro excelled
at OCS and the Basic School, and after
graduation got his “dream job”: orders to
Vietnam as an infantry platoon leader.
Punaro’s combat tour in Vietnam shaped
the course of his subsequent life. Punaro
starts the book with an incident in which
he almost died. “None of us would come
back the same. Some wouldn’t come
back at all, especially from my area of
operation, which held the dubious distinction of having the most casualties of
any in the combat zone” (p. 26). Punaro
learned well the leadership lessons of
an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam.
“We grew to respect each other, and
my Marines gained confidence in my
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leadership for two primary reasons:
I never got lost, and they knew that
I wouldn’t put them in more danger
than absolutely necessary” (p. 50).
After nearly four months in Vietnam—
almost all in the field—Punaro was
seriously wounded. One of his fellow
Marines, Corporal Roy Lee Hammonds,
attempted to help Punaro but was killed
in the firefight. “I had no doubt that the
bullets that had torn through his protective gear would have ripped me to shreds
had he not thrown himself between
me and the snipers” (p. 55). Punaro
was medevaced to a naval hospital in
Okinawa. He always has remembered
Hammonds’s actions that day.
On his return from Vietnam, Punaro
was assigned to Marine Corps Base
Quantico and became involved in
planning social events for the training
battalion. His wit and humor show
when he describes the art of doing so
in cooperation with officers’ wives.
“It was an early lesson in Washington
ways: if you don’t mind kissing some
butts, you can go far” (p. 62).
After leaving the active-duty Marine
Corps, Punaro entered the University
of Georgia’s Grady School of Journalism. He excelled in his graduate
studies and was offered a job with
Senator Nunn. “Little did I know that
I was signing up for a decade’s tour
on Nunn’s personal staff, and then
another fourteen years on the Armed
Services Committee[—]nearly a
quarter-century with the Senate and the
senator, in one way or another” (p. 72).
Punaro weaves a tapestry of crucial
events in our nation’s history through
different presidencies—those of Carter,
Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush
II—with details available only from
a congressional insider. Moreover,
he gives the reader a front-row seat
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on the development of American
national security under each of these
presidents. “As we wrapped up eight
years of a defense buildup and both
positive and negative developments,
from Iran-Contra to the Gorbachev
era, we thought we had seen it all. But
we could not imagine the tumult the
next years would bring” (p. 150).
Perhaps the best chapter is the last:
“Lessons Learned.” Punaro provides
a short synopsis of important lessons
learned throughout his illustrious
careers in the military, the Senate,
and private business. These are
lessons distilled after a lifetime spent
in leadership positions and working
with other great leaders. He writes,
“If today’s leaders could find the
courage to apply these, they would
be well on their way to solving most
of today’s legislative gridlock, finger
pointing, and failure to act on even
the most pressing issues” (p. 209).
The book is much more than a collection of autobiographical anecdotes.
Punaro and his coauthor provide keen
insights on important national-security
issues in our nation’s history that many
of us have never heard before, told from
a Washington insider’s perspective. This
book is a must-read for young military
officers. I wholeheartedly recommend it.
THOMAS J. GIBBONS

“I Am Determined to Live or Die on Board My
Ship”: The Life of Admiral John Inglis; An American in the Georgian Navy, by Jim Tildesley. Kibworth Beauchamp, U.K.: Matador, 2019. 561
pages. ₤19.99.

This five-hundred-page biography
is longer than many devoted to the
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world’s most famous admirals. One
has to search quite carefully in the
literature on the Royal Navy during
the American Revolution and the
wars of the French Revolution to find
even a passing reference to John Inglis
(1743–1807). During his forty-two
years of active naval service, Inglis
reached the coveted rank of post captain.
Following his retirement from active
service in 1799, he rose by seniority up
the ranks of “yellow” half-pay admirals,
eventually becoming a vice admiral.
The author of this work, Jim Tildesley,
former director of the Scottish Maritime
Museum, has unearthed—with admirable diligence, in more than twenty
archives in England, Scotland, and
the United States—the documentary
evidence of Inglis’s life. The result of
many years’ labor, Tildesley’s book
provides a fascinating and lucid
account that serves as a valuable case
study of a diligent and successful naval
officer who retired as a captain.
From other historians, we know that
two-hundred-some captains were
serving in the fleet during Inglis’s
career, and only a small percentage of
them could rise to flag rank on active
service; then, as now, reaching the rank
of captain meant that an officer had
had a typical successful career. Thus,
Inglis is part of a significant group of
career naval officers worthy of study.
Tildesley follows Inglis’s life and career,
seemingly using every scrap of paper
that relates to him, his family, and his
ships, from log- and muster books
to municipal tax records as well as
newspapers, estate records, letters from
family friends and acquaintances, and
a wide range of official reports. The
result is a remarkably complete view
of an ordinary naval captain’s life.
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Despite being part of a large organization, captains have distinctive careers
and different experiences within the
broad range of activities that define
naval service. From the outset, John
Inglis was somewhat different, having
been born in 1743 at Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, then the world’s
third-largest English-speaking city,
after Bristol and London. John was
the son and namesake of a wealthy
Philadelphia merchant, slave trader,
and slave owner. His father was born
in Edinburgh, Scotland, and settled in
Pennsylvania in 1730, after a period as
a merchant at Nevis in the West Indies.
Young John joined the Royal Navy at age
fourteen in 1757, as an aspiring officer
in the frigate Garland, commanded
by the notoriously ineffective future
admiral Captain Marriot Arbuthnot.
Young Inglis soon deserted his ship,
but family connections to the three
sons of Sir Gilbert Elliot of Minto in
the Scottish Borders resurrected his
career prospects. The eldest of the three
Elliot brothers inherited the family’s
Scottish estates and became a member of
Parliament and a Lord of the Admiralty;
the second became a wealthy merchant
in Philadelphia and married John Inglis’s
mother’s sister; and the third was a
naval officer in his first command.
This last took John Inglis on board and
rated him a master’s mate, a typical
rating for an aspiring officer. Within a
few weeks, Inglis saw his first fleet operations as part of Admiral Sir Edward
Hawke’s squadron in the Bay of Biscay.
Quickly promoted to midshipman, Inglis
remained with Elliot as he moved to a
new command and was with him during
his successful capture in the Irish Channel of the French privateer squadron
under François Thurot in 1760. In 1761,
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fully trained by Elliot, Inglis took his
examination and was commissioned
a lieutenant, then followed Elliot to
the Mediterranean as fourth lieutenant in the seventy-gun Chichester.
Inglis’s career touched on several naval
operations that have a broader interest
beyond his career. Tildesley’s detailed
accounts of these events often provide
valuable new information based on
documentary evidence. They include
coverage of Inglis’s first command,
in 1768, of the eight-gun schooner
Sultana—a replica of which was built
in Maryland in 2001—and his service
in that ship enforcing the Navigation Acts. This included operations
in Chesapeake Bay, where he met
Colonel George Washington, and later
the notorious smuggling operations
in Rhode Island’s Narragansett Bay.
While in command of Sultana, Inglis
was professionally interested in law
enforcement and became one of the
subscribers to the first American edition
of Blackstone’s Commentaries. Later,
Inglis was in command of a ship during
the mutiny at the Nore. He participated
in the battle of Camperdown and was
involved with an attempt to persuade the
Dutch warships under Van Dirckinck
to defect to the British in 1796.
Tildesley’s study of Captain John Inglis
is a notable addition to the literature. His
work complements recent studies, such
as Hilary Rubinstein’s Trafalgar Captain:
Durham of the Defiance; The Man Who
Refused to Miss Trafalgar (2005), Victor
T. Sharman’s Nelson’s Hero: The Story
of His “Sea-Daddy,” Captain William
Locker (2005), and Bryan Elson’s Nelson’s
Yankee Captain: The Life of Boston
Loyalist Sir Benjamin Hallowell (2008).
In his work, Tildesley breaks away from
the Nelson-Trafalgar focus and gives
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a new, illuminating insight through
this case study of a captain’s career.
JOHN B. HATTENDORF

The Greek Genocide in American Naval War Diaries: Naval Commanders Report and Protest Death
Marches and Massacres in Turkey’s Pontus Region,
1921–1922, ed. Robert Shenk and Sam Koktzoglou. New Orleans: Univ. of New Orleans Press,
2020. 400 pages. $24.95.

Living in an information-saturated
world in which social media and
ubiquitous cell phone use allow the
worst atrocities of war to be livestreamed
on a global scale in a matter of hours
can make it hard for us to understand
a time not so long ago when acts of
senseless violence were obscured by
long distances and the fog of war.
In the aftermath of the First World War,
the Ottoman Empire disintegrated into a
bloody intercommunal conflict between
millennia-old Greek communities along
the Black Sea and a new nationalist
Turkish government. There to witness it
was the U.S. Black Sea Fleet, which was
tasked with maintaining the security of
American interests, primarily relating to
tobacco companies and U.S. relief workers, in the Turkish hinterland during the
Greco-Turkish War. As neutral observers
(the United States never declared war on
the Ottoman Empire, despite its alliance
with the Central Powers), the fleet used
this network of contacts to report on allegations of ethnic cleansing and forced
population removal. While the plight of
the Ottoman Empire’s Greek population
on the Ionian coast during the great fire
of Smyrna in 1922 is covered well in previous scholarship, editors Robert Shenk
and Sam Koktzoglou shed additional
light on the fate of the Pontic Greek
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communities of the Black Sea coast,
using the U.S. Navy as the narrator.
The bulk of The Greek Genocide in
American Naval War Diaries uses
condensed accounts from the war
diaries deposited in the National
Archives of American destroyers based
on the Pontic coast to build a body
of compelling evidence of wartime
atrocities. Shenk, who previously has
written more broadly on the region
in America’s Black Sea Fleet, and
Koktzoglou highlight the challenges
naval officers faced in discerning the
ground truth in a wartime environment in which sea power stopped at
the shoreline. The accounts capture
the conflicting narratives heard, the
incomplete information available, and
the sense of impotence felt by U.S. naval
officers with no sanction to intervene.
Using the naval war diaries as the
backbone of the narrative and
supplementing them with testimony
from American businessmen and aid
workers, Shenk and Koktzoglou make
the case that elements of the Turkish
government were involved in a direct
effort to carry out what is defined in
the modern era as genocide against the
Greeks of the Pontus region. The war
diaries detail a series of forced removals
of the military-age males of the local
Greek population conducted by Turkish
forces, often resulting in reports of mass
killings. Furthermore, the naval diaries
present accounts brought by internally
displaced persons and American aid
workers from the interior of Anatolia
detailing the wholesale destruction
of Greek villages, ethnic cleansing,
and mass rape. Coupled with these
stories are discussions with Turkish
government officials outlining their
justifications for such extreme tactics,
as well as the uncertainties USN officers
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faced regarding the true extent of the
killings and Turkish motivations. Some
of the accounts from survivors of the
mass killings and rapes are not for the
faint of heart, and underscore the sense
of powerlessness felt by the commanders
of the Black Sea Fleet, who, despite their
possession of state-of-the-art weapons
of war, could do little to stop the chaos.
That is not to say that USN officers
stood by and did nothing. The war diaries provide several portraits of heroism
by officers attempting to avert further
bloodshed and the great professional
risks some destroyer captains incurred.
One account in particular highlights
the power one officer can have when
compelled by humanitarian virtue. Captain Arthur L. Bristol Jr. of USS Overton
risked his future career prospects by
sending a well-timed letter to compel
his commanding officer, Admiral
Mark Bristol (no relation)—who had
a well-known affinity for the nationalist government—to issue a formal
complaint to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
over the planned forced removal of
noncombatants. This likely spared the
lives of twelve thousand Greek women
and children. In multiple accounts, we
see naval commanders struggling to
define actions and concepts for which
they had no words: genocide, ethnic
cleansing, and a nascent sense of the
responsibility to protect. We witness in
these accounts the internal struggle
of U.S. naval officers caught between
the promise of America’s new global
role and the limits of that promise.
The Greek Genocide in American
Naval War Diaries is a compelling,
primary-source resource for scholars
seeking to understand the human face
of sea power in the twentieth century.
MICHAEL IMBRENDA
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“Vincere!”: The Italian Royal Army’s Counterinsurgency Operations in Africa, 1922–1940, by
Federica Saini Fasanotti. Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2020. 224 pages. $44.

Most military historians are familiar
with the colonial histories of Spain,
France, Italy, and Great Britain on
the North African littoral (along with
Belgium in the Congo, as well as
Germany and Portugal in southwest
and southeast Africa). This recent work
considers in detail the experience of
one of these participants as it appears
from eighty years of retrospection.
With a title that can be read as conquest
or victory, the book deals with the
timely topic of low-intensity conflict in
Africa in the first part of the twentieth
century by a European power: Italy’s
Royal Army in Libya and Ethiopia
(or the Kingdom of Abyssinia). These
were campaigns fought to pacify the
coastal regions and interior. It is not a
surprise—with success in the global war
on terrorism and the “Long War”—that
something is familiar in these colonial
campaigns fought within the same
locations, terrain, and populations as
today’s. Yet while tactics, techniques, or
procedures might be similar, the policy
and strategic goals were very different,
as were the actual results of the conflicts.
The study divides logically into
two stand-alone parts, the 1922–31
campaign in Libya and the 1936–40
campaign in Ethiopia. Introductions
and conclusions provide context for
each campaign; sections on acronyms
and personalities, as well as glossaries
and notes, support the narrative. The
well-written narrative also provides
after-action lessons that are of interest to
current efforts in the region. One theme
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from these campaigns is that the army
and air force units that conducted initial
offensive operations had to be replaced
by locally raised forces to perform
subsequent pacification and occupation
duties. This required leaders with language and cross-cultural skills prepared
for a long commitment to their assigned
theater. In both campaigns, firm
defensive bases and mobile columns
were used in conjunction with rudimentary mechanization and air support
that matured as the campaigns continued—all experiences similar to those of
the U.S. Marines in the small-war era.
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visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC. This is her
fifth book, here translated (with only
a few anomalies) from the Italian
by Sylwia Zawadzka. Based on Saini
Fasanotti’s ten years of study in Italian
archives and on-the-ground research,
“Vincere!” provides original insights that
even now will be of interest to those
responsible for these regions. It serves
as an example of applied history that
can be a practical tool to inform policy,
tactics, procedures, and techniques
in more-contemporary operations.
CHARLES D. MELSON

Saini Fasanotti earned a PhD at the
University of Milan and is a senior
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RESPONSE TO “PEAK OIL, PROGRESSIVISM, AND JOSEPHUS DANIELS,
1913–21,” BY ROGER STERN, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 73, NO. 4
(AUTUMN 2020), PP. 139–66.

Sir:
In his article, Dr. Stern describes “the management of an imaginary oil-scarcity
crisis by Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels.” He attributes it to claims by
Interior Department scientists that the United States soon would run out of oil
and to the Progressive “ideology” of using the power of the federal government
to mitigate or eliminate actual or “ostensible” crises (p. 139).
Readers owe Dr. Stern thanks for digging into this issue, especially for his
use of the papers of Mark L. Requa. Requa directed the “oil section of a wartime
agency called the U.S. Fuel Administration” (p. 147) and served as a sort of liaison
officer for the Petroleum War Service Committee, “a voluntary body composed
of industry executives” (p. 146).
However, readers also deserve to have a clearer idea of what Secretary Daniels
was thinking. In testimony to the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of
Representatives on 29 January 1914, Daniels revealed that he had been influenced
by a statement made in the British Parliament by Winston Churchill, the First
Lord (civilian head) of the Admiralty. Daniels quoted at length from Churchill’s
statement, in which the First Lord had explained to the House of Commons why
the Royal Navy was switching from coal to oil, and therefore why the British government needed to have a reliable, secure source or sources of fuel oil.
As Churchill noted, oil-burning warships could sustain a higher speed than
could coal-burning ones. In addition, for the same weight of fuel, oil gave the
Royal Navy’s ships greater range. Oil-fired ships also were much easier to refuel,
and it took many fewer sailors to tend and maintain their boilers. In sum, “there is
one great special advantage which oil confers upon the British fleet which would
not be enjoyed by any weaker naval power—I mean the special advantage to the
strongest navy of not being forced to leave its fighting position in order to refuel.”1
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After explaining the advantages of oil fuel and the need to stockpile it in
quantity, Churchill turned to the issue that both the British and the American
governments faced: price. The oil producers primarily were private firms; as
such, they responded to changes in supply and demand in the petroleum market
by adjusting the price of fuel oil and other petroleum products. What these firms
wanted and needed was the flexibility that an open market gave them. However,
what many major consumers of petroleum products wanted was price stability;
to get it, they negotiated long-term supply contracts. The result, explained
Churchill, was “that the oil market in future years is going to be greatly divided
up and pegged out among different consumers,” which made the policy of relying
on annual procurement contracts high risk. As he said, “Our stake in oil-burning
ships is becoming so important that we must have the certainty of being able to
buy a steady supply of oil at a steady price.”2
The oil producers needed market flexibility; the Royal Navy needed the
certainty of an affordable supply. How could these different positions be
reconciled? Churchill’s proposed solution to this problem had several parts.
One part was that “the admiralty should become the independent owner and
producer of its own supplies of liquid fuel.” As he put it to the Commons, “I do
not myself see any reason why we should shrink, if necessary, from entering this
field of State enterprise.” Another part was “that we must become the owners or,
at any rate, the controllers at the source, of at least a proportion of the supply of
natural oil which we require.”3 Was this socialism? No. “[W]e are moving toward
that position of independence outside the oil market which is our ultimate policy
to secure.” After all, if the Royal Navy’s dockyards provided a “check on private
constructors,” why could not the Royal Navy act to guarantee a reasonably priced
supply of oil fuel for its ships?
These arguments by Churchill were the same basic arguments that Daniels
gave to the House Naval Affairs Committee. Indeed, the fact that the Royal Navy
was acting to secure a supply of oil was reason enough for Daniels to want to
secure as-yet-untapped oil supplies in California. Churchill had told the House
of Commons, “We are, or soon shall be, able to draw oil from Burmah [sic],
California, Persia, Texas, Roumania [sic], Borneo, Egypt, Mexico, and Trinidad.”4
Daniels did not want to risk being unable to draw on California oil; he did not
dare place the Navy in the position of having to go hat in hand to the British to
purchase oil at exorbitant prices from sources they controlled.
The U.S. Navy was shifting to oil from coal before Daniels was confirmed as the
Secretary of the Navy—and even before the British made the decision to switch
to oil themselves.5 Daniels therefore found himself in the position of trying to
meet a rising demand for oil from the Navy—his Navy—while watching other
major consumers negotiate long-term contracts with producers. As Churchill
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understood, the problem was not just the availability of oil; it was also the price.
Daniels could foresee a situation in which the high price of oil could constrain
not only the ability of the U.S. fleet to deploy but even its size. Churchill had laid
out a plan that could serve as a model to head off this potential crisis.
Daniels laid Churchill’s comments before the House Naval Affairs Committee
in January 1914 so the committee’s members could think about what the British
government was doing. In August 1917, Congress passed the Food and Fuel
Control Act (PL 65-41), giving the federal government the authority to control
the distribution of food products and fuel. As Dr. Stern pointed out in his article,
that was the legal basis for Secretary Daniels’s efforts to place some California oil
off limits to foreign purchasers.
As Dr. Stern argued, Secretary Daniels may have acted during and immediately
after World War I on the basis of incorrect scientific advice to secure California
oil supplies for the U.S. Navy. However, I believe that the evidence shows that
what also prompted him to take this action was less a “Progressive” ideology
than a sincere desire to protect the Navy from a form of price gouging. Daniels
watched what the Royal Navy was doing and understandably chose to follow its
lead in controlling sources of oil.

TOM HONE

NOTES TO MR. HONE’S LETTER

1.	
Hearings before [the] Committee on Naval
Affairs of the House of Representatives on Estimates Submitted by the Secretary of the Navy,
1914, 63rd Cong., p. 671 (1914) (statement
of Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy),
quoting Winston Churchill.

3.	Ibid.
4.	Ibid., p. 671.
5.	See Norman Friedman, U.S. Battleships: An
Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1985), pp. 104–105.

2.	Ibid., p. 672.
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Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program
Manager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading
Program.

S

ince 2006, the President of the Naval War College has functioned as the
executive agent for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP). The dean of the College of Distance Education has provided
oversight, with this author serving as the program manager. (The Reflections on
Reading article that appeared in the Winter 2021 issue of the Naval War College
Review detailed how a new slate of book titles was generated recently for the
CNO’s consideration.) After a review of recommendations and the incorporation
of additional input, on 23 February 2021 CNO Admiral Michael M. Gilday, USN,
released his update to the CNO-PRP. The updated book list can be found on
the CNO-PRP website at www.navy.mil/CNO-Professional-Reading-Program.
Portions of the following text are adapted from the Navy press release that announced the launch of the new program.
The goal of the program is to help sailors extend their personal and professional development beyond their primary designators and ratings. “It is critically
important for our Navy to be a learning organization,” said Gilday. “One of the
very best ways to do that is to foster an environment where every Sailor deepens
their level of understanding, learning, and leadership skills. That’s why this book
list is so important. . . . Make no mistake, to outthink our competitors today, we
must study and apply lessons we’ve learned from our past.”
With a motto of “Read well to lead well,” this updated reading list aims to do
the following:
• Enhance professionalism and improve critical thinking skills
• Foster a deep appreciation for naval and military history and heritage
• Increase knowledge of joint war fighting and strengthen sailors’ ability to
make sound judgments
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• Develop a greater appreciation of the views of others and a better understanding of our changing world
• Encourage discussion about the maritime profession and the ever-evolving
role of sea power in this day and age
The CNO-PRP list includes fifty-three titles organized into four key lines of
effort: Readiness, Capabilities, Capacity, and Sailors. Additionally, the works are
subdivided into tiers—foundational, advanced, and capstone—indicating which
books are most appropriate during the various stages of a sailor’s career.
Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy (MCPON) Russell Smith identified
twenty-one additional books as suggested reading. “Reading is a fundamental
staple in the growth and development of any leader,” said Smith. “For this list,
the titles included were methodically chosen in order to provide a specific focus
on targeted areas for reinforcement, a focus that will provide enlisted Sailors the
greatest benefit given our role in the organization. A focus on team dynamics,
seeking innovative solutions, leveraging the incredible strengths inherent in the
diversity of our enlisted force, and the virtues of altruistic service to a cause greater than ourselves—these are the things that enable the enlisted force to execute
the vision of our commanders, leading to unit success and our Navy prevailing
in combat when called upon.”
Together, the CNO and MCPON lists offer a variety of writing categories and
genres. They include works of fiction and nonfiction, and span topics ranging
from the expressly military to strategy, management, technology, and more.
Most of the seventy-four books are available at no cost to sailors in both
e-book and digital-audio formats from the Navy MWR digital library collection.
Directions on how to sign up for an account and access these books are available
at the CNO-PRP website, and eligible patrons can download the books at www
.navymwrdigitallibrary.org.
By design, some of the recommended books may be considered a bit controversial. Gilday has written, “While I do not endorse every viewpoint of the books
on this reading list, I believe exposure to varied ideas improves the critical thinking skills of our sailors.”
The fifty-three titles in the CNO’s portion of the newly revised, fifth iteration
of the CNO-PRP and their respective authors are as follows:
Army of None
Artificial Intelligence Basics
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy
Burn-In
The Character Gap
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss2/1

Paul Scharre
Tom Taulli
James R. Holmes
P. W. Singer and August Cole
Christian Miller
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Deep Thinking
The Dichotomy of Leadership
Ego Is the Enemy
The End of Grand Strategy
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Garry Kasparov
Jocko Willink and Leif Babin
Ryan Holiday
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski

Fearless

Eric Blehm

Fed Up

Gemma Hartley

The Fifth Domain
The Fleet at Flood Tide
Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat
Fortune Favors Boldness
The Future of Violence

Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake
James D. Hornfischer
Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
Barry M. Costello
Benjamin Wittes and Gabriella Blum

The Future of War

Lawrence Freedman

Genius Weapons

Louis A. Del Monte

Ghost Fleet
The (Honest) Truth about Dishonesty
How to Be an Antiracist
Human Compatible
The Inevitable
The Infinite Game
Just and Unjust Wars
The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors
The Leader’s Bookshelf
Leaders Eat Last

P. W. Singer and August Cole
Dan Ariely
Ibram X. Kendi
Stuart Russell
Kevin Kelly
Simon Sinek
Michael Walzer
James D. Hornfischer
James Stavridis and R. Manning Ancell
Simon Sinek

Matterhorn		

Karl Marlantes

Military Ethics

George Lucas

Mindset
Neptune’s Inferno
The New Jim Crow
The New Rules of War
The Next 100 Years
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Carol S. Dweck
James D. Hornfischer
Michelle Alexander
Sean McFate
George Friedman

185

180

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 2, Art. 1

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

No Ordinary Disruption

Richard Dobbs et al.

No Pity		

Joseph P. Shapiro

One Nation under Drones

John E. Jackson

Our Robots, Ourselves

David A. Mindell

The Perfect Weapon
Red Star over the Pacific

David E. Sanger
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes

The Road to Character

David Brooks

Sea Power

James Stavridis

Seapower

Geoffrey Till

The Second Most Powerful Man in the World
Sexual Minorities and Politics
Six Frigates

Phillips Payson O’Brien
Jason Pierceson
Ian W. Toll

Start with Why

Simon Sinek

A Tactical Ethic

Dick Couch

Tiny Habits
Toward a New Maritime Strategy
We Can’t Talk about That at Work!
What It Is like to Go to War

B. J. Fogg
Peter D. Haynes
Mary-Frances Winters
Karl Marlantes

The next Reflections article will highlight the twenty-one books in the
MCPON’s suggested reading list. As the CNO and MCPON say: “Read well to
lead well”!

JOHN E. JACKSON
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